CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100040076-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: April 30, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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30 April 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Current Developments in Laos
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1. military During the period
October-December 1952, Viet Minh forces captured all French
Union outposts in the mountainous Thai country of northwestern
Tonkin except Nasan, Laichau, and Dien Bien Phu, and conducted
reconnaisance operations across the border in northern Laos.
Expecting the Viet Minh to renew their attack son Nasan and
northern Laos during the good' weather period of April and May
1953, the French Command continued during the January-March
respite to build up the defenses of Nasan and to fortify the
area of Sam Neua, a town astride a terrain corridor from Tonkin
into northern Laos. During March it became apparent to the
French Command that the Viet Minh were preparing to strike
again, and the French expressed confidence in their ability
to hold Nasan and to stop an attack into northern Laos.
2. On 14 April the Viet Minh resumed the offensive and
drove into Laos with an estimated strength of 21 battalions
supported by large numbers of coolie supply porters. In the
initial attack, one column of 9 battalions quickly routed the
French Union garrison at Sam Neua and moved southwestward
toward the Plain des Jarres; another column of 9 battalions
moved inland from the Annam coast and quickly reached the
French Union position on the Plain des Jarres; a third column
of 3 battalions moved southward along the valley of the Mou
River toward Luang Prabang. At the present time the exact
location and movement of Viet Minh units in Laos is obscure,
but the immediate tactical objective appears to be the early
capture of Luang Prabang and possibly the administrative
capital of Vientiane.
3. In meeting this threat, the French theoretically
could: (a) bring up reserves from the Delta and from south
and central Vietnam to defend Luang Prabang and reinforce
such strong points as the Plain des Jarres, and/or (b) attack
the seriously overextended and vulnerable Viet Minh lines of
communication by striking in force from the Delta. The French
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have decided on the former. It is still too early to esti-
mate whether they will be able to move sufficient reinforce-
ments to prevent the capture of Luang Prabang and Vientiane.
Meanwhile, the consequent dispersion of French strength from
the Delta, while not so great as to endanger French ability to
resist large-scale Viet Minh attacks, makes it extremely doubtful
that the French could launch a successful attack from the Delta
against the Viet Ninh lines of communication which extend from
Laos through Tonkin to the China border. It would therefore
appear that the Viet Minh will be able to retain the military
initiative in Laos even if they do not succeed in early capture
of Luang Prabang and Vietiane.
4. Probable future trends in Indochina. The long-range
implications of the Laos campaign are more serious. It would
appear that the Viet Minh have realized the futility of assault-
ing the more heavily armed French Union forces in the Tonkin
Delta and at other strong points. The Laos campaign would fit
into an over-all strategy of seizing the military initiative
by attacking lightly defended portions of Indochina while post-
poning and avoiding a final test of arms with the principal
French Union forces. This tactic would also have the result
of forcing the French to disperse their forces more widely,
thus preventing them from building up sufficient strength in
strategic Tonkin to assume the offensive.
5. The French are not now in a position to take the
military initiative away from the Viet Minh. The reduction
of French Union strength in the Tonkin Delta will seriously
reduce French ability to clean out the Viet Minh guerrillas
infesting the Delta, and will postpone still further the time
when French Union build-up will be great enough to support an
offensive. Diversion of units from south Vietnam has forced
postponement of plans to sweep that area of guerrillas this
year. Moreover, Vietnamese morale may decline, causing an
increase in "fence sitting" and much greater difficulty in re-
cruiting to meet projected expansion goals of the Vietnamese
Army. Therefore, unless and until the French Union increases
its total armed strength, concentrates its available strength,
and adopts more aggressive military and political courses of
action, the Viet Minh can be expected' to retain the initiative
and move gradually to the consolidation of its control over
Laos, Cambodia, and the lightly defended portions of Vietnam.
6. The threat to Thailand. We do not believe that the
attack on Laos was undertaken with the primary purpose of
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preparing for an invasion or infiltration of Thailand. It is
certain, however, that a Viet Minh occupation of Laos will
provide opportunities for Communist organizational activities
among the 40-50,000 Vietnamese who inhabit northeastern Thailand,
and for exerting psychological pressures on the Thai government.
In time, a serious guerrilla movement might be developed among
the Vietnamese in Thailand on the basis of supplies and leadership
provided by the Viet Minh. The threat to the stability of Thailand
would be further increased if the Viet Minh were not stalemated
in Laos and were permitted to move southward along the Mekong
River and the Thai border to Cambodia.
7. Because of the establishment of a Thai autonomous
area in southern Yunnan Province in Communist China, there has
also been speculation that the drive into Laos might be part
of a Communist plan to establish a "free Thai Republic" encom-
passing the Thai peoples of Laos, Thailand, and the Shan States
of Burma. It should be noted, however, that the establishment
of a Thai autonomous area in southern Yunnan was only one act
in the Chinese Communist program for setting up autonomous areas
throughout China where large groups of racial minorities are
concentrated. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the appeal of
a "greater" Thai republic would prove effective in Laos, the
Shan States, or in Thailand. The use of the fiction of a "free
Thai" movement, in one form or another, particularly as a device
to cover a Chinese Communist and Viet Minh supported guerrilla
movement in Thailand, must be considered a future possibility,
however.
8. Relation of the Laos invasion to current Soviet tactics.
In the recent Soviet statement made in reply to President Eisen-
hower's speech of 16 April, the Soviet leaders appear to dis-
claim any responsibility for or control over the "national-libera-
tion" movements of Southeast Asia. We believe, however, that
the Viet Minh is responsive to guidance and direction from Peiping
and Moscow, and that if Moscow had felt that the crossing of the
borders of the Kingdom of Laos by Vietnamese communists would
prejudice seriously Soviet global interests, the USSR could have
brought about a postponement of the lo a d m on.
ss s ant Dirt ctor
National Estimates
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