NSC BRIEFING-CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100010029-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: BRIEF

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BRIEF ING -
~~ c7 TO: T;i ^
I -'r
o
RUTH. HR 70-
DATE/ - d REVIEWER:F-
I. Provisional President Manuel Urrutia established himself in presidential
. : i it(li:JlF D
ave. na 5 January.
palace in
A. Urrutia, Fidel Castro's personal choice for president, is 58 year-
old former judge who ga" ned face fi w"as Ae#ie4a by acquitting a *u*ber of
youths charged with rebel activit/. Strongly anti-Communist.
B. Brrutia'e cabinet contains moderate responsible elements, but
r minister Jose re ona Is very highly regarded
president of Cuban Bar Aso'n just returned from exile.
2. Foreign Minister Roberto Agramonte is leading political
and intellectual figure and former presidential candidate;
regarded as pro-US and strongly anti-Communist.
C. Urrutia has named Fidel Castro his "delegate" to armed forces;
Fidel will probably be top military chief and most influential figure
in govt.
fear indicta--t l to--new .gavt s. oUcies.
25 YEAR
RE-REVIEW
Fidel Castro has often asserted his desire for friendship with US.
1. However, strong bitterness developed among some rebels
during revolution who convinced US assistance prolonged Batista's
regime. (Actually, US stopped arms shipments last March).
B. Fidel's 1955 pledges to nationalise foreigm investments and public
utilities have not reappeared after Batista's fall.
Fidel has called for division of large estates among peasants, but
program vague and issued in beat of battle. Be is big landowner.
Main content of rebel speeches is strong emotional stand for
political democracy 25X1
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STAT
TAT
STAT
STAT
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I
1 1 .2-
L. Cuba, likely to become an aggressive champion of dersocracy in
hemisphere.
1. IIrratia has already condensed dictatorships in minicab
Rey blio (where Batista took refuge), R#carsgua, and Paraguay.
III. New govt f~acee difficulty in restoring stability.
A. A rift betwi ez rebel groups d.-layed Urrutia's establishment in
palace on 5 Ja maary.
1. Revolutionary Directorate, a student group which had Was
fighting in Las Villas province had apparently used its
tenperary occupation of the palace in an attempt to extract
concsasions f6ron Iza2z&ft doainastF 6 of J?Aly Movement
in Organization, of new govt.
F
Be MoatWeadera of 26 of July M Tenant are Politically inexperienced
many responsible professional lfficers are likely to resent control by
young rebel leaders and in long roan 26 of July MOTezem t may have
difficulty controlling military.
ex-President, Prie.
D. Military appee ra to have km-ea Tirtnally totally aureemdered,
and sore, including Fidel's younger brother Vail, appear i-reeponsible.
0. Difficulties will be added to by Old-line politicians each as
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V. Comrrnnists actively trying to exploit situation.
A. The 8,000-12th member 8opular Socialist (Ce n unitt) Party (PS),
outlawed by Batista in 1953, has strnngl1 supported rebel movement is
pi blic statements.
1. Its serous attempts to join rebele in united front were
apparently rebrsffed.
2. Communists are believed, however, to bays infiltra-red none
rebel units on a low level.
3. Anti US sentiments of s^me rebel leaders may be exploited by
Couiea.
B. In current fervor for democracy, PSP may Us re-legalized.
1. However, strnng anti-Cemlunist convictions of Urrutia and
cone other members of now govt aPPnmx*z may cter-balance.
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E. Batista's r fuge in the Dominican Republic puts him in a favorable
eventually
position/to stage a co*el?ack? inZihmn with the aid of dictator Trujillo.
II. Thus far' only a few indications as to new ;cu't's policies. New regime
is a product ^f a truly poj-ulcer revolution participated in by lower
classes axe. -M may have implications sw:mxazaa ag on G ulba's social
order.
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C..cJ ` ~'V
F ? c p 1 Re ern ~...
Ales o a} ~Jsta s e Bureau for .,.,,
at first r?tertea'y Col. ?rnuin
n of Co l unist Activities,
sevaral Caxnurist att pts to c^aisa
a selli>ag
strong because of UK s zxg tanks and
~rtago'^~_slx ak a'xtst British =4
_e3 to Batista late last summer (sore arrived as late as Dece:ber;;. Castro
said at tire of arms daal that his 4ove>l+ext would boycott all British goods.
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