THE GREEK ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 31, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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'60NFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
31 August 1951
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: The Greek Elections
For more than a year there has been widespread talk
in Greece of a "Papagos solution" the displacement of
the unstable and largely ineffectual coalition cabinets which
have succeeded one another since the war by a "strong man"
government headed by the widely respected Marshal Papagos,
until recently Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The
establishment of such a government has emerged as a definite
possibility with Papagos decision to contest the 9 September
parliamentary elections at the head of a new party, the 'Greek
Rally. With the elections less than two weeks away, however,
the.Marshal's formal entry into politics has as yet failed to
produce the band wagon effect which his unparalleled prestige
in Greece had led most- observers to expect.
9
Before Papagos threw his hat into the political ring,
the Greek parties could be roughly divided into four major
groups: the small parties of the far right, making up about
10 percent of the present parliament; the right centrist groups
(Populist, LEK, and the Social Democrats), including about
40 percent of the deputies; the left centrist groups (the
Liberals and EPEK) comprising another 40 percent; and the
far left, making up a final 10 percent. One of the right centrist
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CONFIDENTIAL
factions, LEK, hastened to disband in favor of the new
Papagos party, and it appears likely that the Papagos
ticket will capture a high proportion of. the right centrist
vote. Papagos has failed, however, to line up vote-getting
supporters from the left centrist parties; and has encountered
violent opposition from the King, who was once considered a
principal advocate of a Papagos solution but is now deeply
embittered over Papagos' criticism of the Palace entourage
and his precipitate resignation as Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces at the end of May. The King has worked
closely with the politicans of the far right, but has also re-
ceived considerable cooperation from Premier Venizelos.
In addition to exhorting politicans to steer clear of Papagos,
the Palace faction has sought to weaken Papagos' influence
in the army and to prevent Papagos from using the army as
a source of political strength.
Predicting election results is particularly difficult in
the case of Greece, where political alignments have the
ephemeral character, usually ascribed to Hollywood romances
and where most politicans have few close ties with the elector-
ate once they get to Athens. E nthusias m for a ref or m adminis
tration under Papagos --- though not yet evident -- might sweep
the country without the Marshal's getting further support from
the professional politicans. Various candidates on other tickets
might decide to join Papagos once they get elected. At present,
however, the prospect appears as follows-
a. Papagos is likely to head the largest delegation in
the new parliament but will probably fail to get a
majority. Assuming Papagos gets the bulk of the
right-of -center vote and makes limited inroads
into the Liberal and EPEK followings, he would
gain about 100 of the 250 seats In parliament --
about as many as those going to the two left
C.DNFIDENTIALG
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C!ORPrDENrrAt'
centrist parties combined. He could not get
a clear majority, however, without inducing
one of every three normally left centrist
voters to deny his vote to either the Liberal
slate or EPEKO
b. Papagos will probably get first chance at
forming a government and should be able to
get enough support from other groups to get
a working majority in parliament. Although
the King might try to bypass him (as he tried
in, the case of Plastiras last year), Papagos
would probably have enough votes, at least
initially, to prevent any government he opposed
from getting a vote of confidence.
c. Papagos, as Prime Minister, would probably
work more earnestly than his rivals to achieve
the major US objectives in Greece. elimination
of corruption and waste in the government,
economic reform, and maintenance of a strong
professional army unhampered by political
pressures. He would continue close diplomatic
and military cooperation with the US
d. It is quite likely, however, that Papagos would
be frustrated in the. reform program, much as
was General Razmara In Iran, by the opposition
of the Palace, the resistance of the vested
interests (which are strongly represented in his
own following), the unreliability of his political
allies, and his own political inexperience.,
e. There is some danger that the stability of the
government will be weakened by political
NFbENTIA."'
sue,
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eoxFIDENTIAV
interference with the army and by continued
wrangling between the King and Papagos,
The Marshal might eventually seek to establish
a dictatorship, though there is as yet no strong
indication that his thinking is running along.
such lines a
f o US action or lack of action will have an impor-
tant bearing on the course of events inasmuch as
the US controls Greece's purse strings and is
accepted by Greek leaders as an arbiter in
Greek affairs.
From the US point of view, the 9,. September elections
thus appear to hold out little promise of an improvement of the,
Greek situation. Governmental instability is not only likely to
continue but may well be increased by the Palace's increasingly
open meddling in politics and in. army affairs; eventually the
long dormant question of monarchy versus republic, which
was responsible for nine attempted coups d'etat between 1922
and 1937, might be revived. The one "strong man" available
for a crisis appears likely to be cut down to the level of the
ordinary politicians.
WILLIAM L. LANGER
Assistant Director
National Estimates
4 ~`: ~ENTIA~
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