Present Chinese Communist Tactics

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 27, 1955
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Relee 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R000 A000200030005-
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
ECLASSIFIED
CL +SS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2 --"
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C 1' G E N C Y
27 July 1955
MEMORANDLM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Present Chinese Communist Tactics
SUMMARY
1. The tactics of Communist China in its relations with
the non-Communist world, like those of the USSR, are at present
comparatively temperate, and in some respects even concilia-
tory. These tactics are in accord with what appears to be an
agreed Bloc policy, adopted at least in part with a. view to
the East-West negotiations of the summer. However, they do not
represent an altogether new departure in Peipingt; conduct of
affairs. For several years the Chinese Communists have, with
increasing diligence, been working to improve their relations
with most of the non-Communist governments of Asia, and to con-
ciliate many of the important non-Communist personalities of the
area. More than a year ago Peiping took the initiative to obtain
a truce in Indochina, and has since proclaimed its pacific intent
NOTE: This memorandum has been informally coordinated with OCT.
It has not been coordinated with any of the IAC Agencies.
rAv"
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Rele 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00A000200030005-1
towards that country. Only with respect to Taiwan and the off-
shore islands has the transition to relative moderation in con.
duct and propaganda been very recent.
2. In 1948 and 1919 the Chinese Communists and the USSR
appear to have believed that Asia was ripe for revolution.
Communist tactics emphasized the use of force both by regular
Communist armies and by indigenous "liberation" movements.
Preparations were openly under way for an attack on Taiwan, and
covertly for the invasion of South Korea. Cormenunist-directed
violence flared in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
3. By 1951, however, it began to be obvious to Peiping
and Moscow that the general program of armed action in the Far
east was not prospering., and that its continuation would serve
only to incite Western countermeasures and to isolate Peiping
in Asia. Except in Vietnam, the attempt to identify the Communist
movement with the cause of nationalism and anti-colonialism was vir-
tually a failure. The established governments in the area clearly
represented the interests and desires of the population to a
greater degree than did the Communists. The Communists began
gradually to abandon violent measures., and to shift to a policy
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relese 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00 A000200030005-1
of cultivating these governments, At first this development
showed itself in friendly approaches to Nehru, U Nu, and the
Indonesian government; later the policy was extended. It was
accompanied by the arrangements for an armistice in Korea.
4. In Indochina the "objective situation" continued for a
longer time to be favorable to Communist military operations,
and the Chinese gave increasing supr,ort to the armies of the
Viet Minh. Nevertheless, it was on Comunist initiative that
the first moves toward a truce were taken in 19514, and Communist
tactics at the Geneva Conference to arrange this truce were
fairly moderate.
5. With respect to Taiwan and the offshore islands, on
the other hand, Peipingts policy became markedly active in late
19518. This was, in our view, pursuant to the genuine Chinese
Communist belief that the territories in question rightfully be-
longed to the government at Peiping, and to a deeply-rooted aim
of acquiring them in order to finish off the civil war. Peiping
regarded the problem as an internal, Chinese one. Most of the
governments of Asia, arirl many in other parts of the world, sym-
pathized with Peiping's view in this respect. It soon became clear,,
-3
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relee 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP79ROO%04
v~AO00200030005-1
however, that the Chinese Communists could not acquire Taiwan,,
or even Quemoy and Matsu, without grave dancer of war with the
US. This alarmed the other Asian countries even though they were
sympathetic to Peiping's aims, and probably gave pause to Peiping
itself. Moreover, promotion of tensions over the Taiwan issue
appeared incompatible with the developing peace campaign of the
USSR, and we believe that the USSR exerted a restraining influence.
Accordingly, the Chinese Communists have adopted a rmro moderate
posture and have allowed the situation in the Taiwan Straits to
become relatively calm.
6. We believe that Communist China will continue its con-
ciliatory policy toward most non-Communist governments of Asia,
for at least a year, and will not encourage local Communist parties
to undertake violent action on any substantial scale. However,
Peiping will xl drntinue covert support and guidance to
Communist movements of infiltration and subversion throughout the
area.
7. With respect to Indochina, we believe that Peiping's
policy will be determined by the course of events in that country,
Should a rapid stabilization take place, Peiping would probably
adjust itself to the situation, and possibly pursue tactics of
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relee 2000/05/23: CIA-RDP79R00 OA000200030005-1
conciliation similar to those adopted toward other countries of
the area. It appears more likely, however, that the situation
will not soon become stabilized, and that Peiping will therefore
consider that opportunities for Communist advance must be supported
and encouraged. Overt military action seems unlikely, except per-
haps by guerrillas, unless the peace campaign of the Bloc is
virtually abandoned.
