The Argentine Situation

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040017-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: April 19, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL I: N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
19 April 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: The Argentine Situation
1. Thus for the Provisional Government of the armed forces,
headed by General Aroraburu, has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to
survive periodic crises during the 17 months of its cxistenco. As the
regime enters the last year of its temporary receivership, it still faces
serious political and economic prc.blerus, and we believe it will
become increasingly vulnerable to overthrow. The dilemma of this
essentially conservative regime is that it has committed itself to
general elections in February 1958, but no strong,; party or coalition
with which it is in sympathy and to whom it would be willing to transfer
power has emerged. The leftist leader of the Radical Party, Arturo
Fronclizi, is still the chief contender for the Presidency in are election.
Army elements within the regime are atrotig;ly opposed to Frondizi, who
they believe would head a nationalistic, 1&:yor-oriented government.
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2. It. this situation, the present regime might attempt to
delay the February elections. This could be done by slowing clown the
revision of the Ccnatitution, now scheduled to take place from
September to mid-Nover.iber, by a Constituent Assembly to be elected
this July. Alternatively, it night attempt to rig elections against
Frondizi. As a last resort, array elements within the regime might
attempt to depose Arauburu and forestall elections.
3.
On the other hand, it appears that civilian and military
sentiment for elections is fairly widespread. Ant zgonism to efforts
on the part of the regime blatantly to rig or further to delay elections
might therefore precipitate its overthrow. Hence:, should it appear
that sentiment for a duly constituted govern:, ent io so strong that any
military action to forestall elections would precipitate widespread
internal disorder, the military might feel compelled to go aLead with
elections even if it meant Frc;ndizi's victory.
4. The Aramburu regime, which inherited a prostrate economy
from Perot., has thus far been unable either to increase agricultural
production for export, to attract foreign capital, or to halt Argentina's
deteriorating financial situation. i-irgely for political reasons, it
recently abandoned a proposed austerity program in favor of minimal
remedial actions designed merely to stall off the impending financial
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crisis until after the presidential elections. Assuming these economic
policies continue and that elections are actually held, any new govern-
ment will almost certainly be faced immediately with a seriously
weakened financial position and a balance of payments crisis.
5. The most recent estimate on Argentina? NIE 91-56 dated
17 July 1956, for the most part remains valid. We continue to feel
that there are great obstacles to an. orderly transfer of bower to a
constitutional regine, particularly since a nodora vo-conservative
coalition sympathetic to the provisional regime's ~,wri social and
economic predilections has not er.erged. We believed last suomer
that the chances for an orderly transition were somewhat better
than even; we now believe the chances are somewhat reduced. The
forthcoming elections for the Constituent Asserbly will precipitate
widespread and intense political activity. As the situation develops,
the Provisional Government's area of maneuver will become more clearly
visible. In whatever way the problem of el-xtiors is resolved, a
period of strain and possibly of turbulence lies ahead. Even if
rightist forces should Successfully attempt to prevent the emergence
of a constitutional regime, we continue to believe that such a
solution would be temporary and that any authoritarian regime would
have tc: give way to one enjoying mass support.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25X1A9a
SHERMAN KENT
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