SOVIET MOTIVES IN SEEKING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 17, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
17 March 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Soviet Motives in Seeking a Summit Conference
CONCLUSIONS
1, We believe that the USSR strongly desires a Summit Conference;
its primary objective is a relaxation of tensions which would reduce
the danger of thermonuclear war and facilitate the current Soviet
strategy of peaceful competition. The USSR probably believes that
this objective mould be furthered both by the very fact of a meeting
at the Summit, and by agreement on one or more issues which the
Soviets probably have conauded can--sooner or later--be resolved an
terms favorable to them. The Soviet leaders probably estimate that
even if they do not succeed in getting a conference, they will profit
by being the power which sought negotiations, in contrast to the
nintransigeantn attitude of the US.
2. However, the rigidity of the Soviet position on substantive
issues suggests that the USSR hopes primarily to create a general
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atmosphere of detente, rather than to settle many of the outstanding
issues which divide East and West. Nevertheless, it probably expects
that the growing Western pressures for accommodation, together with
potential divergmOies among the Western allies, can be exploited to
make progress toward at least implicit Western recognition of the
status quo in Eastern Europe, some form of limited disengagement in
Central Europe, and a nuclear test ban.
I. SOVIET MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES IN SEEKING A SUMMIT CONFERENCE
3. The drum-fire of Soviet notes and letters--a sort of public
pre-Summit negotiation - -together with the substantive rigidity of the
Soviet position suggest that the Soviets think that the value of a
conference for them lies primarily not in settlements made or agree-
ments reached, but in the general impact which the conference may have
on world opinion. The USSR is interested primarily in creating an
atmosphere of detente without a broad series of compromise settlements
on key issues dividing East and West.
Soviet pressure for a large
conference, preferably with neutrals represented, as well as for an
early meeting without extended prior consultations, tend to buttress
this view, The Soviets seek to picture themselves as the foremost
advocate of relaxed international tensions, in contrast to the alleged
intransigeant stance and war preparations of the West--and in particular
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of the US. Whether or not the conference were to take place, the
Soviets would expect to profit substantially by exploitation of appar-
ent Western reluctance or refusal to negotiate and to work for lessening
the danger of mar.
Ii. Apart from seeking a general relaxation of tensions, the
Soviets probably hope to find some give in the Western position on
certain issues, particularly a ban on nuclear tests and disengagement
in Central Europe. They probably regard the growing interest in many
European quarters in these proposals, reflecting general Western
European desire for a broad detente, as creating pressure on the US.
In this connection, the Soviet leaders appear to believe that their
own recent satellite and ICBM achievements have given them a pro-
nounced political advantage, Thich they are seeking to exploit.
Whether or riot they originally intended to press hard for a Summit
meeting when they first broached the idea in December, the favorable
reaction of world opinion has subsequently encouraged them. By urging
such a conference, the Soviets apparently hope to capitalize on the
advantages of having taken this initiative and to probe potential
weaknesses or divergencies in the Western position. They appear
hopeful that growing pressures in the West for accommodation, and
their own present position of strength, will force the Western powers
to compromise on some issues on which the USSR desires an agreement.
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5. We believe that the Soviet maneuvers in connection with a
Summit Conference reflect a lively concern over reducing the threat
of nuclear war. The Soviet leadershipts present air of confidence
that the USSR is outstripping the West is probably tempered by the
realization that a cataclysmic nuelear Conflict is the one event which
could most quickly and decisively frustrate all their hopes. We
believe that despite their own growing deterrent power they greatly
fear war by miscalculation, for example, in the event of another up-
rising in Eastern Europe. Moreover, if the East-West tensions could
be made less acute, the underdeveloped countries would probably
become less wary and hence more susceptible to Soviet political in-
fluence and economic penetration, and divisions among the Western
allies might grow. Thus the current Soviet politico-economic strategy
would be served.
6. The Soviet leaders are also seeking to offset the impetus to
Western countermeasures evoked by the recent Soviet technological
successes. Though confident of their own long term ability to outstrip
the West, they realize that their present favorable position may be
only transitory. They are concerned over such developments as the
accelerated US defense buildup, the prospective stationing of IRBMs
around the Bloc periphery, and Western efforts to strengthen the
various regional alliances.
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7. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders or Khrushchev
personally feel under any strong domeStic pressure it seeking a
Summit Conference. A Srmmit Meeting And Soviet suocesses in working
for "peace" would probably enhance the popularity of the regime at
home and might permit devoting more 'eSources to domestic uses. Of
cource Khrushchev would almost certainly like the resultant fillip
to his prestige and position from a successful Summit meeting. But
these are not primary Soviet motives in our view.
