MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100030003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 17, 1959
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 17 March 1959
B. Nasir, however, is continuing a full-scale propaganda war
against Qasim, and has pulled out all stops in epithets and
specific accusations that Qasim is a Communist tool who will
inevitably be overthrown by true Arab nationalists.
1. In private, UAR top officials indicate they feel there is
little they can do about Qasim at the moment, Their more
pessimistic estimate is that it may be more than a year
before another movement can be organized.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
I. In Iraq, the Qasim regime appears to have restored order in the
Mosul area; major problem has not been the rebel force (dispersed
or captured a week ago), but looting by tribesmen and revenge
killing by anti-rebel elements, including the ubiquitous Communist-
controlled Popular Resistance Force. In fact, the regular
authorities in Mosul appealed several times for a. curb of the PRF.
A, In the wake of the revolt, pro-UAR "nationalists" and other
anti-Communists seem thoroughly intimidated; assassination of
Qasim is for the time being their only hope,
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3, In addition, there are persistent rumors that Iraqi
Communists teams have been sent to assassinate Nasir.
C, Iraq's relations with the USSR meanwhile continue to develop.
An agreement signed in Moscow on 16 March provides for a 137
million dollar Soviet loan at 2.5 percent, plus Soviet technical
assistance for various light industry projects and studies in
irrigation, transportation, and development of mineral
resources (could mean oil). This is in addition to an arms
deal,
made last fall.
1. Signature of the economic agreement was occasion for
Khrushchev speech in which Soviet leader clearly supported
Iraq against the UAR, although pledging "non-interference"
in affairs of both countries.
Pravda, possibly foreshadowing Soviet efforts to build up
Qasim as a counterweight to Nasir, declared on 13 March
that "Baghdad is more and more becoming an important center
of the liberation movement in the Near and Middle East."
II. Nasir's relations with the USSR, as a result of the latest develop-
ments, are again becoming a matter for apprehension in the eyes
of the UAR government.
A. The possibility that the USSR may cut off aid or reduce its pro-
grams for the UAR is obviously worrying people like Kaissouni,
the UAR finance minister, who now seems to be looking rather
desperately for signs that the US will come to Nasir's rescue.
Interior Minister Zarakria Muhi al-Din has also said now is
the time for the US to take the initiative and make an offer.
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B, Nasir in his speeches has expressed determination to press the
anti-Communist campaign regardless of the cost. Although
Nasir still makes clear that he wants good relations with the
Soviet Union, he evidently does not really believe t1at he can
have them as long as he persists in his present course.
C. Khrushchev has charged that Nasir has used the "language of
imperialists" and sought to unite Iraq with the UAR against
the will of the Iraqi people and warned that the anti-Communist
campaign will "inevitably fail." Nasir quickly replied that
Khrushchev had distorted the facts and that the Soviet leader's
defense of Arab Communists is "a matter which the Arab people
cannot accept,"
D. Khrushchev and Nasir seem to havelaid down a set of incompatible
qualifications to their stated willingness to continue their
relations on previous basis. One will have to give way or
further deterioration seems inevitable..
III. Nasir, frustrated in Iraq and in trouble with the Soviet Union, may
possibly seek to operate in other areas to show he is still the
real "only leader" of the Arabs, In addition to Kuwait, which was
mentioned last week, such areas include:
A. Sudan, where the political-military pot is still bubbling,
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B. Libya, where persistent elements o instability remain and
where we still have large stake in air base.
C. Yemen, where however Ambassador Hare is having some success
in impressing
1. The Imam now seems willing to accept US help in road im-
provement and agriculture; this might counterbalance the
efforts of Crown Prince Badr to bring about extensive
dependence on Sino-Soviet aid.
IV. Both Jordan's King Husayn and Prime Minister Rifai are now enroute
to Washington, and will arrive next week. Rifai brings with him
what he feels are especially galling budgetary problems and hopes
that the United States will decide that Jordan is an irreplaceable
bastion of the free world and therefore deserves at least fifty
million dollars in aid this coming fiscal year.
A. Meanwhile, back in Amman, the government claims to have un-
covered still another plot against the monarchy, and a number
of army officers are reported to have been arrested..
C. Most depressing development from Husayn's standpoint is sudden
emergence of Nasir as the area's most strident anti-Communist;
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V. Meanwhile, Soviet-Iranian tension increased during the past week,
A. There has been an increasing series of charges and counter-charges'-
1. Ambassador Pegov is returning to Moscow amid speculation
that he will not return to Tehran.
2, Departure of Iranian ambassador-designate to Moscow has
been postponed "until such time as relations improved."
3. Soviet radio propaganda has renewed explicit personal
attacks on Shah.
4. Iran, in turn, by press and radio is seeking to counteract
Soviet propaganda by charging Khrushchev with return to
the era of Stalin and Moscow with attitude that anyone
"who is not Moscow's flunky is its enemy."
5. Tehran has also alleged 81 violations of Iranian air space
by Soviet planes during recent months; and Moscow has charged
that Iran has massed troops on Iraqi border, Neither
charge is substantiated.
Moscow has also termed Iran's efforts to "annul" clauses (5
and 6) of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 as "clumsy
attemptstt,,,to escape treaty obligations. Pravda has
asserted that USSR intends "to hold to a.,.pact with Iran
enabling Russia to send troops into the...country if
aggression threatens the Soviet Union."
B. The Soviet political warfare moves involved probably foreshadow
tougher Soviet tactics designed to topple the Shah's regime.
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