CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200070021-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2003
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: July 14, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

NSC BRIEFING""' For Release
State Department review
completed
14 July 1960
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I. Enthusiastic initial response of Castro officials to Khrushchev's
public support was reflected in speeches at 10 July mass rally, but
there was an interesting contrast between "Che"" Guevara's and Fidel
Castro's speeches that suggests Fidel's possible embarrassment
at Soviet embrace of his regime.
A. Guevara told crowds "Cuba today is a glorious island defended
by the rockets of the greatest military power in history...
We are practically the arbiters of world peace."
B. But Fidel, in his sickbed TV talk on the same day, while recog-
nizing Khrushchev's "spontaneous" declaration of support, said:
"Cuba does not depend for the defense of its sovereignty and
independence on Soviet rockets, but rather on the reason and
justice of its cause."
C. By 13 July, Guevara indicated that he may have had a change of
heart when he said in an interview: "Any Soviet attempt to estab-
lish a Communist satellite in Cuba would be resisted to the last
drop of blood."
D. Most educated Cubans oppose alignment with Soviet bloc, and
though opposition still unorganized and leaderless, US embassy
believes implications of Khrushchev's speech should be a powerful
influence in developments over next few weeks.
1;I. Internally, trends continue toward tighter dictatorship and enhanced
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B. Pro-Castro lawyers, some in militia uniform, seized offices
Havana Bar Association and on 8 July named new governing board.
1. The duly elected board is protesting to President Dorticos,
who is president of National Bar Association, but probably
to no avail.
2. Ambassador Bonsai comments: "This is another important step
in establishing monolithic support of government by pro--
fessional institutions."
C. Cuban press announced 6 July that all provincial officers of
powerful Communist-controlled Cuban Workers' Confederation have
been replaced by men "who truly respond to the revolutionary
moment in which the country now lives."
D. Communist leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is becoming increasingly
prominent and Ihe may be named minister of
f inance.
1. He has long been one of Castro's closest advisers, but until
recently has remained in background.
defected 11 July with strong anti-
Castro, anti-Communist declaration and announcement he would
work to oust Castro.
1. He was sixth ambassador to defect in last 30 days.
F. US Embassy has growing feeling that Castro may be willing to
sacrifice Cuban interests for sake of what appears to be his
greater ambition--humiliation of US, wrecking of inter-American
system, and eventual "liberation" of all Latin America.
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G. Castro's illness apparently genuin
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III. Castro's ministers of economy and commerce reported worried over
possible US embargo on foodstuffs, but are confident they can lick
oil and sugar problems.
A.I embassy's agricultural attache says these
officials feel they would face "dangerous situation" if US cuts
off food shipments to Cuba (primarily lard, rice, flour, and
corn.) They fear this would be worse than imminent shortage of
farm and industrial machinery parts.
B. Current very depressed market for tanker charters eases Soviet
effort to supply Cuba with oil.
1. It is only because of depressed market that Soviet Union
can deliver oil to Cuba and other distant markets at
competitive prices.
2. British, Norwegian governments have already indicated to
American embassies their inability to influence tanker
owners against accepting Soviet charters or to violate
existing arrangements.
IV. In 12 July press conference, Khrushchev ridiculed reports of Soviet
interest in military bases in Cuba: "A most silly fabrication. What
do we need bases in Cuba for?"
A. Highly doubtful that Soviet Union would carry its commitments to
Cuba to extent of establishing base there.
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V. Among the US acts of "intervention" and "aggression" cited in Cuba's
request for UN Security Council action was "the recent meeting of the
NSC, at which the future of Cuba was discussed as if that country
were a factory or a subject people."
VI. Khrushchev's missile threat and Cuba's call for UN Security Council
debate have startled many Latin American governments out of earlier
aloofness, and majority favor formal inter-American consideration
of problem.
A. OAS Council is to meet Saturday morning to consider Peru's re-
quest for meeting of foreign ministers.
1. Meeting would be primarily concerned with Cuban problem.
2. Several high-ranking Argentine foreign ministry officials
had favored a similar initiative.
3. Brazilian foreign ministry officials favor a strong stand
on Cuba.
4. Chile is now expected to support a call for an OAS meeting on
Cuba despite its previous insistence on an informal Latin
American effort to conciliate US-Cuban differences.
5. Most smaller Latin American countries have for some time
supported view that the Cuban regime is a hemisphere problem.
B. But most Latin Americans fear domestic reaction to pro-Castro
groups.
1. Brazilian, Bolivian, Chilean, Peruvian, and Venezuelan
officials have expressed concern that pro-Castro strength
in their countries will limit their ability to support the
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C. Mexico, probably traditionally the most sensitive to any sugges-
tion of foreign interference in internal affairs, has taken
equivocal stand.
1. Strongly pro-Cuban leftist minority attacking US policy on
Cuba and pressuring Lopez Mateos government to take firmer
pro-Cuban stand.
a. On 7 July influential leftist ex-president Lazaro
Cardenas attacked US "economic aggression" against Cuba,
compared Cuban position today to Mexican position after
foreign oil interests seized there in 1938. 25X1
c. Leftists may further seek to exploit innate Mexican
resentment of US "interference" in its affairs.
2. Only clarification of Mexico's official position on Castro
regime given in 11 July press release by Foreign Minister
Tello.
a. Declared recent pro-Cuban statements by Mexican congress-
men do "not necessarily" reflect opinions of Lopez
Mateos administration.
b. Recognized existence in Mexico of "deep affection" for
Cuban people.
c. Advocated efforts to solve US-Cuban difficulties within
framework of OAS.
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VII. Latin Americans appear surprised at US announcement of new aid
plan for hemisphere.
A. Only official comment to date is from Brazil. President
Kubitschek in press statements 11 and 12 July seemed annoyed
he not consulted, expressed hope that plan, when known, would
show US has adopted positive attitude toward his "Operation
Pan America."
1. Said "palliatives and emergency measures" will never cure
the ills that beset Pan-Americanism.
2. Kubitsohek's chief foreign policy advisor quoted privately
and in press 11 July as saying "Fidel Castro had to make
a pact with Russia before the US would think about OPA."
B. Bolivian leader right-wing government forces commenting on
Cuban situation 12 July said privately "unlikely any Latin
American country would speak out very strongly against Castro
in OAS since all grateful to him for awakening US to Latin
American realities."
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