The Soviet Position in the Middle East

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040018-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: April 17, 1957
• Content Type: MF

:Approved For Relea*2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO090 0003000400
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G N C J ; A G E N C Y
17 April 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intolli,g*a ce
SUBJECT: The Soviet Position in the Middle East
1. When the Soviet offensive in the Middle bast began two or
tps? e yeare ago, many observers feared that it would overrun all
the neutrali?3t states of the area and at least partially negate
Wostern efforts to strengthen the stability and defansivs capabilitieo
of those countries already committed to the West. With the actual
unfolding of the Soviet campaign, however, the threat has become more
specific and., at least for the prasent, more limited. The USSR has
gained important lodgments .n the area, but in the process it has
alienated various of the neutralist states, reinforced the anti-
Soviet outlook of most of the pro-Western countries, and general..ly
reduced its .fr odam o.~" action in the area,
Advantages in the Soviet Position
7
2. The Soviet Union has been accepted as a friend and collabo tator
by Egypt which occupies a key role in the Middle Last,, and has also
developed profitable ties with Syria and Yemen. Soviet material sup-
-3
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
]( DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70.2
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP74 9 AU0-030964t -v
.i l~9S,
 Approved For Rele 2001/03/04 ;CIA-RDP79R009A000300040018-5
port and encouragement to these countries in their efforts to ex-
clude Western influence from the area has facilitated the con-
solidation of Egypt's de facto control over the Suez Canal, the
tacit scrapping of the Suez base agreement. and the elimination
of British military forces and bases from Jordan. It has also greatly
strengthened the indigenous pressure against the remaining Middle
"stern redoubts of Britain and France in the Persian Gulf and North
Africa.
3. In its support of Nasser and his allies, the USSR has be-
come a champion of Arab nationalism in its opposition to Israel and
the West and has almost eertaia.]y impressed all elements in the area
with the value of its support. Even if Nasser and other leaders
presently cooperating with the USSR should be overthrown, the power-
ful currents of ultranationalism in the area would continue to provide
the USSR with important opportunities for continuing in this role.
i. The new situation in the Middle East, which the Soviet Union
has helped create, has for the first time given the USSR "big power"
status within the area and has at the same time weakened Western
unity both within the area and on a broader international level.
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040018-5
 Apprlved For ReleaW 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79RO090 000300040018-5
Disadvantages in the Soviet Position
Thi USSR's succoas in developing special ties with Egypt,
Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan has alienated regional rivals and
created fears of Communist domination both in the countries con-
cerned and in the area as a whole. King Saud's suspicions of
Egyptian and Soviet intentions and his desire for US friendship
have increased sharply. He has also moved toward closer cooperation.
with Hashimite Iraq and thrown his weight against the leftists in
Syria and Jordan. Lebanon, Libya, and Tunisia have reacted to grow-
ing Soviet-Egyptian pressures and influence by publicly announcing
their intention to stand with the West. The Baghdad Pact nations'
opposition to Haase' has grown proportionately to the Egyptian
leader's success. Even Afghanistan, oldest and most pampered of
the Soviet targets, has officially accepted the American Doctrine
and moved toward a rapprochement with Pakistan.
6. The clear-.cut association of Soviet "big power" military
strength with the leaders of militant Arab nationalism has on-
couraged a new assertion of direct American interest in the area, of
which the USSR has already shown itself derp4.y apprehensive. The US
declaration that Communist aggression in Vie area will be met by
force has reduced the future effectiveness of the Soviet technique of
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040018-5
 -Approved For Relea2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R0090'b00300040018-5
threat which (in the eyes of the Arabs at least) was responsible
for halting the British-French-Israeli intervention in Egypt last
November.
7. Finally, the Soviet effort to win the confidence of Middle
East governments has necessitated the avoidance of proselytizing
activities on the part of Soviet technicians and similar circum-
spection in support of local Communists in many cases. While the
influx of Soviet goods and personnel into the Middle East has led
to increased acceptance and sympathy toward the USSR and has pro-
vided an expanded-basis for future Communist penetration it has not
as yet led to major increases in current Soviet subversive capabilities.
Thus for the present, at ate rate, the USSR's position; in the area
is largely dependent on marriages of convenience with movements and
Individuals over which the USSR has no real controls Arab nationalism
is an emotional and often irresponsible force which has as yet
developed little internal cohesion or steadiness. At times the
governments which espouse it probably provide almost as manor head-
aches to the USSR as they did to the West in the latter's previous
attempt to cooperate with them. Additional threats to the USSR's
position are contained in the latest conflicts of interest between
the 'Middle East states accepting its aid and in the continuing presence
of internal opposition to these governments and. their pro-Soviet policies,
-h-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040018-5
 Approved For Relea''2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79R0090000300040018-5
..r
Lumamrz
8. On balance, therefore, it appears that the USSR has found
in extremist Arab nationalism a dynamic instrument whica could make
Moscow's influence decisive in the whole Middle East. At the same
time, however, the Communist-Naticnalist alliance has provoked a
reaction which could eventually undercut the ultranationalist
position and reduce or wipe out present Soviet gains. This reaction,
significantly, is centered in those ccuntries which contain the
Western-controlled oil resources and military bases or alliances
which are Moscow's primary targets.
-5-
Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040018-5