CONGO

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00890A001200080025-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 23, 2004
Sequence Number: 
25
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 17, 1960
Content Type: 
BRIEF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00890A001200080025-9.pdf157.51 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release ~ NSC BRIEFING CONGO 25X1 17 August 1960 I. Lumumba's 16 August declaration of martial law "throughout" Congo may presage new harassment of his opponents, and even clashes with UN forces. A. Martial law may serve to intimidate Congo Senate, which was scheduled to reconvene 16 August. Prior to recessing 22 July, Senate was focal point of criticism of government. B. Declaration serves to emphasize Lumumba's claim to all of Congo, including Katanga, and possibly designed as legal preliminary to eventual attempt to invade Katanga. II. Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non-African UN troops, if persisted in, could eventually involve a withdrawal of the UN operations in their entirety. A. Hammarskjold--who hopes Security Council will endorse his policy of non-interference in Katanga dispute--has stated that if non-African contingents forced out of Congo by Lumumba he will recommend whole force be withdrawn. Z. Sec .. to. i' rer.t,c a"av. IS?c/~'Sst B. Lumumba has used period of UN occupation to bolste his political position and to build up a police force loyal to himself. In view of Hammarskjold's position on Katanga, Lumumba now probably feels he has little to gain from the UN presence. C. According to Army Attache in Leopoldville, officers of UN force believe that Lumumba attempting to provoke incidents between UN and Congolese troops. DIA review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : X01200080025-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2Q 25X1 III. As his strong-arm capabilities increase, Lumumba may threaten use of force against Belgian bases as well as against Katanga. A. Number of troops available to Lumumba not known, but probably number between 2,000 and 4,000, mostly around Leopoldville. Total is expected to increase as he regains control of Force Publique units in the interior. 1. Tshombe, in Katanga, has about 2,000 trained and 2,000 semi-trained soldiers. B. Whereas distance involved rules out early move against Katanga, Belgian base at Kitona, in Leopoldville Province, is accessible to "siege" by Lumumba. C. Issue of Belgian troop withdrawal still not fully resolved. 1. Troops in Katanga being pulled back to Kamina base as UN forces arrive. Brussels apparently still proceeding on hope that it can negotiate agreements for retention of both Kamina and Kitona bases. IV. Moscow is continuing to stimulate distrust of Hammarskjold's motives and UN moves. A. Soviet, propaganda is concentrating fire on Hammarskjold, charging him with using UN to support Belgium and its NATO allies. 1. Izvestia on 13 August headlined charge "Hammarskjold is disgracing the UN flag", and accused him of collusion with Tshombe in conspiring against lawful government. B. Soviet officials are actively advising Congolese government. Approved For Release 004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79R00890A0 1200080025-9 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2q 00080025-9 C. Concurrently Moscow appears to be looking forward to time when, in concert with African states, it might demand evacua- tion of UN contingents from the Congo. 2. Soviet diplomats in Leopoldville are believed to be giving guidance to Lumumba in his efforts to bring Katanga under the rule of the Central Government. 25X1 observer group to assure implementation of UN resolut~83M was suggested by Kuznetsov(First Deputy Foreign Minister) 1. Lumumba's call on 13 August for 14-nation Afro-Asian On?15 August Moscow Radio noted that Congolese might have to "dispense with the services" of UN since UN "cannot or will not take resolute action to restore order." D. USSR could be expected to follow up call for UN withdrawal with offers of economic and technical assistance in hope of propping up Lumumba. 1. Kuznetsov told UN Security Council that USSR "cannot disregard" Congo Government's appeal to USSR for bilateral aid. 2. 2. Moscow has already circumvented UN channels and provided 1i++-EfCd direct aid in form of food, 15 to 20 medical specialists, and one transport aircraft. 2, fled d-~.,s Si ' . h 13zd 'a,? A .s.j -~.~ J ~,,~~ac r, Approved For Release 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79R00890A001200080025-9 V. Although Soviet bloc thus giving Lumumba warm support, enthusiasm for Lumumba may be waning among some independent African states. A. Ghana--which earlier offered troops to Lumumba for his personal use--indicated late last week that offer no longer applied. B. Liberian President Tubman has characterized Nkrumah as agreeing with him that African "summit" conference--scheduled for Leopoldville between 25 and 30 August--was not "necessary" and could be on ministerial level rather than as conference of heads of state. 1. Lumumba probably envisioned conference as anti-Western propaganda forum. Among independent African states ex- pected to attend are, at the least, UAR, Morocco, Ghana and Guinea. Approved For Release 004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79R00890A00 200080025-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200080025-9 Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP79R0089OA001200080025-9