SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RAIL AND CANAL CONSTRUCTION IN BERLIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020016-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 14, 2005
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 17, 1951
Content Type:
MF
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Approved For Release 2005/11/29 :CIA-RRDP79R00904A 100020016-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 September 1951
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Significance of Soviet-East German Rail and Canal
Construction in Berlin
The Soviet-East German authorities are constructing a
railway by-pass encircling Berlin and a canal which, when
completed, will eliminate the necessity of their traffic passing
through the Western Sectors of the city, Completion of these
traffic by-passes will ensure complete Soviet control over
R-ast German external and internal passenger and freight
traffic. It is estimated that the railway ring will be completed
by January 1952 and that the canal, which will free the Com-
munist authorities of the present necessity of sending barge
traffic through waterways in the British.Sec'tor of Berlin, will
be completed between August 1952 and January 19530
There are apparently two reasons for the Communist
construction of the railway by-pass: (1) to ensure adequate
capacity for internal German rail traffic, and (2) to free
Berlin rail traffic from the possibility of Allied interference
There is a real, even acute, economic need for a rail by-pass
of Berlin. Pre-war Berlin had such a by-pass, generally
referred to as the Outer Rail Ring. This ring was partially
dismantled and removed in 1945 by the USSR, As the East
German economy recovered and existing rail facilities be -
came inadequate, the Soviet authorities began to reconstitute
the Outer Ring.
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iv?
It is, however, obvious that a major consideration in
the reconstruction of the Outer Ring Is to by-,pass the Allied
sectors. Instead of reconstructing those segments of the
Outer Ring which cross the Western,Sectors, the Communists
have gone to considerable expense and effort. to construct new
rail lines, which do not pass through them. Much smaller ex-
penditures on, the rail segments crossing the Western Sectors
would have increased the total capacity of the Outer Ring more
than, the construction of these parallel lines
The completion of the 35 kilometer long Neiderrieuendorf-
Paretz Canal will mean that the Elbe-Oder waterway traffic
need no longer transit the British Sector of Berrlin. In the
past, Allied interdiction of this waterway traffic, particularly
important in German.-Polish trade, has proved to be an import-
ant countermeasure to Soviet harassing tactics i.n.Berlin. The
new canal will, therefore, make the Soviet position in Berlin
less vulnerable to Allied counteraction.
blockade.
Communist independence of the Western Powers for a
right of way through Berlin by rail or canal does not necessarily
mean that the USSR will impose a complete blockade of the city
when these facilities are completed. Major political and
economic considerations, such as the greatly increased East-
West tension that would arise and the effect- of a blockade on
East-West German trade, would be involved. It must, however,
be recognized that the completion of both construction, projects
by late 1952 will decrease Soviet vulnerability to Allied counter-
measures and may, therefore, increase the likelihood of the
imposition of additional harassing measures and/or a complete
WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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