Some Long-range Threats to Burma

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000300040020-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 1998
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 8, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I V B 1 4 O F , A G E N C I
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIM TES
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRt B;`IC . (Draft)
S't1B. FDT: Some Long-range Threats to Burma
8 April 195?
ID At presents the political situation in Burma is relatively
calm and stable Prime Minister U Nu has returned to office with less
freedom of action than he enjoyed before his resignation and has promised
to coordinate future major policy decisions with the Burma Socialist
Party faction of the governing AFPFL coalition. The disagreement
between U Nu and Kyaw Nyein9 which threatened the unity of the governnaent9
apparently has been patched up fac the time being. The provisional
settlement of the Chinese-Burmese border dispute reached last fall has
not been finalized9 but the tension the dispute generated has largely
subsided. There has been some slight modification in the government?s
general policies and international orientation in the direction of a
stiffer attitude toward the Bloc and internal Communism. The government
has announced its decision to out rice shipments under the barter
agreements with the Bloc to about one-fourth of last years thereby
reducing Burma ? e increasing economic dependence on the Bloc 6 An aid
and loan agreement of-$25 million has been reached with the US which
DOCUMENT NO. I
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AUTH: HR 10.2
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will probably further reduce Bloc influence.
Although Burma's
economic development continues to be very slow and its financial
condition has deteriorated during the past year, the country appears to
be in no serious danger of economic collapse, With the return of
a rice seller?s market in 1957, the economic situation will probably
improve.
2. But beneath the surface there are a number of factors which
pose serious threats to Burma's continued political stability,
Perhaps the most immediate of these is the general decline in law
and order over the past several months. Both ordinary banditry
and organized insurgent activity have increased markedly and the
military and police authorities appear to be unable or unwilling to
cope with the situation. The general decline in internal security
is impeding normal commercial activity and contributing to public
demcralization and disillusionment. If the situation does not improve,,
or grows worse, the government's prestige and political support will
certainly diminish,, and public pressure for negotiation with insurgent
groups will probably increase
3. Over the longer rune perhaps the most important threat
to the government is the National United Front (NUF)s a coalition of
leftist and Communist parties including the Burma Worker's and Peoples
Party. It is the principal opposition party and it made significant
t
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eaine in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies last April, The
NUF wine were probably due primarily to a growing public dissatisfaction
with the AFPFL and the widespread corruption among government officials.,
U Nu resigned as Prime Minister last spring ostensibly to reorganize
and clean up the AFP 'L, It does not appear likely that he has accow,
pl.ished much along that lineb Unless there is some imp:rovemcnt in the
standards of efficiency and honesty in government and in the general
level of economic welfare there is a danger that over a period of two
or three years the AFPFL may lose much of its popular support to the NUF4
There is also a danger that the AFPFL9 to achieve leftist unity..,
me accept Communist dominated individuals or parties into its ranks
or into the cabineto
Dissension within the Uuz^mese arm is increasing, This is
due primarily to tension between the old line career officers., many of
whom are Anglo=Uurmaris or me, ers of ethnic minority groups,, and officers
sponsored by the Socialist party in its & f ozLt to gain control of the
army. In the April elections there was a considerable NUF vote in army
unite., Probably this was mostly a protos?t vote based on dissatisfaction
with government corruption and with government political activities in
the army, However, if dissension within the arm contint ee', its
limited capabilities may be impaired.
Over the past several years there has been a steadily
increasing infiltration of Chinese into bur n, soc a of them agents
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carrying forged documcnt3. Although there is no accurate count of these
illegal entrantea the embassy now estimates the overseas Chinese
residents in Bursae at I4OO OOO to 5OD,ooO in contrast to estimates of
3009000 shortly after World War h o The recent Chinese arrivals have
fanned out over north and central Burma, settling down and opening
businesses in the toms and villages. Some have settled in Rangoon
There the Bank of China to reportedly advancing than money to buy up
-sal estate and rice millsn and to of en businesses,, In additions,
.Chinese diplomatic missions in Rangoon and Lashio have been effectively
reorganiti.ng the overseas Chinese Cciamunitises, The Burmese government
has not been able to cope with this illegal immigration., and even a
satisfactory settle tent of the border dispute will probably not and
-the problemo
6. The Communist insurgents have recently stepped up their
terrorist activities and staged a nmber of spectacular raids a
Probably the insurgents are using violence to remain in the public, oy'a
and to increase pressures un the goverment to negotiate with them? We
do not believe the insi gents have the capability for- a suet fined
increase in guerrilla activity, Be-varths1essp they are capable of
disrupting economic ?autivity tnd administration in many parts of
Burmao Although U Nu has stated that the government. will not
negotiate with the Communist tnsurgente, he has promised to moderate the
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NINOW
Penalties and legalize the political organizations of those surrendering
with their arms. Over a period of time the Communist insurgents may
be able to inconvenienea the government sufficiently to win concessions
which would auaw them to vege their battle above ground and by
political mean.
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