NORTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900020018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2008
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 15, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900020018-7
NBC BRIEFING 15 October 1957
NORTH AFRICAN PROBLEMS
I. The continuing Afgeria.n rebellion remains the issue about which all
major North African problems revolve.
A. Tempo of rebellion appears--as claimed by French officials--
to be substantially slower than during December-January peak.
Nevertheless, constant recruitment appears to maintain strength
of rebel "professionals" at 20,000 to 30,000 men while training,
equipment and logistical support are all improved over a year
ago. There is some indication rebels may be girding for
sensational offensive to coincide with UN debate next month.
supplies
sources.
cbspite vigorous efforts by
seal Algerian borders, rebels still obtain substantial
from external 25X1
1. This due to widespread procurement facilities of Egyptians
and transit facilities afforded by Libya, Tunisia and
Morocco. Most important channel appears to be overland
route westward from Egypt through Libya--where Kubaar
government now increasingly cooperative.
2. Main arms sources are Egypt and Western Europe. Some Czech
material reportedly identified. An apparently unsuccessful
attempt was made this summer to deliver a major shipment
of Czech arms
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I I
3. Soviet arms are not known to have reached rebels yet,
It is believed that nothing larger than relatively small
mortars and bazookas have been received.
C. French military strength remains constant at 400,000 men.
II. Most immediate Tunisian problem: Paris' refusal to supply promised
arms for small, ill-equipped security forces and intercession with
NATO allies to prevent sales to Tunisia.
A. Long-standing situation became acute with 1 September clash of
French army unit based in Algeria. with Tunisian border guard,
Subsequently, Tunis on 4 September requested "urgent assistance
of US in procuring small arms for internal defense.
1. Thereafter, some 13 violations of Tunisian territory by
French army and air force has contributed to acute popular
tension.
2. Well disciplined popular demonstrations 4 October permitted
some popular steam to escape, but situation remains explosivE
B. Paris--which considers Bourguiba.'s support for Algerian rebels
too blatant--sees no sense of urgency; may still hope by
withholding arms force Bourguiba to cut down aid to Algeria;
caretaker government refuses to allow arms shipments.
1. Italy--most logical arms source--ready to sell, but unwilling
to risk complications in relations with France.
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2. Spain--in line'with new policy of closer collaboration
with France on North African issues--a.iso playing along
with Paris.
3. President Bourguiba has assured Tunisians he has commitment
from US that he would get arms this month.
III. Morocco: No border clashes similar to Tunisian and Libyan incidents,
French well aware of aid to rebels and fact that Moroccan King-- 25X1
on 20 August 1957 for first time declared full support for Algerian
independence. Paris, however, considers Moroccan aid to Algerians
more "discreet" than Tunisian.
A, Moroccan-French relations have improved somewhat since Moroccan
ambassador was recalled a year ago. Nevertheless, relations
are disturbed on many issues.
B. King and most Istiglal leaders are cool toward Egyptian
overtures; yet 72 Egyptian teachers--51 more than last year--
will have considerable impact on Moroccan youth.
1. Egyptian school--attended by some 200 Moroccans--held in
building evacuated early this year by US 17th Air Division
headquarters at insistence Moroccan government.,
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C. Moroccans closely observing Tunisian arms situation; if
Bourguiba, succeeds in breaking away from French supply
monopoly, Morocco likely to try same tactics. Has already
indicated desire for American military assistance.
IV. Libya.: Recent events appear to foreshadow future difficulties in
Libya's relations with the West.
A. Preliminary approach made on 21 September for renegotiation
of American base rights, using alleged Soviet offer of
assistance as a lever.
French attack on 3 October stirred anti-Western feeling.
1, Libyan government requested British military assistance
following French attack on Algerian rebels taking refuge
across the Libyan border.
2. Public demonstrations in Bengazi on 6 October demanded
reassessment of Libyan agreements with France, Britain,
and the US.
3. French now report Franco-Libyan consideration of border
commission to prevent recurrence.
C. Egyptian effort to exploit Libyan avarice and fear continues.
1. Six armored cars and quantity of light weapons presented
to Libyan royal guard on 14 October, accompanied by a.
small Egyptian training mission.
2. Egyptian cooperation with Soviet mission in Libya continues,
and pro-Egyptian elements exist in government at all levels.
V. UN debate on Algerian issue carried largely by Tunisia and Morocca
on behalf of rebels--not likely until late November.
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A. Algerian gambit of proposing negotiations between France,
Morocco, Tunisia, and Algerian representatives to solve
Algerian problem within a "North African" context is bid
for maximum support in UN.
B. Present indications are that demand for "right to independence"
will be soft pedalled, but independence is still goal.
_5_
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900020018-7
 Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900020018-7
Approved For Release 2008/06/27: CIA-RDP79R0089OA000900020018-7