YUGOSLAVIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001100030017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2002
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 17, 1959
• Content Type: BRIEF

DOCUMENT NO.
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YUGOSLAVIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC
1. Recent actions by Belgrade show that, in contrast to previous
attitude, it now prepared to take initiative against bloc in
replying to anti-Yugoslav attacks.
A. Usual hostile relations with Albania have recently degenerated
into unusually tense situation, with acrimonious exchange of
notes and charges..
1,. Both countries have exchanged large number of official
protest notes since end of January, and Belgrade suddenly
decided to publicize recent trials and sentencing of
13 Albanians accused of espionage against Yugoslavia.
a. This represents significant change since January,
when Belgrade cancelled public trial of 25 Yugoslav
"cominformists," fearing effect on bloc relations.
Tito, speaking in Skoplje on 6 March, called Albanian
party chief Enver Hoxha, a "warmongering ...new Goebbels
in the Balkans." The following day, in Belgrade, Tito
threatened to place Albanian and Bulgarian "irridentist"
attacks before the United Nations.
3. Tito also expressed his determination to answer bloc
charges in future blow for blow, making clear there could
be no understanding with bloc as long as Moscow permitted
such actions to take place.
B. On 14 March Belgrade announced recall of Yugoslav minister to
Albania and his assignment to other duties.
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1. Albania will fly retaliate in kind, but neither
side country likely to initiate a full break in relations.
a, A similar "freeze" in relations with Red China last
summer did not result in break,
C, Belgrade's actions probably presage further worsening in
relations with bloc, especially with Albania and Bulgaria,
with whom polemics also acrimonious.
II, Fundamental ideological cleavage between Belgrade and bloc
continues with no visible prospect of reconciliation.
A, Yugoslavs read out of Communist camp April 1958, but continue
to insist Marxism-Leninism being correctly interpreted in
Yugoslavia,
1. Belgrade considers basic cause of dispute not ideological,
but result Yugoslav refusal permit Soviet domination:
points out that bloc countries in fact following certain
examples from Yugoslavia's internal practice.
2, Tito on 7 March said he believed dispute not theoretical,
but result "differences of opinion on certain issues which
practice of socialist development has raised" both in
bloc and in Yugoslavia,
B, Despite Soviet claims at 21st Party Congress that revisionism
"smashed," Moscow still obviously concerned over Yugoslav theory
as divisive influence in bloc and because of sympathy engendered
in Africa and Asia.
1, In order discredit Yugoslav theory in bloc, bloc belittles
Yugoslav internal achievements?
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In order discredit Yugoslav theory in uncommitted areas
recently visited by Tito (Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India,
Ethiopia, Sudan, UAR), bloc claims Yugoslavs "imperialist
agents."
a. This contradicts Khrushchev's declared aim in his
opening speech at Congress to cooperate with Yugoslavs
in "struggle against imperialism" wherever bloc and
Yugoslav interests coincide,
III, Since beginning of dispute, party differences have inevitably
overflowed into state relations, as illustrated by current
Yugoslav-Albanian difficulty,
A, Relations with Peking virtually suspended since last summer,
B, Only country which retains some rapport with Belgrade is
Poland: close economic, cultural, scientific exchanges with
Warsaw continue,
C. Although economic credits to Yugoslavia cut off by USSR, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Moscow is hesitant to initiate economic
blockade, since ineffectual last time and would arouse sympathy
for Belgrade in Asia and Africa.
1. All bloc countries except China and Rumania have concluded
1959 trade agreements with Yugoslavia.
a, Soviet agreement represents 20 percent cutback over
1958, and lowest trade level since 1956.
If these 1959 trade agreements implemented, Yugoslavia's
trade position with East not heavily affected. But bloc's
policy is to keep Belgrade guessing about deliveries.
D. Nevertheless, out of fear of threatened loss Bloc markets,
Yugoslavs have been casting about for alternatives.
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1. Aid from US continues at high level--for fiscal year 1959:
22,5 million dollars for fertilizer plant (Pancevo),
5 million dollars for diesel engines
14.2 million dollars for health, education, agriculture
69.2 million dollars for general economic development,
a. Some from Britain
3 million pounds (agricultural and other equipment)
b. France has indicated increased interest in the question.
2. Belgrade's main effort recently has been to develop new
markets and sources for raw materials in Asia and Africa.
a. Tito during tour obtained agreements in principle
to improve economic ties from most countries he visited
(Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, Ethiopia, Sudan, UAR).
This promises to be very fruitful area for Yugoslavs
despite competition from bloc countries.
IV. Despite this current worsening in relations with bloc, Belgrade
shows determination not to become too closely tied with West.
Yugoslavia to preserve its policy of non-alignment.
A. On Tito's return to Yugoslavia he forcefully denied bloc
charges made during trip that he was attempting to create a
"third bloc" or attempting to revive the Balkan Pact with Greece
and Turkey, which Khrushchev said tied Yugoslavia to NATO.
1. The Balkan Pact was played down during his talks with
Karamariis.
2. official Yugoslav spokesman on 13 March attacked Turkish
press for "distortions" about Yugoslavia, probably to empha-
size fact that p 'iia not reviving Balkan Pact.
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