THE SOVIET NOTES ON GERMAN UNITY AS A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF A MORE 'CONCILIATORY' SOVIET POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100030069-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: April 21, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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CON 'IDENTIAL1
CENTRAL IIJ TELLIGEUCE AGEli CY
OF tCE OF IJATI011AL ESTI'L\TES
AT April 1952
THE SOVIET NOTES ON GER',.117 UNITY AS A POSSIBLE I:1DIC'1TION OF
A :.0RE "CONCILIATORY" SOVI1;T POLICY
1. Recent Soviet moves have been interpreted in some
quarters as indicating that the Kremlin is seeking to produce
a. calmer international atmosphere,
2? The recent Soviet notes on German unity are the most
striking indication of such a possible shift in Soviet policy,
In the first of these notes, the Kremlin called for a peace ,
treaty with a united, neutralized, and rearmed Germano In the
second note, the Kremlin asked for immediate four-power discussion
of the terms upon which free all-German elections should take place6
If the Kremlin is actually prepared to permit free elections in
Fast Gerry, and to permit German unification. and rearmament,
these concessions would represent a significant s!iift in Soviet
policy toward Germany, and might indicate a shift in the world
policy of the Kreml"
3? 11hile such a shift is possible, the'Doard of National
Estimates believes that the Soviet objective is to divide the
hest and retard estern rearmament, and that there are as yet
no indications that the Kremlin intends to make real concessions
in order to attain these objectives or in order to lessen
international tension0
6 The Kremlin probably estimates that if the ::astern Powers
agree to four-power discussions on all.Ger:-ian elections, the
conclusion of the EDC and contractual agreements would be delayed,
and that delay would not only prevent ratification of the agreements
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CONFIDENTIAL,
by the US Congress before it adjourns, but would also adversely
affect congressional, sentiment with regard to the larger program of
military aid to the NATO countries. The Itrerrl.in probably also
estimates that European opinion is in such delicate balance that
.a few months` delay might be fatal to the rearmament pro1-ramo There-
fore, if the Kremlin could delay the conclusion of the EDC and con?
tractual agreements the whole t+estern defense program might be
delayed,, or crippled, On the other ? hand, the Kremlin probably
estimates that if the Uestern Pours refuse to discuss terms for
all-German 'elections. public sentiment in ?%est Gerruanys Dritain,
and France might turn so strongly against the EDC and contractual
agreements that. the governments of these countries would refuse
to sign the agreements, or that the agreements would not be ratified.
50 The ,Soviet proposals for German unity come, therefore, at
the time when they can do the most harm, "Moreover, the proposals
commnit the USSR to nothing more then talks and the Kremlin has
never been averse to protracted discussion.,
6a We believe, therefore? that the estimate in NIE'53,
"Probable Soviet Courses of Action with Respect to Germany
during 1952," (19 February 1952), remains firm:
"In order to delay ,lest German integration with the
West and West German rearmament* the Kremlin might
attempt negotiations on free elections throughout
Germany, but only to gain timed The Kremlin almost
certainly believes that free elections would result
in a repudiation of Communism in East Germany,
Lioreoverp the Kremlin would not be satisfied that a
united Germany which was'not under Soviet control'
could be kept neutra $ or that Germany, once frees
would not eventually rearm and turn against the
USSR. Tie believe, therefore, that the Kremlin is
unlikely actually to permit free elections to take
places even if the Kremlin were convinced that by
this means it could block West Ger-ian integration
with the West and West German rearmament, As a
tactical manoeuvre, the Kremlin might remove some
of its more overt control mechanisms, including-
some of its military forces9. We do not believe,
however, that the Kremlin would so relax its con..
ax its c
trol over East Germany as to affect the foundations
of Soviet authority."
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