8. With respect to the Taiwan issue, the Chinese Communists
are unlikely to put much faith in the prospects of making progress
by purely peaceful and diplomatic means. They are continuing a
rapid build-up of their Air capabilities in East China. Although
they will probably prolong; the present relative calm in anticipa..
tion of negotiations on the Far East after the Summit meeting,
they will probably decide eventually that a resumption of
pressures is necessary to keep the issue active and to improve
their negotiating position with the US. However, we believe
that military pressures in the area will be limited by Chinese
Communist concern not to become involved in war with the US.
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Releae 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R009 A000200030005-1
A. Background
9. The classic Leninist-Stalinist bases of Communist
tactics in Asia, which were further developed and refined in
practice by the Chinese Communists prior to World War IT, in-
volved principally the exploitation of nationalism, anticolonial-
ism, and agrarian discontent through Communist-led national fronts
and armed movements. Following; World War II, and particularly
as the Chinese Communists moved to final victory in 19L8-1949,,
Moscow and Peiping apparently became convinced that a revolution-
ary situation existed throughout Asia which should be rapidly
exploited.
10. Following a general call to armed struggle in Asia in
February 1948 at the Calcutta Youth Conference, over-all theoreti-,
cal guidance for a course of violent "armed liberation" was set
forth at a WFTU meeting in Pei ink; in November 19L9, one month
after the formal establishment of the Chinese Communist Government.
.F It should benotdd that as usual the formal theoretical guidance
came after the fact. By 1949, armed rebellion had already
occurred in nearly all former colonial territories in Asia, and
in most cases, the tide had begun to turn against the Communists
before the WFTU convened.
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relee 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00A000200030005-1
At this conference, Chinese Communist leader Liu Shao-chi classi-
fied even the newly independent governments of India, Burma,
Indonesia, and the Philippines as imperialist lackeys, and called
upon the peoples of those countries to join in national libera-
tion and resistance fronts. Existing Communist armed movements
in Indochina, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines were
judged to be "acting entirely correctly." Armed action was pro-
claimed the "main form of struggle in the national liberation
struggle in many colonies and semi-colonies." The Communist
tactics which had. been used in winning China by force were termed
the "path that should be taken." Liu Shao-chi also told the
delegates that it was "necessary to set up wherever and whenever
possible a people's liberation army led by the Communist Party."
11. These guide-lines appear to have governed Communist
policy throughout much of Asia at least into 1951-152. This
period was marked by Communist-led uprisings in India, the con..
tinuation of armed insurrection in Burma, Malaya, the Philippines,
and Indochina; vilification of the Thai government;; preparations
a~ The Indian Communist Party apparently did not receive specific
guidance and experienced serious internal differences as to
the significance of general s?uidance from Moscow for its own
situation.
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relepe 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00WA000200030005-1
by the Japanese Communist party for armed struggle arZainst the
US occupation and the Yoshida government; andp most importantly,
the invasion of Korea. An accompanying tactic was widespread
employment of "people's diplomacy," a device whereby official
and unofficial Chinese Communist representatives often ignored
constituted governments, Tokyo in particular, and dealt instead
with Red Cross Societies, labor unions, cultural delegations,
and other unofficial groups.
12. During 1951 and 1952, however, and especially as evi-
denced in China's March 19.53 initiative which revivified the
Korean armistice talks, a gradual shift began to occur in Com-
munist tactics away from violence, armed action, and "people's
diplomacy." Chinese and Soviet documents of this period, in
discussing the situation in Asia, conceded that there had been
a "receding of the revolutionary wave." Many considerations lay
behind this shift.
They probably included the Communist failure
to conquer Korea and the great risks to Moscow and Peiping attend-
ing a continuation of the war effort in Korea, the domestic poli-
tical problems posed to the USSR by the death of Stalin, and the
disruptive effect of the Korean war on the Soviet and Chinese Com-
munist economies. Perhaps the most important single development
was the failure of the Communists to conceal their aims and to
- 8 -
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00Q4A000200030005-1
identify their cause with nationalism. The people failed to
rally to the Communists in such newly independent states as
Burma, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines and the armed libera.
tion movements were gradually suppressed. In general, continued
armed action involved increasingly greater risks. Given the
relatively non-revolutionary situation, a joint estimate apparently
was made that less aggressive tactics were better suited to
realizing Communist aims in much of the Far East and in particu-
lar would tend to disrupt Western unity,
13. Communist China's moderation at they 1954 Geneva Con-
ference, perhaps occasioned in part by fear of US military inter-
vention, ushered in a period of somewhat more pronounced con-
ciliatory tactics toward the independent governments of Asia
apart from the Chinese Nationals. Peiping sought during the en-
suing; year to capitalize upon the atmosphere of good feeling,
created at Geneva, while incidentally gaining increased world
prestige for itself and its leaders. During this period Peiping
increased its efforts to gain the sympathy of Asian leaders such
as Nehru and U Nu, to broaden its formal contacts and relations
with the constituted governments of Asia, and to convince these
governments that the US was resprnsible for Far East tensions.
