MIDDLE EAST
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00890A001000080011-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 21, 2004
Sequence Number:
11
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 5, 1958
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 182.98 KB |
Body:
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5 esber l9W
1IEVIA EAST
rags situation is the area's cost critical,
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some likely Qlasiz will rely sore heavily than over
on Cossuaists, who are his ss.Jor so rce of organised
-r" support.
approached us or, as far as we know, any
Lilies for support. JkrLtloh apparently expect
serious trouble and are considering evacuation of their
nationals iron Iraq.
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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2.
Iraqi civilian sentiment is almost certainly diri
attitudes toward Nasir and association with , although
there, is so real anti-Sasir sentiment.
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is not wielding
the influence behind the scenes which he and his supporters
pad and expected be would.
While General Abbud's regime apparently intends to defend
Sudanese interests vigorously and has given clear-cut
approval to the proposed American aid program, it also feels
compelled to make friendly gestures toward Nasir and to adopt
some of the postures of the Arab neutralist bloc. (Sudan has
recognized Communist China.) %JN1
As in Iraq, further changes the Sudanese gove rtuzent
likely as the new regime shakes down, and as eles
the picture try to regain some of their influence.
There appear to be difficulties ahead in Libya, where we have
our large wheelus Field airbase.
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In Sudan, situation, still unsettled following army coup there.
A. Prime Minister Khalil,
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Crown Prince and a cumber of relatively pro-Herter
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i
Libyan officials are disgruntled over ldsrissse; failure to
move against subversive elements or to give them pow
to do so.
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the Libyan
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IV.
situation is aasically unstable and the death or disability
of the ling would very likely trigger an attempt by pro
Wassir and pro-Soviet *lsaeats to setae power.
Premier K bo ar on 30 November publicly promised to ry o
renegotiate the LibysaAAneriean aid and base agreements.
f*bssr said privately he v ants a straight rental arrangement
ling misayn is still hanging on
government
lifted aartial iav 1a an effort to give itself a psychoiogt+sl
boost.
A. never, essentially equivalent powers remain in effect.
t cbanc. to prove that the ( can "do something" to
ease pressures on Jordan.
eraser too seem to have troubles, especially in Syria where
. Meanwhile, gussyu is giving the UN representative in Aaoame
simesasemen and landlords have been dismayed by eeforcement of
land reform and by other Zgyptian-inspired economic policies.
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Ly in sasw
this gr nblt.
teals his regime has not been
Nacir last week outlined his rtsi
possibly because I.*
irwhere lately,
the i as a
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"democratic socialist" society, emphasizing econmdes
development and lacing his speech with statistics.
-ring sane speech, he again bitterly attacked the U,
claimed privately that because of "leans" to the Americata
press of his attitude toward Iraq, he could never again
deal frankly with US represontattres.
Rasir subsequently has indicate d through an
ary that he wishes to buy wheat from the
rather than the UBSR. Ambassador Rare has been instruc
to follow up this approach in order to toot the reality c*
Hasir's long-standing assertion
with us.
Israel may be adopting a sore belligerent attitude o
border problems.
Decision to take 3 December clash wi
a rolat ns
Syrians to SR
looks like building a record to which Israelis can point
it they should later decide to sake direct "retaliation.
Air and army attaches in Tel Aviv have reported grow-
ing sentiment in Israel's army recently that some type
action required.
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