SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00890A001200080024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 17, 1960
• Content Type: BRIEF

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
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17 August 1960
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I. You will recall that at Bucharest last June, the Communist parties
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attempted to find a formula for reconciling Moscow and Peiping.
efforts to achieve even nominal unity at
Bucharest meetings were complete failure.
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II. Since Bucharest meeting, Moscow has taken offensive with moves--
both within bloc and within international Communist movement--to
force Chinese to accept Soviet views.
A. Pravda and Izvestia carried long articles this past weekend
affirming Soviet views that peaceful coexistence possible
and that war not inevitable; Izvestia termed Peiping's contrary
interpretation of Lenin "a blasphemy" and other points of
Chinese position "absolutely absurd."
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B. Moscow announced on 13 August that Khrushchev would visit
North Korea in October, but made no mention of stopover in
Peiping.
C. Russian-language publication of Sino-Soviet Friendship Society
issued by Chinese in Moscow "suspended" about six weeks ago.
D. TASS has reportedly refused to handle New China News Agency re-
leases In New Delhi, following Indian Government's closure
of latter's facilities.
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G. Moscow and other bloc radio broadcasts have--not surprisingly--
ignorOd Yugoslav and western press reports of withdrawal of
Soviet technicians. We have, however, noted changes in pattern
of Moscow broadcasts about China.
1. For Soviet home audience, for more than 5 weeks Moscow has
not commented on Chinese affairs, but has broadcast news
items on innocuous subjects such as cultural events. Since
early June, Soviet home audience has not heard about ChiCom
economic progress or Soviet aid--a-~,usual staple.
2. Foreign audiences continue to hear Moscow broadcasts about
China, but volume reduced.
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III. The Chinese resumed their anti-Soviet polemics--muted since Bucharest
--in a 13 August People's Daily editorial.
A. They asserted that "modern revisionists" were spreading calumny
and slander against China and were "apologists for imperialism."
B. The Chinese have boycotted the international congress of orient-
alists currently meeting in Moscow.
1. Some 300 to 500 had been expected.
IV. At series high-level party meetings held during June-August period,
ChiComs probably made painful reassessment of their position in
bloc and their relations with Asian neighbors.
A. Leadership apparently concluded that dispute with Soviets had
projected image of Chinese truculence that not only isolated
Peiping in the bloc but was alarming neutralist countries.
B. Current foreign policy emphasis, therefore, now placed on
Peiping's pursuit of peaceful coexistence.
P~Q~,~~ss To~~e~
1. Chinese are publicizing Aborder settlements with Burma and
Nepal as evidence of peaceful policy.
2. Foreign Minister Chen Yi now enroute to visit Afghanistan.
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3. Peiping has softened its dispute with Indonesia over the re-
settlement of Overseas Chinese and has professed to be mak-
ing "great efforts" to settle Indian border problems.
C. We think their moves are intended more to avoid Peiping's total
diplomatic isolation than to placate Soviets.
V. ChiComs have also been Jolted by domestic difficulties which prob-
ably also discussed at the recent party meetings.
A. Peiping is clearly concerned about the agricultural situation.
1. Tighter controls on consumption and persistent reports of
food shortages contrast startlingly with the regime's
grandiose claims for food output.
2. There are growing signs that it may be preparing to allocate
more resources to agriculture and to accept at least some
reduction in industry's growth rate.
B. Peiping has recently hinted that "right-opportunist" critics--
who include those who think China should follow Soviet experienc
--have not been completely silenced and appears to be reviving its
rectification campaign.
U. The differences between Moscow and Peiping are having repercussions
in world Communist movement. From Moscow point of view, danger is
that Peiping will use difference to challenge Soviet leadership.
A. Various Communist parties in free world, mapy of which have
chronic left-right splits, affected by divergent views at apex
of Communist movement. Left or "hard" factions borrow from
Peiping's declarations, while right elements--which tend to
espouse greater degree of nationalism--rely on Moscow's arguments.
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VII. The mounting ill-feeling between Moscow and Peiping and the apparent-
ly complete failure of the Bucharest conference to close the breach
raise the possibility that a Sino-Soviet break similar to (but much
more important than) the Yugoslav-Soviet break of 1948 could occur.
A. The Sino-Soviet relationship can be expected to have its ups and
downs, but the present downswing is unprecedented in scope and
severityA ff.
B. A. split would obviously cause great damage to world Communism,
to the Soviet Union, and, especially, to Communist China.
C. We do not rule out the possibility of a split, but we think it
likely that acute awareness of the cost of a split will lead
the partners to make new efforts towards at least a temporary
patching of differences.
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