II. PROBABLE SOVIET POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES
8, The Soviet leaders clearly hope that a Summit meeting would
again, as in July 19552 establish a widely accepted picture of East-
West aocord and lessened danger of war --even though no solution of
basic East-West issues had been achieved. But if at least agreements
in principle could be reached on one or more issues, it would enhance
the resulting climate of detente, and offer opportunities for further
propaganda and political moves. We believe that the Soviets do expect
to make some progress toward agreement on certain issues, which are
discussed below.
9. Status, quo in Eastern Europe. In view of their evident
sensitivity over the situation in Eastern Europe, the Soviets are
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placing considerable stress on securing at least implicit Western
recognition of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. They are adamantly
refusing to discuss the SatelliteS,, and their proposals for an atom-
free zone in Central Europe, mutual troop reductions, a German peace
treaty, and a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty would All con-
tribute to formalizing the Eastern European status quo.
10. Disengagement in Europe. The Soviet proposals for dis-
engagement are also aimed at reducing the capabilities of the NATO
forces. Such a reduction is probably viewed by the Soviets as en-
couraging the withdrawal of US and UK forces from the NATO shield, and
as limiting Western ability to intervene effectively in the case of
another Satellite explosion. Three related proposals are being
advanced by the USSR: (a) the Rapacki Plan for a de-nuclearized
zone in Central Europe; (b) a thinning out of conventional forces in
Germany and possibly elsewhere in Europe; and (c) a non-aggression
pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations, designed to reassure
Western Europe that there is no direct Soviet threat. The Soviets
may believe that there is a good chance of eventually gaining agree-
ment on some variant of the Rapacki Plan in view of the wide interest
it has aroused in Western Europe. They appear willing to pay some
price for such an agreement in terms of willingness to deny themselves
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forward bases for nuclear weapons, to accept some controls, and to
withdraw some forces. We do not believe, however, that the USSR
would be milling to withdraw all of its forces from Eastern Europe.
11. German Reunification. Moreover, the Soviets are highly
unlikely to permit any disengagement scheme to be linked to German
reunification.
One reason for Soviet insistence upon the participa-
tion of others than the Big Four in a Summit meeting is to undercut
Western arguments for discussion of Germany on the basis of continua-
tion of the Geneva discussions. In fact, the Soviet proposals on
disengagement and for discussion of a German peace treaty with the
GDR and Federal Republic present, seem designed to promote continued
division of Germany. The Soviets may eventually agree to discussion
of the German question, but they would probably simply reiterate
their present stand,
12. Nuclear Test Ban and Disarmament Measures. The Soviets
wish agreement on a nuclear test suspension, and if possible a ban on
use of nuclear weapons, which they believe would inhibit the West's
use of its nuclear deterrent power. kmbassador Thompson has suggested
that in view of the campaign the Soviets have conducted on this issue,
they mould also regard a test ban agreement as greatly enhancing
their prestige. We have estimated that the Soviets would at least
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initially abide by a test suspension. They would probably be milling
to accept some limited test monitoring. They might even accept some
zone of mutual inspection for .prevention of surprise attack.
13. The most recent Soviet statements indicate that the Kremlin
regards US proposals for control of space weapons as an effort to
apply controls in a field where the USSR is ahead. Moscow will almost
certainly continue to tie this propbsal to liquidation of foreign
military bases. We doubt that the USSR expects much progress toward
Summit agreement on these issues, but it will exploit them to keep
up pressure for US withdrawals.
14. Reduction of Tensions in the Middle East and Far East.
Notwithstanding Soviet proposals to "reduce tensions" in the Middle
East, we doubt that the USSR is willing to trade any concessions in
this area for Western concessions on other issues. Instead the Kremlin
seems to be after some form of broad agreed limitation on great power
intervention in the area which would facilitate Soviet penetration and
encourage neutralism. Therefore the USSR will probably repeat its
call for a great power pledge not to "interfere" in the area, and
possibly also not to ship any more arms to Middle East countries.
Though the Soviets probably would not expect such agreements to be
reached, the sheer fact of East-West discussion would serve the Soviet
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aim of forcing Western recognition of the Soviet right to participate
in great power decisions affecting the Middle East. As for Far Eastern
issues, Soviet failure to propose these issues for Summit discussion
suggests that the TISSR desires not to allow the US to avoid a Summit
Conference because of our position in Communist China.
1.5. Other Measures to Reduce Tensions. The Soviets have also
advanced other proposals tito reduce international tensions ?" In
calling for relaxation of trade controls, the Soviets are capitalizing
on the unpopularity of such restrictions in many. Western countries.
They probably expect to encourage further relaxation of controls and
thus to benefit from greater access to Western technology. As bait
they will offer vague promises of greater trade. Similarly, the
Soviets are seeking to claim the initiative, and to appear as more
cooperative than the US, in promoting cultural and other exchanges.
They have called for an end to war propaganda, charging the West with
permitting statements which allegedly propagandize the idea of pre-
ventive war. Any Western efforts to reach agreement on this point
might later be exploited as admission of previous guilt.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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