MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200030012-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 1999
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 15, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CSC BRIEFING 15 March 196?
MAINLAND S?UTHEAST ASIA
I. Situation in mainland Southeast Asia continues to contain many
subsurface dangers and vulnerabilities from our viewpoint.
II. Laos remains mayor area of concern despite the drop-off since last
summer in attacks by Communist insurgents which led to UN investi-
gation.
A. The Communist Pathet Lao insurgents, almost certainly aided
and abetted by North Vietnam, are continuing to consolidate
their forces and expand their influence.
1. Numerous reports received of recruiting, training, supply
buildup, propaganda and intimidation throughout country.
2. Communists also effectively exploiting grievances against
the government among the tribesmen who make up 5D percent
of Laos' two million population.
3. Despite government security sweeps, the Pathets have gained
de facto control over extensive areas of the countryside.
Pathets do not control all of the twa northern provinces
~ of Sam Neua and Phong Saly, as they did before the 1957
settlement with the government, but they now have pockets
in all twelve provinces.
4. Real security exists only in towns, is considerably less
in a,d~acent villages, and is virtually nonexistent in
most of the rest of the country.
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5. Moreover, strong Pathet pockets in southernmost Laotian
provinces could foreshadow greater Communist subversive
action against neighboring South Vietnam, Cambodia and
Thailand.
6. A good example of the pervasiveness of Pathet activity in
Laos was recently provided by the experiences of a USIS team
which tried to tour the mountain villages in Xieng Khouang
Province. Team was forced to turn back after finding out
that the planned route was heavily infested with Pathets,
who seemed to have considerable influence obey the villagers,
The .Lao government had assured the team that the area was
fully secure.
B, Commies probably prefer to gain their ends in Laos through
subversion, guerrilla warfare and legal means rather than by
open aggression.
1. In the supplemental elections of 1958, the Commies and their
leftist allies were able to profit from vote-splitting among
the non-Communist candidates to win 13 of the 21 seats at
stake. (There were 87 non-Communist candidates.)
2. New elections for the entire membership of the National
Assembly are to be held on 24 April, but this time non-
Communist groups--mainly former Premier Phoui's Rally of
the Lao People and the young reformist Committee for
Defense of National Interests (CDNI)--have markedly reduced
the number of candidates contesting the elections.
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? 3. Thanks in part to our strong prodding the two rival groups
have agreed, at least-for moment, on a list of some 60 odd
candidates far the 59 assembly seats at stake.
4. Commies have not yet clearly tipped their hand regarding
coming elections, but should they became convinced cards
are stacked against them, -they will probably boycott them
and may attempt to disrupt them through resurgence
guerrilla war.
a. Whatever course Commies take, prospect is for long and
difficult struggle between Commies and non-Commies for
country and result highly uncertain.
III. In South Vietnam thexe has b?en Sharp upswing in Vietnamese Commu-
nist terrorism and subversion since last fall in what appears to be
a stepped-up effort to undermine Saigon's control over rural areas.
A. The number of Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam--stabilized
at about 1504 for the past several years--reportedly been
doubled in recent months by fresh cadres infiltrated from
North Vietnam via Laos and Cambodia.
B. At the same time, Communist tactics switched from scattered
acts of banditry and village terrorism to bold attacks on
government army patrols and isolated security posts by bands
few hundred strong.
1. Intimidation and subversion of villagers also been,
intensified--assassinations of local officials, which had
been averaging 15 per month, have recently increased to
over 34 per month. New terrorist acts against American
personnel a possibility,
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' 2. A~ost troubled area is in southwestern delta provinces
where Communist guerrillas ilea across the virtually
unguarded Cambodian frontier when too hard pressed by
South Vietnamese security forces.
3. Evolving pattern is disturbingly reminiscent of Vietnamese
Communist tactics against the French in Indochina during
period 1946-1954.
C. Probable reasons behind upsurge Communist terrorism:
1. Commie desire to increase tensions between Diem government
and people; discredit the government and security forces;
and establish control over broader rural areas.
2. Successful hiding of Hanoi's hand in recent "civil: war"
in Laos may have emboldened Commies to attempt a similar
"popular resistance movement" in South Vietnam.
D. Growing disaffection with Saigon regime of rural population in
southern delta provinces provides basis for extended Communist
guerrilla operations.
IV. Cambodia, although free of Commie terrorism plaguing South Vietnam
and Laos is also target of subversion.
A. Premier Sihanouk, feverishly pursuing a neutralist policy,
opened "Pandora's Box" in 1956 when he began economic and
political relations with Peiping and the Soviet Bloc.
1. Chinese Communists especially have made serious inroads
in the cultural and propaganda fields in Cambodia,
2. Peiping's subversive activities are facilitated by presence
of nearly 200 Chinese Communist representatives associated
with a broad economic aid program and a large Chicom embassy.
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3. Cambodia's 300,000 Overseas Chinese population, largely
pro-KMT a few years ago, today is dominated by the.
Communists.
B. Commies seem to have long range hope that they can take over
by riding on Sihanouk's coattails. Meanwhile, they are believed
attempting to use Cambodia as a base for operation against
South Vi:etuam, Laos and Thailand.
1. Vietnamese Communist guerrillas see Cambodia as a transit
area and staging ground for anti-government operations in
South Vietnam, and mere recently in southern Laos.
C. Sihanouk's flirtations with the Sino-Soviet Bloc have resulted
in domestic dissension and hostility by South Vietnam and
Thailand which continues to harm the West's position in
Cambodia and benefits the Commies.
1. Sihanouk for 'the moment is more critical of Commie sub-
version, but his hand stayed from taking effective
remedial actions by fear of Peiping and belief that the
only safe policy to follow is neutrality; he cites the
fighting in Laos a's an example of problems that come
from adopting too strong an anti-Communist stand.
2. Sihanouk has expressed belief in inevitable Communist
victory in the East-West struggle.
3. Outlook is for continuing dominance of country by Sihanouk,
continuing efforts by him to walk neutrality tightrope, and
continuing weak and potentially dangerous situation.
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V.
In Thailand, some sources of potential trouble exist despite Marshal
Sarit's autocratic regime.
A. Continuing, and perhaps increasing dissatisfaction with
American aid levels to Thailand, and with competing PL 48U
rice sales to Asian countries might incline Thai leaders
toward making some kind of gesture to Sino-Soviet Bloc out
of belief it might dolt us into being more generous and
flexible .
VI. In Burma, the sweeping election victory of U Nu and the voluntary
stepping down next month of the interim military regime under
General Ne Win create a number of new problems.
A. Bath leaders are anti-Communist but U Nu not as inflexible
in this respect as Ne Win.
1. Nu's concept of neutrality may lead him to balance off
improvement in US-Burma relations, achieved during Ne min's
tenure, by efforts improve relations with Communist Bloc.
2. Absence of a serious parliamentary opposition may make the
government cocky with a possible relapse to inept and
corrupt administration, susceptible to domestic Communist
exploitation.
B. Nu's belief in allegations of US aid to the opposition party
in recent elections may complicate future American dealings
with him.
C. Finally, Nu's landslide victary will make it more difficult
for Ne Win to exercise his intended restraining influence on
the new government,
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