POSSIBLE SPECIAL ESTIMATE ON COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A UNILATERAL ROK RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100040021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 14, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT
Attachment
F6WFIDtTrTfAV
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
Possible Special Estimate on Communist Reactions-t07-
a Unilateral ROK Resumptiln of. Hostilities in Korea.
14 October 1953
Proposed Queshtons to be Covered by Special Estimate
on Communist Reactions
1. SE-18 estimates that the ROK has the capability to initiate
courses of armed action which would disrupt the armistice and might
lead to the resumption of fUll-scale hostilities in Koreas that
there are enough ROK leaders who would obey any orders President
Rhee might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral military actions
and that under certain circumstances Rhee would probably take such
action. The question of possible Communist reactions to a unilateral
ROK attack was not within the scope of SE4i8 and was discussed only
in the context that Rhee9s estimate of probable Communist reactions
would be one of the considerations influencing his decision whether
or not to carry out his threats to resume hostilities.
2. An estimate or probable Communist reactions to various ROK
courses of action would be difficult to define and to prepare. If
however, the Planning Board desires an intelligence study on this
general questions we suggest that the estimate concern itself princi-
pany with the attached questions. These questions on our part are
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tentative and mould require further Planning Board definition.
/n the event that an estimate is requested, we further suggest,
because of the unique nature of such a paper, that the usual con-
tribution procedures be waived and that the Board of National
Estimates be instructed to prepare a draft estimate for agency
consideration after informal consultation with agency representatives.
Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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PROPOSED QUESTIONS TO BE COVERED BY A SPECIAL
ESTIMATE ON PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A UNILATERAL
ROK RESUMPTION OP HOSTILITIES IN KOREA
ASSUMPTION
In no event will the US willingly support a unilateral ROK
attack, but the US will take the nocessary steps to insure the
security of its forces.
PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS TO BE COVERED
la What would be the probable initial and subsequent Commu-
nist military and political reactions to a major ROK attack (1 or
more divisions) in the event that the US disavowed the ROK action,
gave assurances to the Cowuniste that the US.would not support the
ROK attack in any way, and:
a. Issued a warning that US forces would remain in and
defend, if necessary, their existing positions; or
b. Issued a warning that US forces would remain in and
defend, if necessary, their existing positions, and
in addition, actively sought to halt the ROK attack
IrtteitErvo
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by employing any measures Considered necessary by
the US, including the deposition of President Rhee
and his principal lieutenants) or
0. Began a general withdrawal of US forces from Korea?
2. How would the above Communist reactions differ:
a. If the ROK attack were limited in size (less than one
division)?
b. /f the US had announced prior to the ROK attack that
under no circumstances would the US support any uni
lateral attack by the ROK?
Co If the US had announced prior to the 90K attack that
the US would withdraw its forces from Korea in the
event of a unilateral ROK attack?
d. If the US had announced prior to the 90Kattabk that
the US would take any measures considered hecettary
by the US to halt an ROK attack once undertaken?
3. How would Communist military- and politica reaCtiOns be -
affected by the military actions taken in Korea and the political
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actions taken elsewhere by UN members other than the US with
military forces in Korea?
4. How woad Communist military and political reactions be
affected by the status of the political conference at that time
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