PROBABLE SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS IN THE FORTHCOMING SAN FRANCISCO PEACE CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: August 21, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 August 1951
Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence
Subject: Probable Soviet Objectives and Tactics in the :
Forthcoming San Francisco Peace Conference
Soviet acceptance of the invitation to attend the US-UK
sponsored Japanese peace treaty conference at San Francisco
follows extended efforts by the USSR to prevent the conclusion
of a peace treaty on the basis of US-UK proposals. The USSR
may have given up hope of blocking the signature of the US -UK
draft and may be attending the conference merely to register its
objections for the record and to continue its propaganda attack
on the US-UK treaty.
We believe it more likely, however, that the USSR, in
attempting to forestall signature of the US-UK draft, will adopt
a positive approach and introduce as an alternative a general
program for peace in the Far East, To create a favorable
atmosphere for the Soviet approach, the USSR may engineer a
cease fire agreement in Korea. A proposal for widening the
scope of the San Francisco conference would be designed to
appeal not only to Japan and other Far Eastern nations, but also
to Western European nations that have misgivings with respect
to US Far Eastern policy.
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Regardless of the outcome of any Soviet proposals,
the USSR will almost certainly not sign the US-UK draft
and will probably attempt to influence Far Eastern nations
not to sign, by threats and intimidation if necessary. We
consider it unlikely, however, that the USSR would go so
far as to issue an, ultimatum to- signatories of- the US-UK
draft, nor do we believe that the USSR will react to the signing
of the US-UK draft by an attack- on Japan.. Rather, on the- basis
of its position at San. Francisco, the USSR would probably seek
to develop popular reaction against the "separate" treaty in
Japan, elsewhere in the Far East, and Western Europe, hoping
thereby to prevent the ratification of the treaty or, at least,
to limit the number of countries ratifying.
We believe that the Soviet tactic at the conference will
be to open with a strong attack against the US-UK draft. The
USSR will probably claim that the draft is "illegal" because
previous international agreements were violated and Com-
munist China was not consulted. They will also contend that
the draft treaty is not truly a treaty of "peace" because it
is part of a US plan to militarize Japan and to convert it into
an American colony for aggressive purposes. In. addition, the
USSR will probably repeat: Communist propaganda that the
US -UK draft does not do justice either to Japan or to other
Asiatic states.
Having delivered its criticism and vilification of the
US -UK draft, the USSR may present an alternative draft peace
treaty embodying a general program for peace in the Far East.
The Soviet delegation will probably insist that this draft be
considered by "all states that participated with their armed
forces in the war against Japan"' (specifically including Com-
munist China and possibly Outer Mongolia and North Korea).
The USSR may indicate a willingness to discuss, either at
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San Francisco or at a later conference, any outstanding
Far Eastern issues not resolved by their draft of the
Japanese Peace Treaty. The USSR might in this way hope
to widen the scope of the San Francisco discussions and
exploit differences between the US and its allies on the
recognition of Communist China and the disposition, of
Taiwan.
Althoufh the USSR will probably present its program
as a `'fresh' approach to the Japanese problem, it will
undoubtedly include specific points already advanced in
official and unofficial Soviet statements.
These will probably include the following-
(1) Communist China must be included among
the negotiating powers.
(2) The treaty should merely ratify agree-
ments reached at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam.
These would have the effect of confirming
Soviet possession of the Kuriles and
southern. Sakhalin and giving Communist
China possession of Formosa and the
Pescadores.
(3) The Ryukyus, Bonins, and other small
island groups should be returned to Japan
or their disposal left to the UN Security
Council.
(4) While Japan should pay reparations, Japan
should be given full opportunities for trade
with the Asian mainland, as well as assistance
in unlimited development of 66peaceful" in-
dustry, and possibly an extension of Japanese
fishing rights
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(5) All foreign, troops should be with-
drawn from Japan within a year,
Japanese rearmament to be limited
and subject to inspection, no power
to be permitted to maintain military
bases in Japan, and Japan not to be
permitted to make bilateral security
agreements
WILLIAM L. L NG R
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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