TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001000050027-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: September 18, 1958
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC ISFI x i$ Uptewb r 195
TA IWAN
1. 'We have Just received word that the Chinese Com aunisto used
aircraft and PT halts is two interdiction action this earning.
A. According to fragmentary advance reports, the first action
took place near Tungting Island (a small ligtthouse rock
about IS miles south of Mission and 7-S wiles Iron the nearest
mainland point). A Nationalist convoy eenroutee there was
fired on by coast artillery which bit and disabled one
escort ssubehaser. The co my reported that it was under attar-
fey C nist PT boats and the subchaser to said to have
requested Navy assistance. At last report,, the Wationali 4c
had dispatched aircraft to the scene, acnee of thew arced
with bombs.
The initial report on this action also said that a Comonai
SIG fighter had strafed a Rationalist shi
lee the Communists have need aircraft for interdiction,
two to three eflilea south of Women. This so 14 be the first
Without the fall story, it is difficult to soap what the
COMMMIets are up to.
I. One possibility to that they want to es phaaiue their
strength and aggressiveness an the second session of
talks gets underway in Warsaw.
iping governuent has publicly rejected any idea of
a negotiated cease fire.
NSA, NAVY reviews completed
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This morning's Peiping Peoples Dally states: ire is
no ap estiou of 'ceasssseftre' since China and the United
States are not at war." The 66 authorities know that our
troops at the Amoy-Q remay front have blockaded Qnsavy
with heavy artillery fire and that the Chiang Kai-shek
troops there are faced with the danger of oxhavatti
their supplies of food and asesnitios. The Americans
are therefore seeking a so-called ceasefire to stave off
our attack in order to reinforce the Chiang Ksi..ahok
trams, afford then a breathing spell, and obstr;
a of the offshore islands."
appears to have been writ
one a I
rel Chines, Coassrunist leaders,, aim* says that
whom the situation "sway at any event explode into a
tween the United states sad China, it to most
these convoys in the belief that now Nationalist methods have
it. V It is also possible that the Chino" Cem"nistss have attic
and war provocations against Chi
Taiwan Straits area and di tinu e its aiiits
urgent that the United States *kip Its deploys
their interdiction is still quite effective.
I. Altogbther aims 23 August only 594 tons have been 1
2. The Chinese Nationalists' estimate of daily requirooeat*
of supplies of all categories is about 700 tarns; we
estimate that their minus requirement is 300 tons a ,day.
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in breaking the G out artillery blockade of Chiooses.
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a gltrs` isoa' B si t i Oss will become cr it iCs 1. in leases
The Cht;
* mouth it the blade is not broken. Chiang Kai. e h
told Airs1 moot as 18 September that it the US- tiO*a1i5t
lies did not show ear d improveaeseat
capability to land seep
in fise days, "drastic stops iaa&ld have to be taken."
1. is these irc ets*ce*. there is danger that the Chines*
jWtioaalit.te will initiates action against the C is to
a. a deaperation measure ? Thine is the further danger
as
that they sir7 take steps designed to provoke he ttlit tea
b etr 'a the US a amid C nisst Ch'n&'
2. Chiang 8si-shek still asserts, ho eaver
live up to his C131 sitar -t not to attack the as
Without prior a onsu1istioas with the Va.
Y I . Soviet public support of Peiping continues. llhra $bchew' a warsi
ttach
that "an attack on the Chin.as People's pi blft -rim as a
Soviet pew ,
on the Soviet Union" bee been strose ed -
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Intelligence hoard completed Its estimate of
$ ime -$oviet intent ions with rem t to Taiwan two days
ago. we concluded that:
A. The Chinese Cvmsntiste will very probably saintaln
of Chiara while the talks are
in naistaiuing the Interdiction it is likely that the
Chin Communists are willing to take actions ia-
volving considerable, risk of as for armed conflict with
the W,
if 95 ships sows close inhere is the courseof
escorting Nationalist supply convoys, the Communists
will probably not desist from their artillery
barrages against unloading operative,
2. If the 05 attempts to prevent by force the inter-
diction of supply, forces so engaged will alms
certainly be attacked within the limits of Masse
Geist capabilities,.
If the 95 were to asseunce that it would resupply
Chimes with all-American convoys (supported by
app griata combat strength ready to defend against
attack) we believe that the Cbisese diets would
probably attack the 0 force, although there is P
chance that they mould not.
C. In addition to the continued interdiction of Ck#asen, the
Chines. C lists night seise,with little or no warning,
one or mare of the smaller offshore island
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We do not believe, however, that they ld deliberately
challenge the lid militarily by assaulting any of the
ss of fshere islands in the sear future. They probably
re the islands will fall or be ceded to then Is
any Came9
to the Soviet side, the Iatelligenco Board estimated
that the Soviet public an amitaent to support the Chia COS.
nuniotsi hike intended to deter the 115--nsa almost certainly
,made on the basis of calculations that activities is the Taiwan
area sonld fall abort of provoking= iaterventio>u on such a
to Call for overt Soviet military participation.
believe that the Soviet leaders have coned in
Communist actions in the Strait area.
3. Their principal objectives are political--to d credit
the =, to Comply with the wishes of their Chinese ally,
and to enhance the power and prestige of the Bloc.
C. They also belle" that if the 98 backs down from its post-
ins or acts in defiance of world opinion, they will have
ed a serious political defeat on the iid .
hove that while the Soviets probably do not wish to see
the scats of hostilities mpasded and the risk of their inrolve-
uo~t saga ifi?d, they Will be aware that the a way b* led by
Sens: communist actions to *"A" C114-1 ss C+ mmist forcees.
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a scale, of increasing damage
and danger to the Chinese regiaae, the Soviets nit directly
attack SS forces engaged in China, including the bamm fros
which such forams were operating, in the face of the atten-
dant risk of general war.
VII. To suma rise our view of the situation, I would sag thins:
gardlesa of their calculations, the Soviets have permitted
Coostst China to net in nation a train of events which
neither of the. can bring under control without retroa
has gives
position. At the sass tins the Soviet Union
ist China what appears. to be an ivocal
wise of wtUtary Support.
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