ISRAELI POLICY LEADING TO CRISIS IN ARAB-ISRAELI AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000100050035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: May 17, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 May 1954
DRAT MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBSET: Israeli Policy Leading to Crisis in Arab-Israeli Affairs
1. Arab-Israeli relations have been plunged into the most
dangerous state of tension since the end of the Palestine War by
a series of violent incidents which started on 17 March. We
believe that recent developments have created a situation likely
to lead to border. clashes of increasing size and intensity and to
great danger of the accidental renewal of the Palestine War.
2a Israeli initiative has been the root cause of this growing
deterioration in the Arab-Israeli situation. For more than a year
the Israelis have felt that events wore running against them, among
the most important of which have been such developments as the US arms
aid agreement with Iraq, which they believe indicate an increasingly
pro Arab US policy. Fearful that in time a growing rapproaohement
between the US and the Arab states will redound., gradually to Israel's
disadvantage., Israel has adopted an increasingly bold and aggressive
policy designed to secure replacement of the present unsatisfactory
armistice by some more permanent arrangement before Israeli bargaining
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power declines., The Gorernnont apparently hopes to create a
situation in which the great powers will feel compelled to inter-
vene and force the Arab states into a settlement, with Israelo
3a We believe that in the absence of strong pressure from
the great powers Israel is unlikely to moderate this policy,
despite the risks of open hostilities involved* Moreover, if the
forthcoming Security Council proceedings on the Palestine question
result in an apparent defeat for Israel, extremist elements in and
out of the government will probably go further and press for a
reopening of the Arab-Israeli Saar., They will argue that this is
the only means by which the great powers can be forced to intervene
and impose the permanent settlement Israel wants o However, we
believe that the Israeli Government would probably not go so far an
to deliberately reopen full scale hostilities for fear that: (a) the
UK would honor its treaty obligations to Jordan; (b) the parties to
the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 m- the US, UK, and France and might
impose a settlement favorable to the -Arab states; and (c) foreign
economic aid to israel would probably be adversely affected.
h., Nevertheless, even if it rejects the tactic of deliberately
reopening the Palestine War, Israel will almost certainly continue
to carry out reprisal raids and to sabotage the armistice machines-yo
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A continuation of such tactics in the tense situation now prevailing
will probably lead to armed clashes of increasing size and intensity,
unless the size and efficiency of the UN Truce Supervision Organi-
zation are greatly increased or the great powers assn re responsibility
for the supervision of then borders. There is great danger that these
clashes cannot be limited and will accidentally lead to full scale
hostilities,
5. As a result of these developments, our estimate in NIE-92,x
"Israel" (11 August 1953) that an early renewal of hostilities is
"unlikely" needs some modification. NIE-92 merely points out that
war could break out by accident' but we now estimate that this clang
is great. Consequently., we recommend that the Board initiate a
slant on NIB-92. Since most of NIE-92 is still valid, however, we
recommend that the slant be limited to: (a) Israeli intentions with'
respect to the Arab states; (b) the likelihood of renewed hostilities;
and (c) the military capabilities of Israel and the Arab states.
These questions could be handled in NIE 36-54 on the Arab states
(scheduled for the 3rd quarteer)# but the chief subject of the slant
would be the Israeli rather than the Arab attitude. We also feel
that if any estimate is done,, it should be done at soon as possible.
Indeed,, a major argument against doing a new NIL at all is that the
planners and policy makers already appear to be fully aware of the
explosive potentialities of the Arab-Israeli situation and that we
may thus be merely writing for the record.
CONFIDENTIA
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