PAKISTAN - - AN ALLY WITH LIABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000700060006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 14, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000700060006-8
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DATE=. REVIEWER:
PAKISTAN--AN ALLY WITH LIABILITIES
_].4 June 1956
For the past two months, 25X1
an increasingly vicious struggle for 25X1
internal power in that country, a. free-for-all that has now become
front-page news.
A. Pakistan has considerable potential as a Free World ally;
it is one of the world's two largest Moslem nations--population
76 million a member of the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, and is one of
the West's most outspoken allies in Asia.
B. However, Pakistan's three major liabilities--the country's
chronic political instability, the serious malfunctioning of its
economy, and bitter quarrels with India and Afghanistan--are
dangerously reducing her value as an ally.
2. The first of these liabilities--political instability--has
been on the rise ever since the 1951 assassination of Prime Minister
Liaquat Ali Khan, the able politician who had kept a. tight rein on the
Moslem League, Pakistan's only significant political force in those
early days.
A. In contrast to the politically able Liaquat, Pakistan's
present leaders--such as President Mirza, and Prime Minister
Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, former civil servants, and Gen. Ayub, an
army professional--belong to a tradition of rule that gives little
thought to popular support. These leaders have lost control
of the Moslem League, and the League, in turn, has lost its
position as Pakistan's main political force.
A*ONFIDIUMAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000700060006-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000700060006-8
B. The result is political structure made up of fragments
AN'Be
(chart): Mirza and Chaudhri forced to develop at least an
appearance of popular support by means of alliances--in West
Pakistan, with the newly-founded Republican Party, and in East
Pakistan, with the irresponsible United Front.
C. Today, the right o' each of these patchwork alliances to
rule its province has been challenged (by the Moslem League in
West Pakistan, and by the Awami League in East Pakistan). The
Republicans have managed--at least temporarily--to weather the
challenge in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, however, the
struggle for political control of the province is still unresolved.
D. As a result, some changes seem likely in Pakistan's national
leadership within the next few months. The most probable change
appears to be Chaudhri's replacement as prime minister? 1ar3
. uhrawa.rdy, national leader of the Awami League; or
Amjad Ali, the Finance Minister and former ambassador to Washington;
or ustaq Gurmani, the governor of West Pakistan. In the mean-
time, Pakistan's domestic and foreign policy and the nation's
administration will probably continue to be hamstrung by factional
strife.
8. One present example of Pakistan's second liability--its
malfunctioning economy--is provided by near-famine conditismns in East
Pakistan and the probable beginnings of a food shortage in West Pakistan.
Pakistan was a, food surplus area in pre-partition India, but today food
shortages have come to be annual occurrences.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000700060006-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R00890A000700060006-8
A. As in the past, the Pakistanis have responded to this
year's famine threat by turning to the US fpr emergency assistance,
and Karachi is now requesting 900,000 tons of relief food.
B. Besides this perennial food problem, both Pakistan's
relatively undeveloped industry and its shortage of foreign exchange
keep the prise of most manufactured goods beyond the reach of the
average Pakistani consumer. With am increasing population, even
the most optimistic of Pakistan's long-range economic plans
envisions little but the maintainance of present low living
standards.
4. Pakistan's third liability--a preoccupation with its disputes
over Kashmir and Pushtoonistan
A. As an example, Karachi plans to "return" the Kashmir dispute
to the UN in July--just after Nehru's visit to the US. This
Pakistani action will probably provoke intensification oft Indian
press attacks on us--including the charge that we have established
air bases in the Pakistani-occupied portion of Kashmir.
B. Pakistan has insisted that both the SEATO and Ba.ghdad Pact
heir communiques statements on the Kashmir
dispute, and that SEATO also give bow support on the Pushtoonistan
question. This has resulted in vigorous protests from both India
i57AA/ . h%D Qielu AM A *f 94' 6C SMSTANea' Ta 'TMOMC
and Afghan charges that the two US-supported pacts are directed
against them.
C. A rash of border clashes with India early this year, as
well as two major Afghan border incidents in April and May, have
sharpened parallel and more valid Indian and Afghan fears that
Pakistan's US-supplied military equipment may someday beised
against them. President Mirza, meonwhile, has protested American
a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R00890A000700060006-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R00890A000700060006-8
investigation of the possible use of US weapons in these border
clashes.
D. Pakistan has also increased pressure for speeded-up
delivery of US arms. Prime Minister Cha,udhri has candidly told
our Ambassador that he needed early delivery of a light bomber
squadron to offset India's possible acquisition of British
Canerra bombers.
5. Pakistan's domestic problems and regional squabbles, moreover,
a on in
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Karachi finds it expedient to
I'E& ties with the USSR and Communist China.
A. Internationally, there is considerable belief in Pakistan
that Soviet support of India and Afghanistan is a sort of "punish-
ment for Pakistan's strong pro-Western policies and therefore that
modification of these policies might buy the USSR's neutrality or
even support on Kashmir and Pushtoonista,n.
B. Domestically, the economic crisis has made it difficult
for the government to resist Bloc trade overtures. On 23 May,
Karachi "gratefully acdeptedt' a "free gift" of 40,000 tons of
grain from the USSR, while the unreliability of coal imports from
India has inspired a, Pakistani agreement to buy 425,000 tons of
Chinese coal during 1956. Finally, the need to dispose of Pakistan's
cotton crop has prompted the foreign minister to request US approval
to export 412,000 bales (or double last year's exports) to
Communist China, in 1956.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/17: CIA-RDP79R00890A000700060006-8