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relse 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R002j4A000200030005-1
14, An exception to this over-.all policy., although probably
not regarded by the Chinese Communists as incompatible with it,
was Peipingt post-Geneva campaign of heavy pressures against
the US and Nationalist China, Peiping probably believed that
the territories in question rightfully belonged to Communist Chiria
and probably had a deeply-rooted aim of finishing the Civil war and
eliminating the Nationalist Government. In addition, Peiping
probably believed that a campaign of heavy pressures would serve
domestic ends, including that of keeping alive an "external
enemy"; such a campaign might also gain some or all of the off-
shore islands, further reduce Nationalist prestige and will to
resist, and expose the US as a "paper tiger"; and also create
serious cleavages between the US and its allies and the neutral
powers. Moscow was probably especially attracted by this latter
prospect. Believing the US to be already virtually isolated
and extremely vulnerable on the Nationalist issue, Moscow probably
considered that the prospect of hostilities in the area of the
Taiwan Straits might cause the UK and other allied and neutral
powers to desert the US diplomatically and inhibit it from taking
military action.
a CRET
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relqse 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00A000200030005-1
15. The risks of this policy were obviously considered
acceptable. China+s leaders probably calculated that heavy
pressures could. be placed on the Nationalists without undue
risk either of US military counteraction or of counterproductive
political reactions in non--Communist Asia where many governments
felt that at least the offshore islands should be given to Peiping.
They may even have estimated that they could later extricate
themselves with grace, should success not be gained or should
the situatinn become too dangerous, by subsequently taking con.,
ciliatory moves and magnanimously reducing the very tensions
their tactics had created. It is our judgment that the Chinese
Communist program was thus essentially one of probing and pushing
to see what the traffic would bear, designed to stop short of
incurring US military counteraction while collecting political
capital for Peiping and Moscow in the process.
16. Whatever the Communist calculations, however, their
policy was not very successful. The US did not weaken in its
determination to defend Taiwan, but instead concluded a defense
pact with Taipei and gave Peiling no assurance that it could attack
the offshore islands with impunity. The UK dial not split off from
the US but drew closer to.it on the need for defending Taiwan.
S
Approved For Release 2000/05/2 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relese 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00- 4A000200030005-1
Even the neutral powers cautioned Peiping against the use of force
against the offshore islands. It is our belief that the USSR be.
came concerned over the possibility of war developing in the Taiwan
area, even though it may have initially approved Chinese Communist
pressures, and accordingly requested Peiping to ease up, perhaps
also suggesting that other tactics might better support upcoming
Soviet moves in Europe.
17. Although the above may have been the most immediate
factors, other considerations were probably also impelling Peiping
in the early months of 1955 to adopt somewhat softer over-all
tactics. Communist China's military capabilities, though greatly
enhanced, were still not adequate for a conquest of Taiwan or even
for an easy capture of Quemoy, and its defenses were wholly in-
adequate against a possible US attack, Intraparty personal and
policy differences had reached their most serious proportions since
1938, culminating in the purge of the highly placed Kao Kang and
Jao Shu-Shih. The cumulative effect of poor harvests, lack of
trained personnel, capital investment requirements, peasant
stubbornness, and military demands had disrupted the overambitious
5-year plans and necessitated cutbacks in its economic goals.
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relejsse 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00 4A000200030005-1
18. China's leaders probably also came around to the view that
there would be several positive advantages in a generally softer
policy toward Taiwan. They probably considered that a prolonged
pc riod of nr gotiations with th US might in time result in beneficial
or at least acceptable arrangements if, during the interval, military
capabilities and osr..:ecially air power in East Chins. wore greatly
built up relative to those of the US and its allies. They probably
also calculated that softer tactics would lessen the vigilance of non-
Communist Asia, Japan and India in particular; advance Peiping' aim
of gaining:; world acceptance as the logitinkato goverment and as the
Security Council representative of China; and sup ~lomont and assist
world-wide Soviet conciliatory noires. Lastly, the prostige dividends
already won by post-Geneva soft tactics toward Japan, South and South-
cast Asia, probably contributed to Peiping's belief that, in an
essentially political stru ;:;le, China could out-compote the US in
Asia over the long; torm and in time could realize Communist aii::s in
Asia at a minimum of risk and of cost.
19. In view of all those coneidorations, China's loaders
probably came to a basic decision some tine shortly before Dandung
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Rel sa a 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R0O$4A000200030005-1
that further conciliatory moves in their foreign policy should be
launched. We believe that the main outlines of this now look worn
checked with Moscow over a poriod of time, as part of Sine-Soviet
,poneral coordination, Moscow and Pcipinc probably agreed that a
coordinated effort should be made to play down international Corxatunisnn
and to approach the Hostern and Asian states with an o tensible
"ibusinoss_like" program for reduction of tensions.
