AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000500040030-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: April 20, 1955
• Content Type: BRIEF

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roved Bgr9RAJ 9/09/11: CIA- 890AON5v DQ30=5 55
ANISTAN
Approve
1. Afghan-Pakistani crisis currently stale-
mated; next move by Afghans is key to
further developments.
A. Crisis began with 29 Mar belliger-
ent pro-Pushtoonistan speech by
Afghan prime minister Daud (see
background on Pusht4 problem).
1. Daud predicted "disorder" be-
cause of Pak merger Western
provinces into single unit.
.
B. "Disorder" arrived on schedule--in
next three days, there were riots
in Kabul (which wrecked Pak embassy),
demonstrations in Kandahar, Jalalabad
(where Paks have consulates).
C. Foreign observers agree "disorders"
government-inspired: numerous signs
advance preparatio~nnlFtnE lT1~~
$EE REVERSE FOR DECLASSIF C QN_____
 ffiV i~i 7r
Ap roved For Rel~ppe 2 t1 A- PtM`r w9ereOwo0rkG of Daud.
1. Probably effort demonstrate his
strength, enlist support.
2. Daud under growing pressure to
curtail his program of increased
economic ties with USSR.
II. Early reports said "local Soviets" had
incited rioters.
A. This raised fears that USSR, after
yea,r-long economic penetration pro-
gram, was becoming openly involved
in situation.
B. Strong Pak reaction also raised
spectre foreign intervention from
that quarter.
1. Paks made reprisal attack on
Afghan consulate Peshawar 1 Apr.
2. Pak government suggested to US
that Daud and whole Afghan royal
family be removed.
-2-
UU 14 FLDLNTIAL
Approve
 Ap
roved For Release4D00/09/11 YC( 090A00050QA40030-5
C. Finally, "disorders" were followed
by reports that tribal elements in
both Pakistan and Afghanistan were
on move toward Kabul--raising possi-
bility of major tribal unrest.
M. However, present situation offers pros-
pect for peaceful solution--at least in
short run.
A. Tribal movements squelched, no sign
of immediate recurrence.
B. Situation in Kabul, other Afghan
towns quiet; government apparently
in full control.
Danger of Pak intervention, over-
throw royal family, apparently subsided
1. Pak officials say t4ey will not
act without consulting US.
2. paks now doing utmost maintain
quiet atmosphere in Pakistan.
D. Reports of Soviet involvement not con-
firmed, and prospect for intervention
,I~E 1 IA
unlikely.
Ap
For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RD 00890A000500040030-5
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a few press and radio releases
favorable to Afghans.
2. One press report (NY Times'
Callahan, from Karachi) now
admitted by writer to be "in-
vention" to give fresh lead to
old story.
E. Actual Soviet aim believed long
range economic penetration.
1. Value of forcefully seized Afghan-
istan to USSR probably not worth
risk of alienation neutralists
(including India), or risk of
speeding Western arms aid to
Iran, Pakistan.
2. Only direct intervention by Paks,
or chaos created by tribal up-
rising, likely to change Soviet
view.
Approved
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A. Weight of present scanty evidence sug-
gests Prime Minister Daud will be "dis-
ciplined" to save face of country,
royal family.
1. Delay in action.indicates royal
family reluctance to remove him.
B. "Disciplining" would consist either of
removal from office or retention on
promise of good behavior.
1. If Daud removed, situation likely
to return to normal.
2. If Daud remains, either as victor
of struggle for power or on suffer-
ance, short-range outlook probably
still not alarming.
3. Daud probably cowed somewhat by
strong diplomatic protests over
March incidents: also worried over
fact that all tribal movements fol-
lowing incidents were toward Kabul,
rather than Pakistan, with looting
of Afghan capital_allegedly upper-
Aporo
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seApQ9,NWHrSM94R IIWIWJ19W"5 803(bg-
cause headstrong Baud likely eventu-
ally to act in manner inimical to
West, despite any promises he may
give royal family.
1. In next few years, death or in-
capacitation of aging royal
uncles will remove last restrain-
ing element on Daud, permit him
to control government by domi-
nating king.