I.IF MOSCOW DOES TEST A NEW WEAPON AT THIS POINT, WHAT WOULD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000600010066-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 66
• Content Type: BRIEF

. If Moscow does test a new weapon at this point, what would
There exists possibility that Moscow believes its mani.
festations of strength made earlier this year have slip;
background and that the world believes it has been
forced by internat weaknesses and the effective Western
of strength to seek a modus viveudi through
negotiations.
(1) Beginning with Molotov's 8 February speech, in which
he claimed the USSR had nuclear superiority ,1( th',
Sino-Soviet bloc's "position of greats
regime has emphasinerstrength" in comparison to
the US. This was w
interpreted in the West as
a reversion to Stalinist policy.
(2) However, the flexibility and reasonableness shown
by the USSR in reaching an Austrian treaty, the
Belgrade visit and the invitation to Adenauer made
it apparent that the new regime was even more con-
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ciliatory than it had been under Mal vkov--hey*De
the "position of greater strength" annunciated by
Moscow earlier this year lost its impact. It never
=caught on," either in the US or among its allies.
(3) The USSR is sensittve about appearing to be lead-
ing from weakness at the conference, and might
vast to exhibit its strength to the world.
Soviet leaders may believe that their military
parades and fly-bye staged earlier this year
have been insufficient.
(4) Against this background, the Soviet leaders may
have decided to renew their effort to impress
the United States and its allies by conducting
blicity around Summit conference time.
nuclear weapons test, with attendant
(5) The Soviet leaders, like the ars , do not
always make "rational" moves which, in Western
nian, would best serve their aims, Their
heavy.handedness has caused them to lose much
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P
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that they might have gained by greater restraint.
With a man like Khrushchev now prevailing a
the Soviet leaders, it possib:
marked lack of restraint might manifest itself
in a decision to explode a nuclear weapon at or
near conference time.
ii. Assuming that such a test actually takes place, what would
be the political repercussions?
A. The political significance would depend mainly on the
use made of it by Bulganin and Moletov at the Summit
talks.
(1) Its immediate effect would undoubtedly be bad.
West, and even such 4*aeutrals" as India,
would interpret it as brandishing a
over the heads of the Western delegates.
b. The entire Soviet propaganda campaign preceding
the conference, whdch has contrasted Soviet
concessions with western "positions of strength,"
would be upset.
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-4-
(2) Nevettheless, if the stet leaders soft-Peddled
the talks and used restraint in
ganda coverage of the tests:
public awareness of its ear
strength" idea without serious
conciliatory posture
the contereece
position
for
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