Probable Consequences of US Actions with Respect to Arms Shipments to Saudi Arabia

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300010002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 17, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 February 195.6
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Probable Consequences of US Actions with
Respect to Arms Shipments to Saudi Arabia
1. General Reaction in the Arab World. All Arab states
(except possibly Iraq) will almost certainly react extremely
adversely to action by the US. in "temporarily suspending"
the shipment of 18 light tanks to Saudi Arabia -,- particularly
in view of the widespread publicity given the action. To most
Arabs, it will serve as dramatic confirmation of their al-
ready strong beliefs that basic US sympathy for Israel as
against the Arabs is an overriding consideration in US policy
toward the Middle East. It will probably also be interpreted as
evidence that the US is at least covertly working with the UK
in the latter's current disputes with the Saudis.
2. While certain Arab regimes, notably those in Iraq
and Jordan, may derive a certain satisfaction from seeing
Saudi Arabia deprived of these weapons, they will probably
be careful to conceal it -- since Arab popular opinion will
almost certainly condemn the move unanimously and vigorously.
3. The move is likely to cancel out much of whatever
Arab good will the US has acquired in recent months by its
refusal to ship ara-ris to Israel. It will provide effective
propaganda ammunition to those who are working against US
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(and Western) efforts to relieve area tensions, such as
the Jordan Valley Development proposal and other US-UK
endeavors to achieve a Palestine settlement. Finally,
the action will strengthen elements in the Arab states who
favor acceptance of Soviet Bloc arms assistance and poli-
tical support ar:airist both Israel and manifestations of
zV stern "imp:; rialism. "
4. Saudi Reaction. Saudi reaction to the move and the
widespread publicity given it will be emotional in the ex-
treme, but a rupture in US-Saudi relations is unlikely.
N? gotiations for renewal of the Dhahran air base concession
(due for renegotiation before June) will almost certainly
become considerably more difficult. There is at least an
even chance that the Saudis will actually insist on termina-
tion of the air base agreement. Saudi relations with
ARAMCO will probably worsen, although the Saudi govern-
ment is not likely to attempt to cancel ARAM.CO's concession.
The Saudi government will attempt to step up in other
Arab states its agitation against US-UK objectives in the
Middle East, and will increase its efforts in the UN and
elsewhere to secure support in its disputes with the UK,
5. If the Saudis estimate that the US decision presages
a settled US policy, it is probable that they will turn to the
S:_7viet Bloc for arms aid. The Saudis will also be increasingly
receptive to standing offers of Bloc political support against
both the UK and Israel.
6. Soviet Bloc Reaction. It is almost certain that the
USSR will move quickly to exploit reactions to the US move.
Its objectives will be to draw Saudi Arabia and other
neutralist-inclined states closer to the Bloc, and to weaken
the V estern ties of others -- notably Iraqi association with
the Baghdad Pact and J:.:jrdan's treaty relations with the UK.
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In its general propaganda, particularly to states receiving
US military aid, the USSR can be expected to reemphasize
that US aid programs carry with them subordination to the
whims of US policy whereas Soviet arms are made avail-
able without prejudice to the independence of the recipient
state. The Soviets will use the incident as evidence of US
faithlessness in backing out of an agreement to provide
weapons which were already paid for; and will suggest that
Iraq, and any other Arab states which cooope%- ate with the
West, can expect similar treatment from the US whenever
their interests clash with those of Israel or the UK..
7. Soviet offers of arms to Saudi Arabia will probably
be renewed promptly, as will similar Bloc offers to other
Arab states. These will probably be followed up with addi-
tional overtures, as for the establishment of diplomatic re-
lations between the Bloc and Saudi Arabia, and Bloc technical
and economic assistance to the Saudis.
8. Israeli Reaction. Initially at least, the B aelis will
regard the US move primarily as evidence that their influence
with the US has not disappeared -- despite their own failure so
far to obtain US arms. Depriving Saudi Arabia of 18 tanks
will not, however, assuage growing Israeli fears of increasing
Arab military strength, and Israel will continue its efforts to
acquire US arms. Accordingly, if the current arms embargo
continues to apply to the Arab States and Israel alike, Israel's
sense of fear and frustration will be increased, and would be
further heightened if Arab reaction to the US move resulted in
the receipt of increased Bloc arms and political support.
9. Consequences-of a Reversal of the US Decision. A US
decision to release the tanks to Saudi Arabia would to some
extent lessen the adverse effects created there and in the rest
of the Arab world by events of yesterday. However, it is doubt -
ful that such a reversal could offset the adverse propaganda
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which will almost certainly be employed by anti-Wec3tern.
Arabs and by the Soviet Bloc. If a reversal of the US decision
were followed by a decision to extend arms to Israel as well,
such a reversal would do virtually nothing to mollify the Arabs.
10. In Saudi Arabia itself, the effects of a US reversal
would depend to some extent not only on how it was done, but
also on what other US concessions were, in prospect. As a
matter of Saudi prestige, however, any reversal of the present
US decision on the arms shipments would probably have to be
as well publicized as the decision of 17 February if it were to
have the desired effect.
FOR THE BOARD OF NA
25X1A9a
SHE-,MAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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