CURRENT COMMUNIST AIR CAPABILITIES IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020011-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 10, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL
10 October 1951
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRALINTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Current Communist Air Capabilities in the Far East
We have reviewed Chinese Communist/North Korean and Soviet
air capabilities for operations against UN forces in the Far
East and have informally coordinated our findings with the Directorate
of Intelligence, USAF.
CHINESE COMMUNIST/NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCES (CCAF/NKAF)
1. Aircraft Strength. The Chinese Communist and North Korean
Air Forces are estimated to have available 1,330 aircraft in combat
units, including 700 Jet fighters. The augmentation of this force
over the past year and the radius of action of the aircraft are
shown in the following table:
January
June
October
Approximate Radius
of Action in
Nautical Miles
Jet fighters
75
400
700
250-350
Piston fighters
250
200
250
4"0-540
Ground attack
190
170
160
165
Light bombers
150
130
120
500
Transports
75
100
100
500
740
1,000
1,330
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The disposition of these aircraft is believed to be as
follows:
CCAF in Manchuria 750 (including /,.0 jets)
NKAF in Manchuria 110
China proper (based principally in
Peiping, Canton, and Shanghai) 470 (including 260 jets)
1,330
2. Combat Effectiveness. Aside from the increase in the
number of aircraft, the combat effectiveness of the CCAF/NKAF has
steadily improved as a result of: (a) An intensified training pro-
am; (b) combat experience gained in both night and day operations;
(c) ) an extensive early warning radar network which has been established
along the China Coast; and (d) early warning and ground controlled
interception radars which have been installed in North Korea and Man-
churia and are being effectively used in co-ordination with fighters
for air defense. The area of jet interception activity over Korea
has been extended steadily southward from the Yalu to the Pyongyang
area. Despite these improvements, the general level of operational
skill of the Communists still appears to be substantially below that
of the United Nations. There is no evidence that the CCAF/NKAF have
fully mastered the complex techniques and developed the facilities
required for effective ground support. They have not conducted the
extensive air reconnaissance over UN lines that would be necessary
for adequate target selection and bombing accuracy. Furthermore,
maintenance and supply difficulties probably would limit the avail-
ability of Communist air equipment for sustained operations.
3. Airfields. Airfields in Manchuria and China are adequate
to sustain operations of the CCAF/NKAF from those areas, and limited
airfield development has continued in North Korea despite intense
and sustained UN aerial bombardment. However, the majority of North
Korean airfields are suitable only for piston-engined planes, although
some of them could possibly be used for limited jet operations. Logis-
tic support of North Korean airfields is seriously hampered by the UN
air interdiction of enemy lines of communications. As long as UN air
superiority is maintained, enemy offensive and defensive operations
will continue to be restricted.
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1,. Logistic Support. The CCAF/NKAF is almost completely
dependent on the USSR for logistical support. All of the jet air-
craft and most of the piston-engined aircraft in the CCAF/NKAF have
been provided by the USSR. The bulk of all supplies is shipped via
the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Siberia and then distributed by means
of Chinese rail units. A smaller percentage of supplies appears to
arrive by water transport at Canton, Shanghai, and Taingtao for
distribution by rail. The shortcomings of the transportation appear
to impose no serious limitations on CCAF/NKAF air operations.
Neither China nor North Korea possesses a significant capability to
develop, manufacture, or meet the supply requirements of an air force.
5. Capabilities. The CCAF/NKAF is estimated to have the follow-
ing capabilities:
(a) To employ its entire fighter strength of 950 air-
craft on air defense missions in China, Manchuria,
and North Korea. Under conditions of sustained
combat, those aircraft assigned to air defense
missions could probably average one sortie per day
per aircraft assigned in Manchuria and China. Air-
craft operating from Manchuria and China over North
Korea would have a reduced sortie capability be-
cause of the distance involved. The defensive capa-
bility over North Korea has been increasing steadily
and UN air forces no longer have complete freedom of
action along the lines of communication from Pyongyang
to the Yalu.
(b) To initiate offensive air operations against UN air,
ground, and naval forces on the Korean peninsula and
adjacent waters. From bases in Manchuria and China,
the CCAF/NKAF bombers and piston-engined fighters
could range over all of Korea and from certain bases
they could strike the southern tip of Honshu and a
part of Kyushu. The jet fighters have sufficient
range to carry out attacks on nearly all of the
Korean peninsula and adjacent waters. The ground
attack type aircraft would have a very limited
capability unless North Korean bases were used at
least for staging, If North Korean bases became
operational, CCAF/NKAF capabilities would be sub-
stantially increased. Although the Communists
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could employ their entire strength of 1,330 air-
craft on offensive missions, it is unlikely that
they would commit more than 800 aircraft in view
of their overall defense requirements. Without
consideration of combat attrition, they could
probably average /+00 sorties per day with this
force on a sustained basis.
6. Aircraft Strength. The USSR has the capability of com-
mitting a large portion of its Far Eastern Air Forces to Korean
operations without delay. The Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces have
an estimated Table of Organization and Equipment strength of 5,500
combat aircraft. (The actual strength is estimated to be about 85
percent of the TO and E strength, but it is believed that these
units could be readily brought up to full strength.) These 5,500
aircraft are primarily of World War II types, but the USSR is now
known to be equipping some units with jet fighters and can deploy
additional jets to the Far East in a relatively short time.
7. Airfields. Of the total airfields,in the Sino-Soviet
Far East 131 are within 500 miles of either the 38th Parallel in
Korea or the Japanese islands of Honshu and Kyushu. These 131
airfields are capable of sustaining the entire Soviet Far Eastern
Air Forces.
8. Logistic Support. The USSR has been stockpiling POL pro-
ducts, including jet fuel, in substantial quantities in the Far
East. Providing no effective UN action were taken to disrupt
Communist supply lines outside Korea, it is believed that the
USSR could provide logistic support for its Far Eastern Air Force
in the Korean theater.
9. Capabilities. If the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces were
deployed to bases adjacent to Korea, night bombing attacks could be
carried out anywhere in Korea or Japan, and saturation-type day
bomber operations could be launched throughout most of Korea. Al-
though no TU--4ts are currently known to be based in the Far East,
they could be readily deployed there, considerably increasing enemy
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air capabilities for saturation-type bomber operations and atomic attack
on UN military installations in South Korea and Japan. With consider-
ation for air defense and other missions, the Soviets could assign
2,000 combat aircraft for support of the Korean war. The sortie
capability of this force could approximate 1,000 per day on a sus-
tained basis.
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WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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