MIDDLE EAST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00890A001000080011-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 21, 2004
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 5, 1958
Content Type: 
BRIEF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00890A001000080011-6.pdf182.98 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000080011-6 5 esber l9W 1IEVIA EAST rags situation is the area's cost critical, 25X1 some likely Qlasiz will rely sore heavily than over on Cossuaists, who are his ss.Jor so rce of organised -r" support. approached us or, as far as we know, any Lilies for support. JkrLtloh apparently expect serious trouble and are considering evacuation of their nationals iron Iraq. DIA and DOS review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001000080011-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001000080011-6 25X1 j 2. Iraqi civilian sentiment is almost certainly diri attitudes toward Nasir and association with , although there, is so real anti-Sasir sentiment. 25X1 is not wielding the influence behind the scenes which he and his supporters pad and expected be would. While General Abbud's regime apparently intends to defend Sudanese interests vigorously and has given clear-cut approval to the proposed American aid program, it also feels compelled to make friendly gestures toward Nasir and to adopt some of the postures of the Arab neutralist bloc. (Sudan has recognized Communist China.) %JN1 As in Iraq, further changes the Sudanese gove rtuzent likely as the new regime shakes down, and as eles the picture try to regain some of their influence. There appear to be difficulties ahead in Libya, where we have our large wheelus Field airbase. Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001000080011-6 In Sudan, situation, still unsettled following army coup there. A. Prime Minister Khalil, 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001000080011-6 Crown Prince and a cumber of relatively pro-Herter 25X1 i Libyan officials are disgruntled over ldsrissse; failure to move against subversive elements or to give them pow to do so. 25X1 the Libyan 25X1 25X1 25X1 IV. situation is aasically unstable and the death or disability of the ling would very likely trigger an attempt by pro Wassir and pro-Soviet *lsaeats to setae power. Premier K bo ar on 30 November publicly promised to ry o renegotiate the LibysaAAneriean aid and base agreements. f*bssr said privately he v ants a straight rental arrangement ling misayn is still hanging on government lifted aartial iav 1a an effort to give itself a psychoiogt+sl boost. A. never, essentially equivalent powers remain in effect. t cbanc. to prove that the ( can "do something" to ease pressures on Jordan. eraser too seem to have troubles, especially in Syria where . Meanwhile, gussyu is giving the UN representative in Aaoame simesasemen and landlords have been dismayed by eeforcement of land reform and by other Zgyptian-inspired economic policies. Approved For Rel 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 Ly in sasw this gr nblt. teals his regime has not been Nacir last week outlined his rtsi possibly because I.* irwhere lately, the i as a 25X1 "democratic socialist" society, emphasizing econmdes development and lacing his speech with statistics. -ring sane speech, he again bitterly attacked the U, claimed privately that because of "leans" to the Americata press of his attitude toward Iraq, he could never again deal frankly with US represontattres. Rasir subsequently has indicate d through an ary that he wishes to buy wheat from the rather than the UBSR. Ambassador Rare has been instruc to follow up this approach in order to toot the reality c* Hasir's long-standing assertion with us. Israel may be adopting a sore belligerent attitude o border problems. Decision to take 3 December clash wi a rolat ns Syrians to SR looks like building a record to which Israelis can point it they should later decide to sake direct "retaliation. Air and army attaches in Tel Aviv have reported grow- ing sentiment in Israel's army recently that some type action required. Approved For Release 2005/06/0t- (' A`RDP79R00890A001000080011-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001000080011-6 Approved For Release 2005/06/01 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001000080011-6