NASIR IRAQ AND THE COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100010031-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Sequence Number: 31
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING
6 January 1959
NASIR, IRAQ AND THE COMMUNISTS
I. While Nasirts propaganda machinery continues to assault the
Arab Communists, his police last week took the strongest
action to date against them.
A. Nasir's security services have raided Communists before,
but hitherto picked up few top leaders and left un-
touched sympathizers in press and radio.
B. Arrested early on 1 January were 211 Egyptian Communists
from all three of the factions into which Cg is split
in Egypt, and a similar roundup, of about 530 Communists
at last count, has occurred'in Syria. Bakdash apparently
got away.
1. This time, arrestees include leaders, and party
presses have been seized as well; arrestees are to
be or have been exiled to oasis in Western Desert.
2. Nasir is reported planning housecleaning of pro-
Communists in radio system; information ministry,
and press generally. However, he does not plan to
move against some prominent sympathizers on the
ground that they are merely "opportunists."
we note he waited until Aswan Dam aid agree-
ment signed with USSR before ordering arrests, planned
weeks earlier, to take effect.
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II> Nasir has said his anti-Communist moves aimed essentially
at Iraq, where he hoped both to develop* pressure on
Qasim and at same time encourage him to free himself from
Communist support.
A. Pressure, in form of numerous violent street clashes
between pro-UAR Baathists and Communists, hast.ndeed
developed and may become serious public security prob-
lem, playing into hands of any group--Communists, civi-
lian independents, or army--who believe themselves able
use chaos as justification and opportunity for coup.
B. Qasim himself, however, shows no sign of dropping Com-
munists,
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2. Although anti-Communist cabinet ministers, such as
Foreign Minister Jomard and Information Minister
Shanshal, have tried to resign, Qasim has made it
clear there can be no resignations from this cabinet.
D. overall picture in Iraq thus remains one in which severe
struggle is going on, but where Communists and those, like
Qasim, who may hope to use them, hold the upper hand.
$ymptdmitic are continuing arrivals of assorted Soviet
"technical experts."
Most disappointing feature, from Western standpoint as
well as Nasir's, is failure of moderate military com-
manders to exert themselves to greater extent. It is
not clear whether they have been lulled into false
sense of security by the fact that Communists have been
careful not to attack them, or whether they in fact now
feel too weak to play a decisive part.
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