INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900010016-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 1999
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: September 11, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

. Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900010016-0
NSC BRIEFING
11 September 1957
I, Outcome of "National Roundtable Conference" now meeting in Djakarta
may well be decisive in determining whether Indonesian unity can
be preserved.
A. President Sukarno and former vice.president Hatta are
participating as "chief advisers" to the conference and
representatives of all provinces--including Lt. Col. Hussein
of Central Sumatra and Lt. Col. Sumual of North Celebes--are
present.
B. There is very little optimism in Djakarta that conference-will
be successful, although many share hope of Premier Djuanda
that it will produce a more "congenial atmosphere" for the
settlement of outstanding problems at a later date.
C. Government-drafted agenda is extremely broad and vague, ap-
parently designed to avoid head-on clashes between conferees;
Djuanda's opening speech also platitudinous.
II. Unlikely, however, that such basic issues as provincial demands for
restoration of Sukarno-Hatta cooperation, greater autonomy, Sukarno's
program for "guided democracy", increasing threat of Communism and
reorganization of the army can be kept under the rug.
A. In recent tour of East Indonesia, Sukarno pulled no punches
in denouncing regional leaders, plugged his program, and was
uncompromising in demanding the maintenance of a highly
centralized form of government.
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B. Hatta, in a 2 September press article, reiterated his opposition
to Sukarno and asserted that Indonesia's leadership rather than
its system of government is responsible for the country's
present difficulties.
1. Although two leaders did not shake hands when conference
opened, they have since held a secret meeting which probably
will have important bearing on conference's outcome.
C. Indicative of provincial leaders attitude is statement byi3outh
Sumatra commander, Lt. Col. Barlian, at preconference meeting
of dissidents in Palembgg in which he denounced "ungodly group
who are moving to gain control of the state with the purpose
of establishing a dictatorship."
III. Some Indonesian leaders fear that an impasse between Sukarno and
the disaffected leaders will develop and prompt Sukarno to take
"drastic action" to enforce his views. 25X1C
A. disaffected leaders are
prepared for such an eventuality.
25X1 C
1. Sumatran leaders have decided
to establish an emergency government independent of Djakarta.
2. They had first considered taking the step after learning
of Communist election victories in Java, but decided to
postpone it until after the conference.
3. Sumual of North Celebes reportedly will support the Sumatrans,
IV. In contemplating separatism, the Sumatran commanders undoubtedly are
banking heavily on Sumatra's oil--along with rubber and tin--to keep
them in business.
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A. This oil is now being produced by three Western oil companies,
two of them American (Caltex and Stanvac); the third is BPM,
a Dutch subsidiary of Shell.
B. The oil companies are still paying revenues to Djakarta, and
Sumatrans undoubtedly hope that once they achieve full
autonomy these revenues would be retained locally.
C. Petroleum products account for 20 to 26 percent of value of
Indonesia's total exports; of this, Sumatran oil accounts for
approximately 85 percent.
1. Reserves in proven fields in Sumatra are estimated currently
at about 1.2 billion barrels; the geological features of
the island, however, are such that chances are believed
good for additional major discoveries. (For comparison,
proven reserves in Middle East total 145 billion barrels.)
2. One competent oil executive thinks it safe to estimate that
reserves of over 20 billion barrels could be established.
However, prospecting has been prohibited by the
Indonesian government.
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