Reactions to ROK Participation in the Indochina War

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010052-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: February 23, 1954
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 February 1954
1 IORANDNNI FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECTS Reactions to ROK Participation in the Indochina War
1, In compliance with the request of the NSC Planning
Planning Boards there follows the Board of National. Estimates
assessment of Communist and non-Communist reactions to the
comnitnent of RON forces against the Viet Minh, The views
here expressed have not been coordinated with the IAC agencies,
2. Whether or not the commitment of ROE; forces to the
war in Indochina would in fact require US logistic supports world
opinion would almost certainly and with virtual unanimity consider
that the operation had been supported and encouraged by the US,
I. THE REACTIONS OF FRANCE AND THE ASSOCIATED STATES
3, The French have been opposed to the introduction of any
combat forces from outside the French Union, Thus,, the comanit?
meet of ROK forces in Indochina would be regarded by the French
as a major blow to French prestige, In additions the use of
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South Korean troops in Indochina would be regarded in France as
iutroduoing a new ally with aims of its own, thus changing the
nature of the ware and so altering the present political circum-
st noea of the conflict as to eliminate aqv prospects for an
early negotiated settlement of the Indochina problem, The French
would be particularly sensitive on this score in the light of the
t rt ooardng Oeneva Conference,
4e We have estimated that French policy toward the Indochina
war currently envisages improvement of the military situation
only to the point of allowing France to negotiate with the Caro-
,
mwaists from a strengthened position, The French probably would
consider that the proposed ROK force could not decisively change
the military situation, Moreover, the French probably believe
that if sufficient ROK - or other foreign - forces were employed
to improve the situation significantly, Communist China would in-
crease its support of the Piet Minh, possibly up to the point of
entering the conflict overtly and in force,
5. We believe, therefore, that France would oppose the.
conmibnent of RAK troops in Indochina. Moreover, we believe the
OS could obtain French consent to this commitment only by pxarting
le Short-term Developments in French Policy",
1 December 1953; NIR-99, "Estimate of the World Situation
Through 1955", 23 October 1953.
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such pressure as would damage US-French relations with respect
to maxr important issues of common concern,
6o The Introduction of RO K forces in the Indochina war
would be regarded with mixed feelings in Viet Nana, Laos, and
Cambodia. Sane strongly nationalist officials and a segment of
public opinion in each of the states would probably welcome in-
creased military assistance from whatever source. However, we
believe that official and unofficial sentiment would be pre-
ponderantly against the ROK commitment, Opposition to the ROK
commmitment would probably be based in part on fear of possible
Chinese Canmunist intervention. There would also be widespread
feeling that the commitment of ROK forces represented a lack of
confidence on the part of France and the US in the Associated
States, that military aid which should be given to the forces
of the Associated States was being diverted to foreign Asian
troops, and that there would be less opportunity to extract poli-
ticml concessions from the French than if the Associated States
themselves were making the increased war effort. We therefore
believe that none of the States would willingly agree to the
commitment of R0K forces in Indochina. If France permitted the
ROK forces to join the conflict, the Associated States, regard-
lees of their own feelings, would have to go along., However, if
the ROK forces were committed in the face of the objections of
3
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the Associated States, there would be even less popular inclination
than now exists to resist the Viet Minh
U. REACTIONS OF OTHER NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
A. Asia
7, Reactions to the commitment of ROK forces in Indochina
would be adverse in most of Asia, and in some countries strongly
8o This adverse reaction would be based in large measure
on existing non-Communist attitudes toward the Indochina war, the
present ROK government, and the concept of collective action against
communism.
a, Although the close relationship between the
Viet Minh and the international Communist movement is
generally recognized in Asia, there is also a wide-
spread belief that the Indochina war is primarily a
struggle between indigenous nationalism and French
colonialism, This ambivalence strengthens neutralist
sentiment in countries such as India, and weakens
support of Western policies toward Indochina even in
such anti-Communist countries as Japan and. Thailand.
b, Most Asian governments and most leaders of
Asian public opinion are not prepared at present to
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%we
participate in collective action against Communism.
This reluctance would apply particularly to any
action in which President Rhee had a leading part'
for most non-Commmunist Asia has a great distrust
of Rhee and fears that he desires to provoke world
War III in order to obtain his objectives in Korea.
9o The commitment of ROK troops to Indochina would in-
wows existing suspicions of Rheep Many Asians would believe
that Rhos was attempting to establish himself as a leader of
an Asian anti-Communist bloc with US support. Asian nationalists
and neutralists would be especially critical of the US for
supporting Rhee, and would consider the ROK troops as US mean
canaries. These criticisms of Rhea and the US would be greatly
intensified if the ROE forces were not enthusiastically greeted
and supported by the Associated States themselves.
3O, In addition, there would probably be a general be.
lief in non-Communist Asia that the commitment of ROK forces in
would not inflict a decisive defeat on the Viet Minh and that the
ROK action might result in Chinese Communist intervention and
thus risk precipitating general war in Asiao
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Go Other Non-Coinnmist Countries
13. The reaction of most other important non-Cow
monist countries to the commitment of ROK forces in Indochina
would be adverse.
III. CCMNIUNiST REACTIONS
114. The Communists would consider the com ttxnent
of ROK forces to Indochina as essentially a US rather than a
RON undertaking. However, they would almost certainly estimate
that these HDK forces could not make an early decisive differ-
ence in the Indochina war. Moreover, they would almost certainly
estimate that considerable political advantage could be gained
from exploiting the unpopularity of the US-RCIK action,, We
therefore believe that the Communists would initial y not com-
mit Chinese Communist forces to an invasion of Indochina or
renew hostilities in Korea. Chinese Communist assistance to
the Viet Minh would be increased if necessary, but this aid
would continue to be limited to logistic and rear area support,.
Meanwhile, they would exploit any differences over the commit-
ment of ROK forces that would probably arise among the US and
other non-Communist countries, and, in particular, would make
propaganda, attacks on the US for jeopardising the success of the
Geneva Conference,
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1115N
150 However, the Gomnunists would be concerned that
this oommitment of ROB forces was only a prelude to more ex.
teneive outside intervention, Therefore, while undertaking
the interim courses of action discussed above, the Communists
would observe carefully the effectiveness of ROK troops in
Inlochina and would watch for any signs that the ROK or any
other powers were planning to commit more forces.
SF RMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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