DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100040097-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 97
• Publication Date: February 27, 1953
• Content Type: MF

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75969
-60NFIDYSTIAti Cy No
27 February 1953
B4ECTI Developments
ts in Iran,
ha lead to the to
ell has won a considerab
temporarily repressed the major eleman
opposition to his regime. If the Shah leaves
principal rallying.point for this opposition will have
been removed from the scene.
b. The nature of Mossadeols victory emphasizes again
that his power is personal;it is not based upon amen.
knit political and seeurity organisation. Opposition has
not been perwmamnitly suppressed. Unless Messadeol consoli-
dates his power to a greater degree than seems likely he
will feel obliged repeatedly to rely upon unpredictable
gm like that of the past weekend
e. We believe it likely that Mossadeq will continue
to dominate the situation at least through 1953 - as eon.
eluded in NI,-.7/l. It is possible, but we believe it
unlikely, that news of the departure of the Shah might
precipitate unrest beyond the power of Mossadeolls govern
merit to control.
d. Unless? such state of unrest aoul.d develop, we
see no immediate advantage to the Tudeh Party arising frol4
the *yenta of the past week. In the longer run, hw.ver,
the departure of the Shah would enhance the importance of
the Tudeh Party as a center of effective opposition to
Mesedeq, and thus would make it more attractive as an
ally to extremist dissidents sueh as Kashani and Baghai.
Moreover, departure of the Shah, by weakening the monarchy
bote/DENTIAL
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. 2 .
'OOVIIIDENTIAt;
as a symbol of unity and stability in Iran, would
bute to the accomplishment of an important Tudeh Party
objective.
e. Inasmuch as Mossadecits maneuvers of the last ten
days were largely directed against those who had criticised
him for not concluding an oil agreement, it appears likely
that he will now be more insistent than ever that the US
and UK agree to his terms.
2. In the present fluid situation we do not feel that an
immediate revision of NIE?75/1 would be useful.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
CONFIDIENTIAC
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