IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001000040011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 13, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

Document No. NV
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NSC BRIMPING
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? Government stabltty in Iran depends on an sbaolut. monarch who
lacks popular support. We are worried that militant nationalism
of Arab World might encourage similar sovements in Iran
A. Senior military leaders would with few exceptions probably
remain loyal to the Shah in the event of an attempted coup*
but the loyalty of the junior officer , is in doubt. Many junior
officers: are dissatisfied with the lock of opportunities for
adVancement.
1. The Shah has begun an. investigation to locate potentisi
plotters in the Army.
2. Poisible conspirators may have to cover themvelves
better from the failure of General Valiolish Gharami,
former G-2* who was arrested last March for conspiracy
against the Shah.
3. *be Shah may be considering the eventual removal of all
combat type units from Tehran leaving only the reinforced
imperial guard on the theory that without combat troops
a coup is less likely.
S. Discontented educated urban groups and the seat-literate urban
lower classes are dissatisfied with the government's graft*
inefficiency* and repression and associate the Shah with
the-swabs es, although be desires rapid reforms.
C. Shah* however* is slow to make reforms because of his fear of
losing support of conservative wealthy class and refuses to
conciliate nationalist groups. Thus: a change of regime*
possibly through vieteicemest inevitable.
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D. The Communist Tudeb party, outlawed since 1949 is still
active especially in Abadan 'And in Tehran, despite the best
efforts of the Iranian security forces. Current Tudeb strength
bas been estimated at 7,000, but this figure is questionable.
II. The VAR and the USSR are putting increasing preasure on Iran,
particularly through subversive rialto troadvests?
A. LIAR radio propaganda efforts are directed at aro ng Kurdish
nationalism among the 800,000 Kurdish tribesmen in northwestern
Iran.
1. There are many rumoro regard thg Arsb and Sotbt sponeored
agents being sent among the Kurds to plot against the Shah.
B. USSR through a clandestine bro* ting station in Leipzig is
calling for the overthrow of the Shah.
C. The Iranian Government in taking measures to reduce the possible
effects of this propaganda among the Kurds, but we do not
know how successful these measures are.
Tb. Shah continues to show signs of fearlgrAtiler
8182:111421traP;
and ba e requested American help in keeping him informed of
opposition lane
Approved For Release 2002/02/12 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000040011-0