LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200010003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 1999
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 5, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

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NSC BRIEFING 5 January 1960
LAOS
I. Laotian political scene characterized by fast-moving changes
in past weeks.
A. The rivalry between Premier Phoui's Old-line Rally of the
Lao People (RLP) and the young reformist Committee for
Defense of National Interests (CDNI) came to a head with
Phoui's resignation on 31 December.
B. Increased CDNI activity against Phoui resulted from their
exclusion from the cabinet he formed 15 December.
C. The army, acting under the King's authority, is now run-
ning the country pending formation of a new cabinet.
II. One of army's first steps was decree that all acts of the
National Assembly in its special session in mid-December
were null and void.
A. This move reflects position of King and CDNI in their
dispute with Phoui that assembly's mandate expired on
25 December and that assembly's efforts in the special
session to extend its mandate were unconstitutional..
B. Way is now cleared for designation of a non-parliamentary
coalition government pending national elections some time
this year.
III. The King has asked the army's five generals , three of whom
are CDNI members, to draw up a list of prospective members
UMENTN. __
of such a government. N.. F- N cuss.
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A. The King and CDNI had originally planned to permit Phoui
to return as premier, but mutual recriminations between
the King and Phoui at time of his resignation have made
this considerably more difficult.
B. CDNI in any case apparently prefers an experienced polit-
ican to a military man as premier, but it may have
trouble finding someone who is both willing and acceptable
to all groups.
IV. Whatever cabinet emerges from the negotiations now in progress
between the King and CDNI, and the RLP, the political balance
of power in Laos has seemingly shifted to the CDNI.
V. Constitutional matters have been in the forefront of the current
crisis but basically the dispute has stemmed from the efforts
of the CDNI to displace Phoui and his old-line followers as
the ruling elite of Laos.
A. Immediate stake is a decisive voice in determining who
will run on a hoped-for unified conservative slate in
the national elections.
B. CDNI's distaste for members of the outgoing assembly,
whom it accused of being corrupt, too remote from people,
and of lacking dynamism, was a root cause of its insistence
that the assembly die on 25 December.
VI. In view of the serious lack of leaders and administrators in
Laos, both the CDNI and the RLP are probably needed in the
government, and the important thing is for both groups to get
back in harness together before the government's anti-Commu-
nist efforts suffer further.
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VII. have expressed concern
over present CDNI ascendency, with its military. coloration.
A. They fear CDNI might order an early trial of Prince
Sduphannouvong and other pro-Communist leaders, or take
some other equally provocative step.
25X6A B. such rash action might re-
kindle internal Communist insurgency, now relatively
quiet, and invite countermeasures from North Vietnam
or Communist China.
VIII.North Vietnam has called on the Lao people to unite and
struggle against the CDNI which it brands an instrument of
U. S. imperialism. It has charged the Laotian army with
recent border violations and warns these will have "disastrous
consequences."
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