MORALE ON THE MAJOR OFFSHORE ISLANDS AND ON TAIWAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030023-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 29, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13 :CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030023-2
CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
29 August 195II
MENDRANDUM FOR fiHE DIRECTOR OF CENTR4I, INTELLIGENCE
SUBSECT: Morale on the Ma3or Off shore Islands and on Taiwan
1. Troop morale on the Chin-mens is probably good at present,
and we do not expect it to become a mayor problem during the next
week or so. The recently reported lift in marale of the troops on
Chin men was probably due to a release of the tension built up
over a long period of watching and waiting for something to happen.
However, their morale will eventually deteriorate if the Chinese
Communists continue or intensify their present level of bombard-
meet and interdiction efforts and the Nationalist troops see no
evidence of effective retaliation. US participation in the
protection of the supply of the Chin-mens would have a beneficial
effect on morale, but would probably not in itself prevent an even-
tual decline if the Chinese Communists continued to maintain heavy
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2. On the Matsus, although there is little information on
present morale, we believe that the response of Nationalist troops
to sustained Chinese Communist bombardment and interdiction efforts
would be similar to that of the Chin-men garrisons,
3. In the event of landings in force in the Matsus o.r the
Chi_ n-mens, morale and military discipline in either island group
would probably hold up, in the early stages at least. Even limited
US combat actions in the defense of the islands would help sustain
the morale of the defenders. However, if the defense effort seemed
hopeless, the Nationalist troops would probably not resist to the
last man. If such landings were to occur following a period of
effective supply interdiction and sustained bombardment, and if
rescue or reinforcement did not seem imminent, the defenders would
be likely to give up readily.
I~. Morale on Taiwan has been under gradual attrition, especially
during the last two years. GRC leaders have shown increased sensi-
tivity to the Free Worlds growing acceptance of Peiping, and, even
more, to actions which they consider signs of lessening US opposition
to Communist China. These developments have seemed to be reflected
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on Taiwan both in a greater sense of frustration among top
Nationalist officials, and in a greater resignation to the reali-
ties of the situation among other Nationalists. On the other hand,
a by-product of Communist Chinas current aggressiveness has been
the hope it has almost certainly bxought to Nationalist leadership
that the US may at last commit itself to the defense of the off-
shore islands and thereby increase its commitment to the total GRC
cause. Taipeits efforts to make the most of this situation are
indicated in its exaggerated reporting of Chinese Communist actions
and its urging US forces to carry out military missions which it
could itself undertake.
5. The morale of Nationalist leaders on Taiwan will remain good
as long as they believe that there is a good chance that the US
will give them the support necessary to hold the offshore islands,
If these leaders came to believe that the US would not defend these
islands, their morale would drop fast and far. Actual loss of these
islands would under any circumstances have a severe effect on
Nationalist morale. The impact of such a loss mould be of the great-
est severity if the US withheld its support and the Chinese
Nationalist troops stationed on the islands were defeated by a
-3-
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Chinese Communist assault. The impact of the loss would be of
less severity if the troops were evacuated with US assistance. In
any case, the Nationalist governments if it is to survive, would
require new and convincing demonstrations that the US was still
determined to protect Taiwan and to preserve the GRC~s international
position. Were these demonstrations given, we feel that, in general,
the previous judgments of the intelligence community would still
apply and that the Nationalists would not fold upo
3~ NIE 3-2- "The Prospects for the Government of the Republic
of China" (27 August 1957)., and NIE 100-i~/1-55: "~Orale on
Taiwan" (16 April 1955).
FOR THE DOA OF NATIONAL ESTIP~TESs
SHEI~4AN KFSTT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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