Intelligence Appraisal of the Soviet Aerial Inspection Proposal of 26 April

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040012-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 6, 1957
• Content Type: MF

r "s, Approved For Relent' 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R009mpp?
0012-1
T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E ' . AGE ?v'C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ES5,"IMATES
6 Flay 1957
DRAFT IM','ET TORANDUM FOR T !HE DI=OR
S BJECT: Intelligence Appraisal of the oviet Aerial Inspection Proposal
of 26 April
PRODLEMM
In connection with the, preparation of instructions for the Stasse t
delegation in London, the Boasd has been asked for its -views on the fol-louring:
a) an appraisal of the intelligence significance of aer .al. inspection of
Soviet territory as offered in the Soviet memorandum of 26 April; b) sigges-
tins as to what areas of aerial inspection would be more equitable from an
intelligence viewpoint0
1, The Soviet aerial: inspection proposal of 26 April. 1957 would providE,
a,!cesv to Soviet territory east of the 108th degree of EF, long ,tudes roughly
the region east of Lake Baikal, and tror~t of the 25th degree of E. longitude?
roug',1y the small strip of European border region west of a line drawn ~-:hb o.gz
ViIna, The intelligence value of aerial inspection s; the: e areas can be
appraised from two pointg of view, a) To what extent woul.cb it .imt Soviet
capabilities for srn prise attack on the continental US? b) What would it
add to intelligence coverage of the USSR in a general sense?
,06 DOCUMENT ND,
8
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0-
4 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHs NQiED TO. TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATES
AUTHs HR 10.2
't ,
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904O W6t12e'$
 Approved For Rele 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0096000300040012-1
Efffeect on Capabilities for Surprise Attack
2,, Coverage of the small strip of territory on the western border of
the USSR would be of little or no sigai#.'icance for intelligence bearing on
Soviet capabilities for sur?-rise attack,, Access to the territory east of
Lake Baikal,, however? would provide surveillance of areas 4iiehs given the
present capabilities of Soviet long-range aviation1 are probably easentiai
for effective surprise attack on the continental US. The northeastern U SR
is the area closest to the US and in view of the range of present Soviet
aircraft is the logical staging area for approaches to the. wet-.torn half of
the continental US,, where many strategic tarots are located, Denial of the
northeastern territory for launching of aerial attack on the US would also
narrow the funnel of approach to the continental US and thus tend to simplify
the US air defense problem,
3., Whether aerial inspection would in fact deny the area for launching
of aerial attack on the US is another question. This urruid depend or the
conditions and frequency of access and these are not
rent. Soviet proposal, A relatively small part of Soviet long-rango a iaticx
is permanently stationed in the area and it woiLld al ay:; :; p^ucible to move
these forces into or out of the area at short. no:;ice