CURRENT JAPANESE TRENDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000700050011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 15, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 15 May 1956
CURRENT JAPANESE TRENDS
1. Japan is in a period of political transition both at home
and abroad. It is trying to form a foreign policy which will balance
Japan's close ties with the United States against expanded relations
with the Communist bloc. This drive stems from a rebirth of nationalism.
This nationalism is primarily a desire aimed at pursuing policies
which the Japanese believe to be in their interests and not necessarily
in the interests of the US. While their basic policy calls for
continuing cooperation with the US, they want to remove American
"dominance" over Japan.
2. On the domestic political scene, the merger of the two
major conservative parties to form the Liberal-Democratic party last
November has provided an opportunity for effective government. This
is impeded, however, by continuing factionalism
3. Hatoyama
will not be
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prime minister much longer. Shinsuke Kishi, the party's secretary
general and a leading contender to succeed Hatoyama, believes the
party's position will be consolidated by next fall at which time the
conservatives will be ready to go ahead "powerfully" under firm
leadership to implement their program. But he may be too optimistic.
4. Factionalism centers on the succession problem. It colors
dfficial positions on all issues; an example being the division-within
the government on policy toward the USSR. One potential successor
group favors a soft policy, the other a firm stand. influential
politicos give the impress that the dilemma is 25X1
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simply beyond their power to solve. There is an additional felling
that "destiny's
will bring
about a solution. In any case, Japan's future international orientation
largely depends on the outcome of this struggle.
5. Japan is enjoying a minor boom economically, due primarily
to a favorable world export market and a mild deflationary policy
at home. Prices are stabilized, production double the normal prewar
years. The Japanese could probably get along under present world
trade conditions without special American expenditures, if they are
willing to tighten their belts.
6. The substantial rise in Japan's foreign grade during the last
two years has made Japan less dependent on the United States economically
and therefore under less pressure to accept American Far Eastern
policies. A rising g population will increase Anspen requirements, but
these can be partly offset by increased productivity and changes in
Japanese food habits. It is believed that Japan's foreign trade will,
over the next few years at least continue to rise sufficiently to meet
growing import requirements and possibly exceed them. Some leading
ja e',ese -Y l %-I ;s erro-,eons r6 assu?,,e i-/ / fdpd.~ ,'s s // c~e
nomists P nae,,f
on American
aid. 19 orre ,
The feeling of nationalism is also strongly reflected
in regard to foreign investments, and the government's policy on foreign
capital has become increasingly severe. Unlike American economic
thinking, the Japanese do not think in terms of an expanding economy,
hence they regard foreign investment as merely cutting the pie a
little thinner.
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7. Two potentially serious irritants to US-Japanese relations
are the movement in the United States to restrict imports of Japanese
textiles and the implied boycott against Japanese goods embodied in
recent South Carolina and Alabama. legislation. They point out
bitterly that their textile sales to the United States last year
amounted to only about 1 percent of American domestic production
and that overall they buy twice as much from the United States as they
sell. They believe the South Carolina and Alabama legislation a
violation of the US-Japan FCN treaty.
8. The rebuff of Japan's bid for membership in the United Nations
was a bitter blow to Japanese pride. Japanese reaction soon exposed
a strong undercurrent of official and private opinion critical of
"over-dependence" on the United States. Some Japanese advocated "going
to Moscow" to achieve Japan's desires, since the United States had
failed to deliver. The Japanese are also more sensitive toward US
nuclear activities than toward those of the USSR.
Regarding Communist China, the
Japanese feel we are frustrating their desire for normal trade
relations with the mainland. They feel that the CHINCOM restrictions
are not only too severe, but that the differential between the
restrictions on the Soviet bloc and China places Japan at an unfair
w%ose expar/s Jo
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Western European nations
Edslern {crepe", rao('ans Can 6e 1rdnSSti.)t~eel /, Cli:na
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9. The Japanese are moving to improve their position in China
trade and strengthen economic ties with the mainland without unduly
irritating the United States. They plan to exhibit embargoed goods
at trade fairs In Communist China this summer and fall; they plan to
carry on trade through the increased use of exceptions, and to press
for a reduction of the Chicom controls. They have indicated they
will support the American position in CHINCOM-COCOM in return for certain
concessions in the form of reduced controls.
