COMMENTS BY THE BOARD ON OIR'S INTELLIGENCE REPORT NO. 6771, 'THE CURRENT SITUATION IN HUNGARY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 17, 1954
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010006-2
1%800) mw
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
17 December 1954
IEMORMNDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF` C IITRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Cc onts by the Board on OIRts Intelligence Report
No. 6771, "The Current Situation in Hungary"
The f ollot-ring are the Board 1 s come rite' on OIR t s Intelligence
Report No. 6771, "The Current Situation in Hwnary. rs
1. The Board of National Est:lxnates believes that the :* oount
of political and economic devolopnonts in Hungary given in IR 6771
is, in the rain, objective and accurate. The Board also believes
that the ludganents rzado in the paper, - that the disharmony and
confusion within the regizle L "e e not now a threat to its security,
and that it is likewise not seriously threatened by nrosent lovols
of popular resistax:ce, -- are sound.
2. The Hu ngnri n rog no is unlikely to r al:o any substantial
progress in the near future in overcoming its oconoo iic difficulties.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010006-2
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010006-2
1%w 1~
It is possible that the regine may decide to provide greater
incentives by increasing production of consumer goods, oven
at the cost of a tomporary loss in total production. It is
unlikely, however, that the regime will be able in any short
period, or willing in the long run, to provide sufficient con-
cessions to overcome popular discontent.
3. Even if the economic e .tuat?on in Hungary does not
improve during the next six months or year, we believe that the
regime will still be capable of controlling any ,active resistance
and maintaining itself in poorer. Moreover, the USSR is unlikely
to allow the socurlty of the Hungarian reginiio to be seriously
threatened, and would, if necessr ryr, take whatever errurgency
economic and security rro a,guros wore rar~uirod to maintain the
Communist power. The USSR has about 30,OCO troops in Hungary.
4. The USSR would not be deterred frcyrm a radical inter-
vention by the fact that any active resistance which might develop
was receiving matorial and/or moral support from the "Test. The
USSR would irobahly be willing to incur serious risks of war to
preserve Communist power in Hungary, since it almost certainly
considers its control of the whole, Srtellito area essential to
its own security.
FOR TIM, BOARD OF NATIONAL E TTtWES:
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010006-2