CONGO
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00890A001200080025-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 23, 2004
Sequence Number:
25
Case Number:
Publication Date:
August 17, 1960
Content Type:
BRIEF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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NSC BRIEFING
CONGO
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17 August 1960
I. Lumumba's 16 August declaration of martial law "throughout" Congo
may presage new harassment of his opponents, and even clashes
with UN forces.
A. Martial law may serve to intimidate Congo Senate, which was
scheduled to reconvene 16 August. Prior to recessing 22
July, Senate was focal point of criticism of government.
B. Declaration serves to emphasize Lumumba's claim to all of
Congo, including Katanga, and possibly designed as legal
preliminary to eventual attempt to invade Katanga.
II. Lumumba's demand for withdrawal of non-African UN troops, if
persisted in, could eventually involve a withdrawal of the UN
operations in their entirety.
A. Hammarskjold--who hopes Security Council will endorse his
policy of non-interference in Katanga dispute--has stated
that if non-African contingents forced out of Congo by
Lumumba he will recommend whole force be withdrawn.
Z. Sec .. to. i' rer.t,c a"av. IS?c/~'Sst
B. Lumumba has used period of UN occupation to bolste his
political position and to build up a police force loyal to
himself. In view of Hammarskjold's position on Katanga,
Lumumba now probably feels he has little to gain from the
UN presence.
C. According to Army Attache in Leopoldville, officers of UN
force believe that Lumumba attempting to provoke incidents
between UN and Congolese troops.
DIA review(s) completed.
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III. As his strong-arm capabilities increase, Lumumba may threaten use
of force against Belgian bases as well as against Katanga.
A. Number of troops available to Lumumba not known, but probably
number between 2,000 and 4,000, mostly around Leopoldville.
Total is expected to increase as he regains control of Force
Publique units in the interior.
1. Tshombe, in Katanga, has about 2,000 trained and 2,000
semi-trained soldiers.
B. Whereas distance involved rules out early move against
Katanga, Belgian base at Kitona, in Leopoldville Province,
is accessible to "siege" by Lumumba.
C. Issue of Belgian troop withdrawal still not fully resolved.
1. Troops in Katanga being pulled back to Kamina base as
UN forces arrive. Brussels apparently still proceeding
on hope that it can negotiate agreements for retention
of both Kamina and Kitona bases.
IV. Moscow is continuing to stimulate distrust of Hammarskjold's
motives and UN moves.
A. Soviet, propaganda is concentrating fire on Hammarskjold,
charging him with using UN to support Belgium and its NATO
allies.
1. Izvestia on 13 August headlined charge "Hammarskjold is
disgracing the UN flag", and accused him of collusion
with Tshombe in conspiring against lawful government.
B. Soviet officials are actively advising Congolese government.
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C. Concurrently Moscow appears to be looking forward to time
when, in concert with African states, it might demand evacua-
tion of UN contingents from the Congo.
2. Soviet diplomats in Leopoldville are believed to be
giving guidance to Lumumba in his efforts to bring Katanga
under the rule of the Central Government.
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observer group to assure implementation of UN resolut~83M
was suggested by Kuznetsov(First Deputy Foreign Minister)
1. Lumumba's call on 13 August for 14-nation Afro-Asian
On?15 August Moscow Radio noted that Congolese might have
to "dispense with the services" of UN since UN "cannot or
will not take resolute action to restore order."
D. USSR could be expected to follow up call for UN withdrawal
with offers of economic and technical assistance in hope of
propping up Lumumba.
1. Kuznetsov told UN Security Council that USSR "cannot
disregard" Congo Government's appeal to USSR for bilateral
aid.
2.
2. Moscow has already circumvented UN channels and provided
1i++-EfCd
direct aid in form of food, 15 to 20 medical specialists,
and one transport aircraft.
2, fled d-~.,s Si ' . h 13zd 'a,? A .s.j -~.~ J ~,,~~ac r,
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V. Although Soviet bloc thus giving Lumumba warm support, enthusiasm
for Lumumba may be waning among some independent African states.
A. Ghana--which earlier offered troops to Lumumba for his personal
use--indicated late last week that offer no longer applied.
B. Liberian President Tubman has characterized Nkrumah as
agreeing with him that African "summit" conference--scheduled
for Leopoldville between 25 and 30 August--was not "necessary"
and could be on ministerial level rather than as conference
of heads of state.
1. Lumumba probably envisioned conference as anti-Western
propaganda forum. Among independent African states ex-
pected to attend are, at the least, UAR, Morocco, Ghana
and Guinea.
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