COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A000900080006-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 11, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 11 April 1953
I. Leadership one of the most self-assured in bloc.
A. Mao crows that "tue east wind is prevailing over the west wind."
B. Regime has intimidated last year's critics.
C. Peiping now poised for "giant leap forward" in economic
development.
II. Soviet missile successes gave important morale lift to Peiping,
buttressing its belief in wisdom of Sino-Soviet alliance.
A. Chinese hailed Soviet achievements as "turning point" in the
East-West race.
B. In Moscow last November, Mao indicated he supported Khrushciv
in latter's bid for leadership.
C. Mao sided more generally with Russians rather than with Pole:
on intra-bloc relations.
D. Chinese delegations in Moscow at that time probably exerted
pressure on Moscow for obtaining advanced weapons.
III. Peiping energetically pushing for international acceptance.
A. Chinese troops being withdrawn from Korea as promised.
B. Peiping calls for international meetings requiring Chinese
Communist participation, e.g., conference on Korea, collectiv3
peace pact for Asia, Asian atom-free zone.
1. Peiping interested in participating in Sumjp.t conference,
but not demanding it.
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C. Peiping skillfully exploits trade issue to draw other coun?rtes
into official relations.
1. Sino-Japanese trade agreement provided for permanent Ptuu.ping
trade office in Tokyo with right to fly flag.
D. Peiping promotes impression of dynamic China by its ability to
extend aid to other underdeveloped countries.
1. Grants to bloc countries (North Korea, North Vietnam, (inter
Mongolia, and Hungary) total $740,000,000.
2. Grants and loans to nonbloc countries (Ceylon, Cambodia.
Indonesia, Yemen, Nepal, Egypt, and Burma) total over
100,000,000.
E. Peiping's talk of "liberating" Taiwan has dropped off.
1. But it still insists that Taiwan belongs to Communist China.
Adamantly rejects "two China's" solutions.
2. Charges US encourages "two China's" concept as way out
of its China policy impasse.
3. Chou En-lai stated privately Peiping would refuse UN
membership if Nationalists also represented.
IV. Domestic policy marked by reversion to hard line after short-lived
liberalization experiment in first part of 1957.
A. Fervor of criticisms by intellectuals suprised regime.
B. Regime reacted by campaign of intimidation but no mass executions.
C. Government shakeup resulted in ousters of non-Communist critics,
including three men at cabinet level.
D. Party purge now under way expected to expel up to five percent
of membership.
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V. Peiping has redoubled effort in mass indoctrination. Adoption of
phonetic alphabet is step with long-run significance.
A. Campaign will not be completed in near future.
B. But regime intends to push relentlessly for eventual wide use of
Latin alphabet to replace complicated ideographs.
C. This will help Chicoms lick problem of illiteracy.
D. It will promote national unity and simplify administration.
VI. Overt resistance to regime virtually disappeared.
A. Ethnic minorities--notably Tibetans--are the exceptions.
B. However minority dissidence does not require large scale military
operations, Minorities inhabit vast area but are few in numoer--
only 6% of the population.
C. Private enterprise in towns virtually eliminated.
D. Bulk of peasantry has accepted collectivization despite
disillusionment with promises of better living.
VII. On economic front, Peiping has just celebrated the "triumphant
materialization" of First Five Year Plan (1953-1957).
A. Plan targets by and large achieved, petroleum and edible oils
being principal exceptions.
B. Many new items--trucks, jet and conventional aircraft, naval
vessels--were produced for first time in China.
VIII. Draft of Second Five Year Plan not yet completed, but indicatio_ir
are that tentative targets already being upped.
A. Slogan is to surpass UK in output of steel and other indust.^ial
products in 15 years or less.
B. Plans for current year are ambitious, yet Peiping already e;--
tracting pladges of substantial overfulfillment.
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IX. Regime seems increasingly cognizant of population growth as
impediment to rapid industrialization.
A. Regime finds itself forced to divert investment funds to
agriculture--is investing 40% more in agriculture this yea:_? than
last (although still only 14% of total investment).
B. Investment in industries supporting agriculture up sharply.
C. Despite ideological antipathy to Malthusian theory, Peipin,gr
now urging birth control, but not yet forcefully enough to
arrest rapid population growth.
X. Peiping's prospects heartening to bloc.
A. Chinese Titoism improbable in foreseeable future. Moscow ,ti_ert
to Chinese sensibilities, and Peiping highly vocal in endorsement
of USSR.
B. With or without formal diplomatic recognition, Peiping will, ex-
pand official relations with other countries.
C. Regime's control over population should be further consolidated.
1. Mao's death could result in struggle for succession, but
collegial leadership will probably govern initially.
2. Liu Shao-chi (#2 man in party) and Chou En-lai (premie7-)
are now top figures after Mao; but watch Teng Hsiao-ping
(secretary general of party) who has come up rapidly.
Defense Minister Peng Te-huai also powerful.
D. Economg should do as well under Second Five Year Plan as under
first. Agricultural production is expected at least to keen
pace with population increase.
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