IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020054-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 13, 2005
Sequence Number: 
54
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
July 6, 1951
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020054-2.pdf128.51 KB
Body: 
Approved For Base 2005/11RDP79R00904100020054-2 CONFI EN AI CENTRAL INTEL IGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 6 July 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: Iranian Developments to There is a serious danger that, unless the UK or the US adopt policies which will maintain the flow of Iranian oil to the West,, Iran will be forced to turn to the USSR for assistance or will suffer an economic collapsed In either case,, Iran would probably come under Communist domination within a few monthso 20 At the present time the UK appears to be prepared to close down the AIOC installations in Iran, withdraw all British personnel from Iran, and boycott Iranian oil rather than submit to Iran8s termed It is unlikely that these tactics will induce Iran to accept a com-. promise settlemento 25X1 L DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 13 1] DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: Ts soC 25X1 NEXT REVIEW DATE: lSqtk Approved For Release 2005MDjI gff79R0 51-110 - r""M Approved For Rase 2005/4 IArRDP79RO0904AA#0100020054-2 L'C1NR'T11~ NIrr n r oil industry were shut down completely for any length of times Iran would find it almost impossible to recapture its former markets4 Iran's crude oil could be replaced almost immediately by expansion in other fields and its refined products after about six months by building other refineries in Western Europe. 4. If Iran cannot sell its oil to the Western world., it might turn to the USSR for assistance. Because of transportation diffi- cultiess the USSR could probably not for some time use more than a small proportion of Iran's potential production. However., with Russian technicians in the southern oilfields., Iran would be lost to the West; and the consolidation of Iran as a Soviet Satellite would be only a matter of.timeo 5o The current US policy* of supporting the Shahs extending military, economics and technical assistance., and bringing our influ- ence to bear on Iran and the UK in the oil controversy appears hardly adequate to the situation. If Iran's stability (and therefore its Approved For Release 200,Aq ik79R00904A000100020054-2 Approved For la ase 2005/1 RDP79R00904A&60100020054-2 CONFIDENTIAL' vulnerability to Communist pressure) depends on the continued flow of its oil to the west, US policy-makers are confronted with the following critical questionsa (a) Can we afford to let the British abandon Iran and permit the oil industry to close down knowing that even under ideal circumstances it will take several months to revive it and that in the meantime Iran a nay be forced to turn to the USSR for assistance or may collapse internally? (b) If, as now seems probable, the British leave Iran, how long can we permit Mossadeq to "starin his own juice" before coming to his assistance? (a) Is it in our interest to assist Iran to maintain its oil industry,, even if such assistance has to be ex- tended on MossadegVs present terms? (d) Are Mossadeges present terms in fact completely unrea- sonable and uneconomic from the point of view of a foreign concessionaire? (e) If they are, is it in the interest of the US to sub? sidize a US oil company to operate Iran's oil industry? -3m -NMMr ONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020054-2 Approved For ease 2005/11/29 : BCIIA-RDP79R00904 W 0100020054-2 CONFIDENTIAL Cr) Would it be better to adopt such a course of action than to be compelled at a subsequent date to use force in Iran to put down a Communist uprising? 5Q All these questions raise serious problems The time appears to be rapidly approaching, however, when they will have to be answered unless the West is prepared tot (1) fight to retain in Iran what it appears unable to retain by nego- tiation; or (2) abandon Iran to Communismo WILLIAM L. LANG ER Assistant Director National Estimates -Sam !,bO"IDENTIAL 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/11/29 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000100020054-2