SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET-EAST GERMAN RAIL AND CANAL CONSTRUCTION IN BERLIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020016-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 17, 1951
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020016-4.pdf128.02 KB
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Approved For Release 2005/11/29 :CIA-RRDP79R00904A 100020016-4 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 17 September 1951 Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence Subject: Significance of Soviet-East German Rail and Canal Construction in Berlin The Soviet-East German authorities are constructing a railway by-pass encircling Berlin and a canal which, when completed, will eliminate the necessity of their traffic passing through the Western Sectors of the city, Completion of these traffic by-passes will ensure complete Soviet control over R-ast German external and internal passenger and freight traffic. It is estimated that the railway ring will be completed by January 1952 and that the canal, which will free the Com- munist authorities of the present necessity of sending barge traffic through waterways in the British.Sec'tor of Berlin, will be completed between August 1952 and January 19530 There are apparently two reasons for the Communist construction of the railway by-pass: (1) to ensure adequate capacity for internal German rail traffic, and (2) to free Berlin rail traffic from the possibility of Allied interference There is a real, even acute, economic need for a rail by-pass of Berlin. Pre-war Berlin had such a by-pass, generally referred to as the Outer Rail Ring. This ring was partially dismantled and removed in 1945 by the USSR, As the East German economy recovered and existing rail facilities be - came inadequate, the Soviet authorities began to reconstitute the Outer Ring. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RD P 16-141 Approved For Releae 2005/11/29 -RDP79R00904A000, 00020016-4 iv? It is, however, obvious that a major consideration in the reconstruction of the Outer Ring Is to by-,pass the Allied sectors. Instead of reconstructing those segments of the Outer Ring which cross the Western,Sectors, the Communists have gone to considerable expense and effort. to construct new rail lines, which do not pass through them. Much smaller ex- penditures on, the rail segments crossing the Western Sectors would have increased the total capacity of the Outer Ring more than, the construction of these parallel lines The completion of the 35 kilometer long Neiderrieuendorf- Paretz Canal will mean that the Elbe-Oder waterway traffic need no longer transit the British Sector of Berrlin. In the past, Allied interdiction of this waterway traffic, particularly important in German.-Polish trade, has proved to be an import- ant countermeasure to Soviet harassing tactics i.n.Berlin. The new canal will, therefore, make the Soviet position in Berlin less vulnerable to Allied counteraction. blockade. Communist independence of the Western Powers for a right of way through Berlin by rail or canal does not necessarily mean that the USSR will impose a complete blockade of the city when these facilities are completed. Major political and economic considerations, such as the greatly increased East- West tension that would arise and the effect- of a blockade on East-West German trade, would be involved. It must, however, be recognized that the completion of both construction, projects by late 1952 will decrease Soviet vulnerability to Allied counter- measures and may, therefore, increase the likelihood of the imposition of additional harassing measures and/or a complete WILLIAM L. LANGER Assistant Director National Estimates 25X1 ,"CRZ I- Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020016-4