I3. The Bandung Conference and the lain Lines of.,-P:resexit...Cliin,eso
Corununist Policy
20. As is suggested by the prior psychological build-up they
gave the l3ancluhg Confor once, the USSR and China probably considered
that the conference was a fortunate, coincidental development, pro-
vicling a forum at w1h7 ch the outlines of their now look in 1Fr East
tactics could bo rcovoalod most effectively. Peiping currently appoars
to airs at: (a) oroatin ; an ovor-all impression of Chinese Coimeunist
reasonableness, moderation., respect for UN charter provisions, and
readiness to make concessions in ardor to achieve -a reduction of
tensions; (b) soft-pedaling ideological and political dif#orcncos with
non-Corm: munist Asia and stressing 1 nstC tld those things that Asia holds
-14-
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relse 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00A000200030005-1
in cor_ rzon, attempting in the process to make :Peiping; t ho spokesman
for those Pan-Asian considorations; (c) completing the shift from
oarlior "pooplo's diplomacy" to acceptance of constitutod Asian
governments, Japan in particular, and the dovolopaont of more cordial
relations therewith; (d) giving Asia various guarantees that China
will respect existing boundaries and will not interfere in the internal
affairs of its neighbors; (e) wooinr, statosmon such as Nehru, lTronon,
U Mu, Prince Wan, Modharviod Ali, flornulo, Sihanouk, and Ali Sastroanidjo jo;
and (f) attonpting to create an are of neutralism around Communist
China from Japan through Indonesia to India.
C. Chinoso Coruaunist Polic in tho I .l.io(li tc: Tutut,Q
21. It is our judgn'nt that the Chinese will continue essentially
the above tactics for the in; oe'iate future. The USSR will probably
continue to exert a moderating influence on Chinese initiativo in an
effort to insure; the closost coordination of Sino-S>oviot r.?ov:;s. Tho
assurances of Chinese -; yocl behavior which Chou i rave, t, e non-
Corer mist powers at fandi. nr;, constitute an additional inhibiting
influence, since any gross snanifostations of poor faith by the Chinese
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relggse 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R004A000200030005-1
woLd alienate those Asian ;over nonts which Peiping socks most to
attract. Moreover, it is our view, that the Chinese will exorcise
self-rostraint because of a sincere dosire for a period of respite
during which they can improve their military capabilities and sock
to extend Communist influence in Asia by "peaceful" moans.
22. However, Peiping' s moderate policy toward most of Asia will
not rule out continued covert support and guidance to Communist rmove-
r..konts of infiltration and subversion throughout the area. With respect
to Indochina, Peiping will probably continue to profess support of
the C~onova Agreement and will demand its "strict" implenontation. How-
over, we believe that l eiping is prepared to- approve covert Viotr inh
activities in South Vietnam, including introduction ofguerrill_as
from the north to assist "-r.opular" armed action against the Diem ovcrn-
moat, if nocossary, to prevent the consolidation of non-Conrunist
control in that area.
23. With respect to the Taiwan issue the Chinese Communists are
unlikely to put much faith in the prospects of nakin;? progress by
purely peaceful and diplomatic r:a ~kns. They are co: tinuing a rapid
build-up of their air capabilities in East China. Although they will
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For Relese 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79ROQ 4A000200030005-1
probably prolong the present relative cain in anticipation of
negotiations on the Far East after the Sunnit ncotinr:, they will
probably decide eventually that a rosun ption of pressures is
necessary to keep the issue active and to improvo their negotiating
position with. the US.
24. In any event, Co nunist China's negotiations with the US
will proceed slowly. Peiping is un.1ike.y to modify significantly its
present position that only US "interference in China's internal
affairs" is responsible for tensions in the Taiwan area. Peiping will
--
almost certainly continue to rebuff all "two Chili. lr proposals
save perhaps one in which Peiping would have the chief voice as a
trust power. Peiping insight ce ncoivably renounce the use of force
against Taiwan if assured early delivery of the offshore islands.
'iowever, we believe teat Peiping's main objective is to secure the
withdrawal of the US from Taiwan and we believe that Peiping would
be unwilling to accept any arrangenont that left the US..Natic)nalist
position secure on Taiwan. The Cotrminists probably believe that the
US is clotorrdnod to retain a position on Taiwan for the foreseeable
future and that to p r;_.it the issue to rest t,rnO.d only strengthen
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1
 Approved For ReIse 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R0Q&94A000200030005-1
the US resolve while making more difficult the resumption of
Cormmunist pressures at a later date.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMAT , ; 1 A9a
SHERMAN KEPT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
- 18
Approved For Release 2000/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000200030005-1