MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION ENTITLED 'SOVIET REACTION TO A US DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100010005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 14, 1950
• Content Type: MF

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W, t 53027
COPY NO.
CONFIDENTIAL
iL December 1950
i es f thi a'~ ti i
SUBJECT : Memorandum for information entitled
"Soviet Reaction to a US Declaration
of National Emergency"
1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation of
this morning, there are attached hereto twenty
copies of above-entitled memorandum for your
dissemination to the IAC and such other action
as you deem advisable.
G
Enclosures;
Copies #1 through 20
of 53026
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125X1
CONFIDEN
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MEMORANDUM TO: -,ne.-rat 5 nith
Shall I have distribution made of the
enclosures to the attached memorandum to the
members of the IAC?
[Voted -
L'1
14 Dec 0
QATE)
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CONFIDENT1A
T REA 91191-TO i7 C LT ON 0 'AT 0 vAL Ei 1ERETd Y
1. The USSR is aware that its policies are causing mounting concern
in the US and,, at least since the outbreak of the Korean war, are producing
increasing US military preparations. The proclamation of a US national
emergency., therefore., would hardly come as a complete surprise to Soviet
leaders and such a possibility has probably been considered by Soviet plan-
ners, The announcement would not., immediately and of itself, produce any
major Soviet reaction. The Kremlin would await evidence of the effects and
implications of the announcement and probably would not alter materially its
present plans unless the announcement was followed by concrete steps toward
large-scale US mobilization.
2. If the USSR intends to initiate global war in the near future (with-
in six to eighteen months), large-scale US mobilization probably would result
merely in an adjustment of the Soviet timetable., The USSR would time its
attack to take advantage of its optimum relative preparedness and to anticipate
the date at which US mobilization measures began to produce major results.
3. It is doubtful that a Soviet decision to initiate global war has
been reached. It may be assined that Soviet leaders will be reluctant to
jeopardize the achievements of the Communist revolution,, the power base of
world Communism r their own positions in the Soviet hierarchy,, and their personal
security. They will hardly gamble for the higher stakes of war until convinced
that major gains can be achieved thereby a d that the less dangerous and less
costly means of Communist expansion have been exhausted. The Soviet Orbit
has, however., achieved a highly advanced state of war readiness. Short-term
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CONFIDENTIAL
war preparations, especially in the Eastern European Satellites and in the
Far East, have been accelerated in a manner suggesting that the possibility
of war in 1951 is being considered. These preparations, the a''parent bold-
ness of current Soviet and Communist pol ey, and the present relative weakness
of Western defenses require that an early and direct Soviet attack be considered
a definite and continuing possibility.
4. If the USSR does not intend deliberately to initiate a global r;ar
in the near future, but estimates that the US is likely to do so, large-scale
US mobilization might result either in a last-minute Soviet effort to reduce
this likelihood by offering substantial concessions, or in a Soviet attempt
to anticipate, the West by an early attack on the US or its allies, as the
alternative to making concessions which would reduce this likelihood0
5. It is improbable that the USSR expects an early attack by t-e US,,
Soviet leaders probably appreciate, and may well exaggerate, their ability
to reduce international tension and forestall a possible Western attack through
concessions and ostentatious displays of good will. Furthermore, while perhaps
hypersensitive to any real or imaginary threats from abroad, and apprehensive
of US atomic and technical capabilities, the Kremlin appears to regard mass
armies as a decisive factor in military success, and is therefore unlikely
to consider US military force in being as a serf ours f:hragt n
6. If the USSR neither intends itself to initiate a global war in the
near future nor expects the US to do so, large-scale US mobilization probably
would not immediately cause the USSR to reverse its intention. Soviet leaders
probably world take advantage of the period between the US announcement anf the
first concrete results of the program to study its effects and implications.
u 2 m
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During this period the USSR probably would accelerate. its own military prepara-
tions and intensify its efforts to divide and weaken.the Western Powers by:
(a) Playing upon the war fears of the Western Europeans in the hope
of thus alienating them from the US;
(b) Extending "peace's overtures and diplomatic feelers for four-
power conversations, for separate Soviet accords with individual
Western nations., and for disarmament discussions in the UN;
(c) Directing further local Communist aggression in the Far East
or elsewhere in an effort to divert US attention and resources
from Europe.
If US mobilization measures promise early and material improvement
in the relative US power position, and the Western Allies appear united and firm,:
Soviet tactics may change, and the Kremlin might then either:
(a) Ostensibly soften its policy, and perhaps offer material con-
cessions to the West .in an effort to reduce international tension,
forestall the comir?letion of US preparations, disorganize the US
economy, and [:ain credit for the USSR as the champion of peace; or
(b) Launch an immediate Soviet attack on the US or its alll6s, estimat-
ing either that a US decision to attack the Soviet Union.had
been reached or that the successful completion of US mobilization
measures would constitute an intolerable threat to Soviet
securiky or to the attainment of ultimate Soviet objectives.
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