Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 1999
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Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 21, 1957
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00890A000900010022-3.pdf124.22 KB
Approved For Release 2001/03/0'4 : CIA-RDP79RO08 NSC BRIEFING 21 September 1957 SOVIET LEADERSHIP I. Khrushchev's current position may be somewhat uncomfortable; 25X1 C indications are that some resistance to his leadership remains despite big victory in June and apparent strong support in Central Committee, 25X1 C A. he wants to get rid of Bulganin, Voroshilov, and Suslov but that he can't secure the necessary majority in the presidium. 25X1C 25X1 C states that Khrushchev is not popular in party circles, where it is doubted that he will be able to keep power for long. 25X1C C. "Khrushchev isn't feared nor loved, In the party apparatus he is still regarded with some contempt,' 25X1 C Khrushchev has lost face with the public as a. result of the June purges, 25X1 C the working people there reacted angrily to the June purge and talked openly about demonstrations. They are said to have booed Khrushchev during his visit to Leningrad for its 250th anniversary 25X1 C received information that the people in Brest were openly critical of Khrushchev and in favor of Malenkov. He claimed that similar reports hadI ?L or..c? ^r.:rsr r:o. been received from other Soviet cities.r Approved For Releas&?nni /mind _CIA-Rrlp79 EDA990A0 600 Qq pp AUTN Vy REVIEWER 372044 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00890A000900010022-3 25X1 C many Soviet citizens are depressed, cynical and distrustful of the present party leaders, III. This changing climate may put Khrushchev under pressure to tighten up. A. One method would be to ty to create a. new wave of popular indignation against the "opposition." B. However, drastic action against Malenkov or other members of the "anti-party group" would not appear to be in Khrushchev's best interest, 1. It would knock the props from under Khrushchev's campaign platform of de-Stalinization, 2. Old fashioned punitive measures could also touch off a wave of terror that might be impossible to control. 3. His economic program would undoubtedly be severely jeopardized, IV. A Stalinist type purge, then, if it materialized, would probably mean that Khrushchev is leading from weakness. A. He may fear that Ma.lenkov, in particular, may become a rallying point for new opponents in the future. (Recent information tends to confirm Soviet claims that Malenkov has been sent to Kazakhstan to head a. hydro-electric station,) B. Yet if he attacks opposition for complicity in the purges of the thirties, he will not be able to hide his own dirty hands. C. However, army may be pressuring him to set the record straight on the purge era. A few purged army leaders have been mentioned favorably recently (Tukha.chevsky, Bluecher). Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00890A000900010022-3 -2-=. 00000 Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0089OA0009000100 ON- ie ? V. These problems may be coming to a head. 25X1 C A. another Central Committee plenum may convene soon. B. Khrushchev is still on vacation, however, but is expected to return to Moscow shortly. 1. Aneurin Bevanr,who saw him at Yalta. on 17 September, claimed that Khrushchev appeared preoccupied with internal affairs, Bulganin (who reportedly became linked with the opposition) is about to be dropped as Premier and that Mikoyan is considered the most likely candidate to take his place. Approved For Release 2001/03/04:C IA-RDP .R9fl890A000900010022-3