Soviet Response to US Middle East POlicy Declaration

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300030015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: January 15, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
15 January 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR*
SUBJECT: Soviet Response to IS Middle East Policy Declaration
1. The USSR has for some time been fallowing an active
policy in the Middle East and has energetically exploited the
broadened opportunities resulting from the Anglo-French reverse
at Suez. At present, the USSR probably believes: (a) the US
policy declaration in and of itself is not likely to result very
soon in any concrete arrangements with Middle East states which
vmu3.d. call for drastic Soviet counteraction; (b) the declaration
is vulnerable to propaganda attack.
2. Thus, the main Soviet response, at least initially, is
likely to be a major propaganda effort to discredit the US move,
and such an effort has already begun. The USSR will attempt to
convince the countries of the Middle East and Asia that the US is
(a) launching new aggressive militaristic policies which increase
CCI has been consulted in the preparation of this paper,
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tensions and undermine the eonptructive role of the UN; and
(b) attempting to save colonialism by itself taking over (to
its own financial benefit) the privileged position which the UK
and France were forced to relinquish. The particular targets of
this campaign will be Egypt,. Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
The aim will be to dissuade their leaders, or to prevent them as
a result of aroused popular emotions, from responding favorably
to the US initiative.
3, The USSR will also continue those lines of action in
which it was already engaged prior to the US declaration, These
are aimed at denying the area to the influence of the Western.
Powers, breaking up the Baghdad Pact, and convincing othor Middle
East states (notably Jordan) Egypt, and Saudia Arabia) that
cooperation with the US is unnecessary and uprofitable. These
lines of action include:
a. Economic and military aid to Egypt,. Syria, Yemen, and
Afghanistan, and continued efforts to press aid and
trade offers on other Middle East states.
r. Support of ultranationalist subversion against Middle
East governments friendly to the West, in particular
Iraq.
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Diplomatic support and encouragement of Egyptian and
Co
Syrian intransigence and obstructionism on the Suez
issue and on the reopening of pipelines.
d. Similar encouragement to Egypt and Yemen to under-
mine the British position in the Persian Gulf-Arabian
peninsula area.
e. Strong diplomatic and propaganda support of the more
extreme Arab aims against Israel.
f. Diplomatic and propaganda support of India and
Afghanistan in their disputes with Pakistan.
In the context of a developing response to the US declaration
there may be an intensification of these Soviet efforts,
particularly under (a) and (b) above. There are already
indications of increased Soviet support to subversive elements in
IZaq. As Egypt's economic difficulttos mount, the USSR might
make a large offer of financial aid.
L. As opportunities appear, or if the Soviet leaders
conclude that there is a need for more drastic countermeasures
against prospective successes of the neA US policy, they may take
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additional steps in the area. These, although we consider them
unlikely at present, could include:
a. Encouragement of a Syrian-Egyptian takeover in Jordan.
b. Efforts to set; up overt alliances, or more likely,
nonaggression treaties, with Syria, Egypt, or Afghan-
c. Rapid large scale rearmament of Egypt and a marked
step-up in present levels of military aid to Syria,
including provision of substantial numbers of Soviet
technical personnel.
d. A major UN initiative calling for settlement of the
Suez and Palestine problems on Arab terms.
e. A formal offer of military support against a renewal
of "colonialist aggression" in the area,? in effect a
para,'ilel guarantee to that of the US.
5. Diversionary moves in other areas would 4Iso be a
possible Soviet response. Actions of this kind might include:
a. Encouraging a renewal of Chinese Communist military
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pressure in the Far East, at Macao, Hongkong, or the
Off-Shore Islands,
b, Actions in Germany.,, in particular affecting Berlin,
which would have the effect of raising tensions in
Europe.
c. Dramatic diplomatic moves to reduce tensions, in the
form possibly of new proposals on disarmament,
Germany, and European security.
In general, however, we do not believe that the chances for
any of these developments takinf_ place have been increased by
the US declaration on the Middle East.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
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Sherman Kent
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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