Probable Communist Reaction to Release of POW's (Re-revised Notes for DCI Briefing of the NSC)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010059-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: January 20, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A GE.NCY
20 January 19511
50
SUBJECT: Probable Communist Reaction to Release of POWle
(Re-revised Notes for DCI Briefing of the NSC) J
1. Over the past weeks, the Communists have issued warn s that
they would regard the return of the 22,000 POW9s to the UNC and their
subsequent release as illegal under the armistice terms. At a recent
UNCMAC meeting, the Communist delegate told the UN delegates that "In
order to insure the implementation of the terms of reference and prevent
the armistice agreement from being further disrupted, thereby gravely
threatening the peace in Korea, I put forth today a proposal which is
of groat significance and ask that your side should immediately put an
and to all the treacherous activities for abducting the POWs" If
your side persists in going your own way and gives no consideration
to this serious proposal of our side, your side must bear the full
responsibility for all therave conse nences On :13 January,,
Indian officials told the British that the Chinese Communist reaction
to the planned release of the prisoners continued to be very strong
and that the Communists had told the Indians they could not "stand idly
by" while the POWs were being returned to the UN.
20 It is our estimate, however, that these warnings do not
indicate a Comunist intent to '?
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to resume hostilities in Korea, or to,launch ne aggression elsewhere
in Asia. In our opinion, the Communists do not regard the disposition
of the POW's as a matter sufficiently important to justify breaking the
status quo in Korea. This was demonstrated when they accepted bon-
forcible repatriation arrangements daring the armistice negotiations.
It was also demonstrated 1-A-M r- 'f3 es de facto acceptance of the
R3K 'release of 27,000 prisoners in mice June prior to signing the
armistice. On both occasions, the Camriunist
attempted to conceal their loss of position,
permit the POW issue to prevent the negotiati
armistice agreement,
protested at length and
They did not, however,
n and signing of the
3- We believe that the withdrawal of major Chinese Communist
forces from Korea, the announcement of long-range Communist plans for
rehabilitating North Korea, and present. Soviet and Chinese Communist
emphasis upon domestic programs are evidence of a Communist decision
not to resume hostilities in Korea. ;Recent Communist tactics concerning
the POW's appear to have been designed largely to exert pressure on the
Indians and to conceal the prestige losses the CorrYnnunists suffered on
the POW issued
4. ( The Communists probably es-ainato that any attempt to seize the
22,000 anti-ODmmunist prisoners while still in the neutral zone would lead
to a renewal of hostilities with UN iou~ces,, At best it would probably
result in conflict with Indian troops,, which the Communists almost
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certainly wish to avoid. Hence, we believe that the Communists will
not make such an attempt.)
54 The most likely Communist actions will consist of disturbances
by Communist agents among the anti-Communist prisoners. (Ai~
-after- Chair. --transfer -to -CNcusto y?) The purpose of
such disturbances would be to give substance to the Communist contention
that pro-Communist prisoners have been forcibly retained. The Commu-
nists will probably also continue to refuse to accept the 349 pro-Communist
prisoners in order to dramatize their contention that the POW's have
been illegally released.
6. Release of the prisoners to civilian status by the UN command
will be denounced by the Communists as a violation of the armistice
agreement, and will~g~o the subject of extensive propaganda.
The Communists might use thi as a justification for actions on their
own part violating the armistice agreement, such as a strengthening of
their military position in North Korea, They might also use it as a-\--
vetrsan for refusing a
demand for the return of UN nationals whom they
rKA
still hold. we do(( believe, however, that the Communists will consider
the release f prisoners, taken by itself, as a development requiring, L. r(
a major alt ration W
their previously determined policy in Kore e
a.
also belyeve that the Communists will not regard the release of the
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prisoners as the justification or pretext for launching aggression
against Hong Kong,, Formosa,, Thailand,, or Burma,, or as a retext for
intensifying their aid in Indochina.
7. We believe that another purpose of the warnings in addition
to obscuring the Communist defeat on the POW issue,, may have beenL~v-
"sJto bolster the Communist bargaining position prior to the Berlin
conference and an anticipated special UN session. By presenting the
view that the POW release was illegal,, that the Korean armistice has
thereby bean violated, and that a tense situation consequently has
been created in the Far East,, the Communists may be seeking to convince
Asian and Western European governments thgt,-.. a Five Power Conference
can-~lessen tensions in Asia.
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