10. The Japanese have indicated they feel a policy seeking to
isolate Communist China is wrong, since it serves only to drive Peiping
and Moscow closer together. They say that the fact that China has made
economic progress despite this isolation proves that the policy has not
been effective. They believe that the only way to drive a wedge between
Communist China and the USSR is to broaden China's contacts with the
West, particularly through trade.
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I I
13. Actually, the Japanese government, while ostensibly attempting
to restrain the popular trend for relations with the Communist Chinese,
has apparently encouraged unofficial contacts with Peiping and permitted
the conclusiob of private trade and fishery pacts and a postal arrange-
ment now appears imminent. In addition there has been a growing stream
of Japanese visitors to the Communist bloc countries including Diet
missions, trade delegations, cultural and labor missions. Japan led
in the number of visitors to China this last year--over 847 according
to the Peiping "Peoples Da,ily." In turn, an increasing number of
Chinese have come to Japan, miter b94-0 Vile Me
14. The complementary Chinese Communist effort is based on the
belief that Japan is a key nation in East Asia and they are endeavoring
to push the Japanese toward a neutralist position. Peiping's first
objective has beenfa weaken ties between Tokyo and Washington and
prevent inclusion of Japan in any Far East security organization. The
Communists have repeatedly stated they are eager for government-to-
government relations with the Japanese but have thus far avoided placing
heavy pressure on Tokyo for diplomatic recognition. A combination of
Soviet pressure on fishing acfivity in waters north of Japan and the
negotiations of a non-professional diplomat, Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry Bono at Moscow appear to have advanced Tokyo well on
the way toward the restoration of diplomatic relations with the USSR.
Kono, who with Hatoyama favors a. soft line toward the USSR, informed
Ambassador Allison pk.lbr to his - re for Moscow that the Japanese
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cabinet, other than the foreign minister, did not understand the
Russians. He said he intended to explore Soviet thinking on Japan so
he could present the real facts to his colleagues.
15. Kono appears to have approached his mission with the utmost
amiability toward the Soviet terms. He was highly flattered as the
result of being the first Japanese to enter the inner fastness of
the Kremlin to see Bulganin. In an interview broadcast to Japan from
Moscow, Kono stated he had revised his approach to the fishery problem
because of "the very understanding attitude of the Soviet side." At
Moscow this week, Kono signed the long-term fishery and sea, rescue
pacts which depend on the restoration of normal relations and the
resumption of suspended peace treaty discussions? resume no later than
31 July. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, following signature of the pacts,
stated that his government must decide on the formula for rester ing
relations with the USSR. Bulganin last week told Kono that this might
be done either through a peace treaty or by merely exchanging diplomatic
representation. Tokyo will probably now begin to prepare the Japanese
public for the ultimate establishment of ties with Moscow on rather
unfavorable terms.
16. The fact that the Japanese and Soviets were able to resolve
a mutual fishery problem on the basis of conservation may further
irritate Japan's long standing dispute with South Korea over tie Rhee
line which excludes Japanese fishing activity on international waters
adjacent to Korea. The Japanese have resented American advice to
protest Soviet and Chinese Communist seizures of their fishing boats
while they receive no assistance in stopping similar South Korean acts.
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17. Growing nationalism is prompting Japan toward an increasingly
assertive attitude toward the United States and steps to diminish
what the Japanese consider an excessive American orientation are under-
way. Concurrently, Japan is moving toward expanded relations with
the Communist bloc and attempting to strengthen the nation's inter-
national stature by developing closer ties with the Afro-Asian nations.
Japan desires to remain a part of the free world but wants a more
important place; the Japanese 91trongly feel their adherence to American
policies cannot be taken for granted and that they must participate
in and be convinced that policies for the Far East benefit their
interests. While Japan is moving toward a position of neutralism,
it is felt it will stop short before adopting the policies of India,
Burma and Indonesia.
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