DISORDERS IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000800020005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 5, 1956
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING
DISORDERS IN NORTH VIETNAM
I. Hanoi has recently admitted that a "counterrevolutionary up-
rising" had occurred in North Vietnam.
A. The uprising occurred during mid-November in a Catholic
population center near Vinh, some 160 miles south of Hanoi.
It was suppressed only after troop reinforcements were
sent into the area.
1. The approximately 1,000,000 Catholics remaining north
of the 17th parallel have long constituted the most
likely source of resistance to Communism in North Viet-
nam.
2. The disorders seem thusfar to have been confined to
the rural population, both in Catholic and non-Catholic
areas. They were apparently inspired by peasant dis-
25X1X6 satisfaction with the Communist land reform program.
25X1X6
confirm Hanoi's guarded admissions
of popular disaffection.
25X1X6
1. Viet Minh
leaders are "at their wits' end."
25X1X6 2. discontent is also
very strong in Haiphong, North Vietnam's pjimary perm -,
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3.
"How can I get to South Vietnam?" is a most common
25X1X6
`I.
question asked of foreigners.
the regular army
(267,000 troops) remains loyal to the Viet Minh regime.
II. The Viet Minh leadership was reshuffled in October, on the
grounds that "mistakes" had been committed in land reform.
A. Truong Chinb, longtime Communist secretary-general, lost
his post and was replaced by Ho Chi Minh (now both chair-
man and secretary-general of the Party, and no president
of the government). However, Truong Chinh retains his
membership in the politburo and still appears prominently
on public occasions.
B. Two other leading Communists were dropped from their posi-
tions in the politburo and central committee.
and were forced out of government jobs as vice-ministers
25X1X6f Agriculture and Interioir respectively.
A. However, the Viet Minh leaders--strong supporters of the
Moscow line--are fully aware of East European developments,
and their reaction has been conditioned by this awareness.
the population of North Vietnam
appears to be almost totally unaware of recent events in Hun-
gary. Thus, the recent disorders seem to have been triggered
by internal problems, rather than events abroad.
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B. In mid-November, the cabinet promised a "democratization"
program, involving elections in 1957 and reforms in the
legal system.
C. In domestic broadcasts, they are now declaring that "im-
portant lesSpns}" will be drawn from the "Hungarian situa-
tion" and that the leaders will now "pay adequate attention
to the people's living conditions."
D. At the same time, the Viet Minh leaders are cautioning
against an "excess of democracy" that could be exploited
by "enemy saboteurs."
IV. In summary, the prospect is for continued disaffection in North
Vietnam, and further disorders are a strong possibility.
A. However, the regime itself--supported by a loyal army--is
in no immediate jeopardy.
B. The contrast between continued progress in South Vietnam/_
and popular discontent in the North will weaken bw*t i Viet
,8v-TN
Minh efforts -A to undermine the Diem government and to effect
unification on Communist terms.
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