POSSIBLE REASONS WHY KHRUSHCHEV WAS COMPELLED TO REVEAL U-2 PLANE STORY AT THIS TIME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200050011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For
a list of the fsctors cited by Mbas
our brief cents attached to each.
agree, but note ,
A. Genuine anger over amt the Soviets consider re"ated provocative
violations of 'their territory.
restrain his
until he had the goods. Mm he made a deliberate
decision to exploit the incident before the Snt. )
3. A demand for a strong stand by the Soviet minty, who are unhappy
over demobilization. (we tend to discount, or to accept this would be to
believe K much weaker in domestic politics than we have estimated.
However, one cannot prove 3b.OmPson Eng.
e true that (1) mill
clearly most unhappy; (2) party making ZMA"s about cs .tiers who do not
decisions; (3) Bch talk about demobilimtion but not much
in high co &. Therefore, it is possible that
footdragging, inch case plane Incident would give
military strong card to play.)
State Dept. review completed
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. A desire to put the President on the defensive at the emit
and weaken our position in the Western alliance.
dominant motive. It is consistent with his tactics in the past;
he is not a man to forego exploiting any chink that may show in his
opponent's armor and we note that he has been careful not to say anything
which might block having the a mit.)
D. Khrushchev's possible discouragement on Sumriit prospects and
his consequent desire to prepare the public for failure. (We doubt
that X's personal expectations from the Summit have been so high. On the
hand)
other) it is quite possible that the Soviet public may have been over-
optimistic -)
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E. Khrushchev's belief that a: strong stand may be required
because of increased opposition to his policies within the USSR and
Bloc. (If the plenum last week is any evidence, he is not under
any great pressure in the USSR. However,, see n' notes on B, above.)
under strong pressure from Chins, and lesser pressure from
?;astern Europe. But if he became convinced that the Chinese had
gone too far in their challenge to hues and/or that domestic enemies
were hitting him in a vulnerable point, his personal commitment to a
detente might cause these pressures to backfire - i.e., he might
feel greater pressure to seek detente rather than to oppose it.)
II. Thompson concludes that internal problems will limit Khrushebevta
freedom of actions at the summit, but that, while working for the
victory of Communism., he genuinely desires relaxation of tensions a;
diminishing the danger of war. (We agree, but feel this statement plays
down too much the force and dynamism of his approach to international
problems. It implies that be would nevoid throwing international
tantrums, yet plane incident makes clear that pressure element 1 ;-his
policy lUJtP eda 'oE lqwgtflw3# FDDP79R00890A001200050011-7