BACKGROUND: SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00890A000800090034-3
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 8, 2002
Sequence Number: 
34
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 9, 1957
Content Type: 
BRIEF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00890A000800090034-3.pdf112.36 KB
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Approved For Release 2002/01/ C`TA! P79R0089OA000800090034-3 9 July 1957 BACKGROUND: SOVIET FOREIGN OFFICE Repercussions of the purge may affect the Soviet foreign ministry but most of the ministry's personnel probably feel reasonably secure in their jobs. A. Foreign Minister Gromyko may be the most vulnerable. 1. He was one of Molotov's right hand men for almost a decade. 2. He continued as First Deputy Foreign Minister under kepi l ov . Gromyko, however, is a foreign policy technician rather than a policy maker and he in not likely to have opposed Khrushchev's policies. In fact, he probably stayed pletely aloof from political machinations. C. His appointment an Foreign Minister seems to have been agreeable to Khrushchev. 1. He was named to the post by the Central Committee in February 1937 at a meeting dominated by ghrushehev. 2. If he has kept his nose politically clean in the recent Kremlin power struggle he may continue to be Eesa rata to the top leadership. Control of personnel appointments in the foreign ministry since Stalin's death appears to have been exercised by the collective leadership as a whole rather than by Molotov ertighepilov_ agg_ne1 Approved For Release 200 T;MMA --RDP79R0QP9qQP4?Q800090034-3 Approved For Release 200 79R0089OA000800090034-3 A. Molotov's prestige and political standing were progressively undermined until he probably had little influence on diplomatic appointments for some months prior to his replacement by Shepilov in June 2966. 1. None of the men affected by personnel actions after ok over appears to have had any special relationship with him. 2. Six of the top eleven positions in the ministry and 17 of the 50 ambassadorial posts are now held by men transferred since Stalin's death from leading posts outside the ministry, principally high level party jobs. The conclusion, then, is that few, if any, Soviet diplomats are likely to carry any stigma because they worked in the ministry when Molotov or Shepilov were minister. The possibility remains that some of them became involved in the sinister plot of the "anti-party" group. If so, less nights now are only the prelude of things Approved For Release 2002 O ; : CJA-RDP79R0089OA000800090034-3