Desirability of Interim Revision of Estimate on Soviet Heavy Bomber Strength

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 16, 1957
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001 , F DP79R0090WA000300040011-2
TS #14158.6
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16 May 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR/IN'ELLIGENCE.
SUBJECT: Desirability of Interim Revision of Estimate on
Soviet Heavy Bomber Strength
REFERENCE: OSI/ORR/OCI Memorandum .for the Record
dated 30 April 1957, and attached note by the
DDI
1. Members of the Board and Staff have reviewed the
referenced memorandum and are in general agreement with
its substantive conclusions. We note, however, that the
figures given for heavy bomber strength in operational units
are based on observed deliveries and should be considered
as minimums (see page 5, first paragraph). We note also
that since completion of the referenced memorandum there
has been some evidence, as yet inconclusive, that the
monthly BISON production rate at Plant 23 is at last in-
creasing (see page 1, conclusion b).
2. Based on the available evidence, we believe that
at present there are probably 35-45 BISONs and 30-40 BEARs
in Soviet operational units, as compared to the 11-4-56 pro-
jection of about 90 BISONs and 130 BEARs by mid-1957;
consequently, that in the past year the Soviet heavy bomber
program has again lagged behind our estimates. We agree
that Soviet performance to date calls into question our
estimate that there would probably be about 800 heavy
bombers in operational units by mid-1960. Moreover,
evidence of a continuing high rate of BADGER production
raises the possibility that within a year or so there will be
considerably more than 700 jet medium bombers in operational
units, and consequently that the composition of Soviet Long
Range Aviation may be quite different from that which we have
estimated.
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Approved For Release 2Q DP791 PQA1n300040011-2
 Approved For Releee 201 rRDP79R009t14A000300040011-2
Assistant Director
National Estimates
Approved Fo ease 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040011-2
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T, 6 119
3. The accumulation of evidence to date is not suffi-
cient to permit a resolution of the new problems raised by
these developments. Recent collection suggests that over the
next several months evidence may accumulate, especially
with respect to bomber production, which would place us in
a much better position to answer the questions raised. There-
fore, while a current estimate of something less than 50
BISONs and 50 BEARs in operational units could probably be
coordinated now as an interim correction to the old estimate,
we believe that the more important question of the future
composition of Soviet Long Range Aviation could be answered
at the earliest only after several more months of collecting
evidence and analyzing trends. Moreover, we doubt the ad-
visability of revising and publishing one portion of the estimate
of future Soviet strength out of context with the other military
forecasts normally included in the 11-4 paper, such as the
submarine and guided missile estimates.
4. Recognizing the critical and contentious nature
of the Long Range Aviation estimate, the Board proposes an
alternative approach to the problem, designed to produce a
better overall military estimate in this year's 11-4 paper.
Under this approach, we would call for contributions to the
Long Range Aviation and other key military sections of 11-4
about a month earlier than we had planned or as soon as the
services have made their quarterly revisions as of 1 July
1957. (At present the only firm air force figures are as of
1 April.) Based on past experience, we could expect to re-
ceive these contributions by about the end of July. We would
then schedule the necessary discussions and briefings on criti-
cal points ahead of the normal IAC. representatives' meetings
on 11-4, so as to devote more attention. to these points without
delaying the completion of the estimate. If you approve this
approach, the Board will submit an advanced schedule to the
IAG representatives at an early date.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONA
cys to: AD/RR
AD/SI