The likelihood of Renewed Arab -Israeli Hostilities

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200020006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 10, 1955
• Content Type: MF

" . e fat . .. .~..
Approved For Release 2005/Q ;' IA-RDP79R00904h0 20 02dO06 Saacnulve R -&Y
10 March 1955
I4 0RANDUN= FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: The Likelihood of Renewed Arab-Israeli Hostilities*
1. Despite Israel's recent attack on Egyptian Army installa-
tions in the Gaza strip, we continue to believe that an early
outbreak of large-scale fighting between Israel and Egypt or
one or more of the other Arab states is unlikely.
2. We believe that the RCC regime in Egypt almost certainly
wishes to avoid a military test of strength with Israel's
superior forces, particularly in view of the present strains
within the Arab League. The other Arab states along Israel's
periphery, all smaller and weaker than Egypt, are probably at
least equally anxious to avoid trouble.
3. The Israeli Government, for its part, has demonstrated
once again that it is prepared to subject its Arab neighbors
to considerable provocation in order to emphasize its determina-
tion to protect Israeli interests and to impress the outside
world with the need for a final settlement of Israel's relations
with its Arab neighbors. Some Israelis, including the influential
ex-Prime Minister and present Defense Minister Ben Cuirion, almost
certainly believe that force is the only way to deal with the
Arabs, and many of them would probably welcome a "second rounds"
as a means of ending an unsatisfactory situation in which time
appears to be working against Israel. We believe it unlikely,
however, that the Israeli Government, particularly under.Prime
Minister Sharett, would deliberately provoke war with the Arabs.
Such a policy would subject Israel not only to various military
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/04/26 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200020006-1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/26?
DP79R00904A000200020006-1
hazards, including the possibility of Tripartite intervention,
but also to probable cutting off of US financial support.
While the, Israelis have presumably been prepared to accept the
risks of war inherent in such major raids as those at Qibya and
in the Gaza strip, we do not believe that provocation of war
was their aim.
!. The chief danger in the present. situation is that the
Israelis may through miscalculation press the Arabs too far.
Egypt and the other Arab states, despite their fundamental un-
willingness-to risk war, would find it increasingly difficult
to remain passive in the face of further Israeli raids, particu-
larly if they were to take place in quick succession. This
danger would be intensified if local Israeli military authorities
went beyond their instructions, as may have been the case in the
Gaza raid. Moreover, the use of fairly sizeable military raiding
forces of itself increases the danger that major opposing units
might be committed before fighting could be halted.
5. We believe that the chances are less than even that Israel
will mount further large-scale raids in the immediate future.
The Gaza raid was apparently intended to counteract the cumulative
effect on Israeli morale and prestige of a series of unfavorable
developments over the last few months, and there is as yet no
evidence that it was intended to inaugurate a new and significantly
tougher policy. Moreover, at least for the present, the pressures
being applied by the US and the UK will probably have a sobering
effect on the Israeli Government.
6. Nevertheless, internal pressures for further retaliatory
raids will almost certainly well up again. Refugee border
crossers will remain a source of irritation and trouble to Is-
raelis in the frontier areas. Dbreover, the problems of maintain-
ing Israel's over-all position in the Near East will continue to
stimulate frustration and discontent -- a feeling that may be
increased by US and UK condemnation of the recent raid. The
Gaza raid has done much to counteract popular dissatisfaction
within Israel over the meager results of Sharett's efforts to solve
Israel's problems primarily through diplomacy. With elections
coming up this summer, the government will be under some pressure
to adopt a somewhat more aggressive posture.
25X1A
SHERI N KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
Approved For Release 2005/04/26) JP79R00904A000200020006-1