Agrarian Reform and Internal Security in South Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 30, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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Isom
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
30 April 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT; Agrarian Reform and Internal Security in South Vietnam
1, The moderately favorable outlook for South Vietnam projected
in NIE 63-56,, "Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam through
Mid-1957", 17 July 1956, remains generally valid. However, while the
government has dealt with the major threats to its continued existence,,
much remains to be done to improve local security. Moreover, the
government has only recently begun to concern itself with basic economic
problems. The government apparently is aware that the resolution of
certain facets of its economic problem,, namely agrarian reform and
resettlement of refugees,, are essential steps to the establishment of
effective Security in the rural areas. As conditions improve,, the allure
of banditry and membership in one of the remnant groups of the sects'
guerrilla fighters will diminish and the capabilty of the Communist
underground to subvert the peasants will be lessened.
DECLASSIF"fED-~ u
CLASS, CHANGED TO TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70.2
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REVIEWER: 0U8
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2. Present internal security problems in South Vietnam are of a
local nature and come from scattered Viet Cong, (Vietnamese Communists)
sect and bandit bands* The 5,000 to 82000 Viet Cong and perhaps 2,000
sect remnants assumed to exist in the country are widely dispersed and
are probably not capabl(h of more than local harassment of government
forces and local populations. Areas posing the most serious security
problem are the sparsely populated border regions and the Ca Mau and
Plaine des Jones regions in the south. Continued government security
operations will probably result in further dispersal and neutralization
of these forces in the next few months. The nature of the security threat
posed by the Viet Cong has changed in the past year from a primarily
paramilitary one to subversion and counter-propaganda.
3. However., the government has not yet reorganized its security
services to eliminato excessive duplication and to provide effective
local control mechanisms. The mission of the civil security services
is to prevent intimidation and infiltration by Communist elements and
to intervene readily in local internal security disturbances. Rcsponsi-
bility for the prevention phase belongs primarily to the Self Defense
Official South Vietnam government fi;ur~..s are; 'Viet Gong, less than
2,000; sects, less than 1,000.
S0
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Corps;, the Municipal Police,, and the newly formed Vietnamese Bureau
of Investigation. The Civil Guard, a quasi-military organization
under the Department of the 'Interiors is charged with responsibility for
local intervention. In practice, the functions of these services overlap
with each other and with the Vietnamese National Army which is theoretically
responsible for resistance to 6xterna1 agressiony but is in many areas
the only government _?orce sufficiently trained and equipped to maintain
security. In this situation characterized by inadequate defenses against
Communist subversion and dissident activities agrarian reform measures
are particularly important as a means of establishing the basic requisite
for security .- a loyal population.
4. An agrarian reform program was initiated in early 1955, but
initially was limited to measures designed to improve conditions of
tenancy by providing for lower rentals and tenure security contracts,
The program also included provisions for some tax relief and extension
of farm credit. A comprehensive agrarian reform program was launched
in October 1956 when the proclamation of Ordinance No. 57 decreed the
breaking up of estates over 300 acres and provided for the transfer to
the government of all rice land thus released. Peasants may then purchase
land from the government, taking six years to pay. The program is int ended to
to be self..supporting after the first year. So far only token land
transfers involving 2,000 tenants and 123000 acres have taken place.
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To achieve momentum in its program of agrarian reforms the
government's essential problem is to transfer the revolutionary impetus
of early agrarian reform measures into bureaucratic machinery for
continuing implementation of the program. It must also successfully
cope with such specific problems as reluctant landowni.ers, many of whom
are important government officials; inadequate transportation;,
inexperienced administrators, and lack of clear channels for carrying out
land reform measures. Approximately three million people, including the
country's remaining unintegrated refugee population of 170x000, will be
affected by the implementation of land transfers tenure security contracts
and the special land development projects,
6. Despite these problems,, the prospects for agrarian reform in
South Vietnam arc considerably brighter than a year ago. The first
concentrateds continuing economic leadership was established in December 1956
by the elevation of Nguyen Ngoc Tho, reportedly a capable administrators
to the vice presidency and the delegation to him of responsibility for
economic matters including land development projects. Ordinance No.
57 provided the essential implementing law for the completion of agrarian
reform. Refugee resettlement on plots of land defined by the agrarian
reform program is scheduled to be completed and the villages integrated
into the government's provincial administrative apparatus by the end of
this year,
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AMOK
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7. In conjunction with its agrarian reform program, the government /
is seeking to resettle reliable peasants on abandoned land in areas
particularly susceptible to Communist su':bbversion. At present four
special project areas -- Cal San in the southwest, Ca Mau in the south,
the Plaino des Jones district in the west, and the Ear, Me Thuot area in
mountainous central Vietnam -- have been chosen as pilot sites for the
establishment of substantial settlements. The success of the Cal San
project, which w as implemented last year, has had an important
stabilizing influence on the surrounding country and has attracted some
35,000 voluntary settlers in addition to the approximately 45,000
roftzgooe ro ottled there. The Ca Mau and Plaine des Joncs areas
are the two most important remaining centers of Communist strength. The
Communist threat in these areas is primarily one of subversion, counter.
propaganda and intimidation of the local populace. Land development,
while not a final answer to this threat, is a necessary first step to
establishment of security in the area.
8. The Ban Me Thuot area may prove to be the most difficult of
solution. The Viet Minh controlled large areas of the mountain country
(Pays Montagnard du Sud - PMS) for several years and during; that time
indoctrinatod many of the mountain peoples In addition, the Vietnamese
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regard the mountain tribes as cultural inferiors and have not made a
serious effort to gain their confidence,
However, the central government
is apparently at least aware of these problems, and, while Ban Me Thuot
resettlement will probably proceed at a slow pace,, the government will
probably be able to create a :relatively stable community there within the
next two years ?
Prospects
9., Barring major disasters, the land transfer program, the tenure
security program and land development projects will probably be largely
completed by 1960, Refugee rekettlement will probably be completed by
the end of 1957? The increased agricultural production resulting from
these programs will probably not be great enough within the next
few years to significantly affect the economic situation of the country.
However, the completion of these programs will significantly improve
the standard of living of the country's peasants and provide a firm
basis for maintenance of internal security.
25X1A9a
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
# the invitation of the South Vietnam government,, the British Adviser
on Aborigines, Federation of Malaya, toured the PMS country in August
1956 and submitted a detailed report, including policy recommendations,
of security conditions In the PMS to the South Vietnam government.
App 6? I ~U ~/( '~E 4af tf~ ~"3*b j iy
to provincial a strators, bu app ear
implemented thus far?