PROBABLE SOVIET REACTION TO FULL-SCALE U.S. MOBILIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100010003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 9, 1950
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release
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CONFIDENTIAL 9 moember 1950
THE DZR TOR OF CENTRAL MTE
obsble Soviet Reaction to Pill-Scale U.
bil.ization
1. The USSR must for some time have been aware that its
policies were causing mounting concern in the U. S. and, at
least since the outbreak of the Korean war, Were pro bacing in.
creasing ti. S, military preparations. At announcement of plans
for fall-scale l. S. mobilization, therefore, probably would not
come as a complete surprise to Soviet leaders, and such a possi-
bility probably has been considered by Soviet planners.
2. If the USSR intends deliberately to provoke global war
in the near future (within six to eighteen months), an announce-
nt of full-scale U, S. mobilization probably would result merely
an adjustment of the Soviet time-table. The USSR would time
its attack to take advantage of its optimum relative preparedness,
and to precede the d a t e a t which U .. S, mobilization measures
began to produce major results.
If the USSR does not intend deliberately to provoke global
the near future but estimates that the U, S. Will do so,
,ernent of full-scale U.S. mobilization probably would
in a Soviet attempt to seize the initiative by an early
attack on the US or its allies.
,, if the USSR neither intends itself to provoke global war
in the near future,,: nor erects the U. S. to do eo an announcement
of full-scale U. S. mobilization probably would not in ediately
affect Soviet plans. Since the possibility of such a U.
of have been anticipated, the announcement would,, in itself,
hat: y cmee the Kremlin inmediately to alter its estimate of
U. S. intentions. Soviet leaders probably would take advantage
of the period between the U. S. anno ncement and the first concrete
results of the program to study its effects and implications.
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Assistant Director fo
National getimates
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release R00904A000100010003-9